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Abstract 
The thesis examines the political economy of trade policy reform in post-apartheid 
South Africa. It challenges mainstream accounts of contemporary trade policy in 
South Africa, which have advanced a solely economic rationale to explain the policy 
choices made by the ANC governments since 1994. The thesis argues that, far more 
than these accounts concede, international and domestic political economy 
considerations have also played a central part in the ANC governments' calculations 
to undertake trade reform to the degree it has. Trade reform in South Africa has been 
the linchpin of a global adjustment strategy pursued by the domestic political elites by 
which they have sought to fulfill South Africa's global, regional and domestic 
political and economic objectives. 
At the global level, the South African state has vigorously pursued trade liberalisation 
in order to shed its past image of international pariah and reintegrate itself into the 
global economy on the basis of outward-oriented growth. Restoring South Africa's 
international political respectability has been as important as reversing its economic 
marginalisation in the international division of labour. At the regional level, the 
South African state has used trade policy reform as a foreign economic policy tool not 
only to rebuild political and diplomatic relations with African countries strained 
during the apartheid era - but also to advance its hegemonic ambitions, particularly in 
Southern Africa, as well as reinforce the region's ability to engage with the forces of 
economic globalisation. The extent to which South Africa's regional hegemonic 
ambitions can be achieved, however, lies ultimately with how adeptly the country can 
reconcile these regional aspirations with its domestic pressures. 
At the domestic level, trade reform has been deployed by the decision-making elites 
not only to lock in the government's austere macroeconomic policy but also to curtail 
the power of domestic interests that have benefited from trade protectionism in the 
past. In return for their co-operation, the South African state has allowed these 
interests, notably business and labour, enhanced institutional representation in 
economic policymaking. In this sense trade policy has been employed to serve 
domestic as much as foreign political and economic policy ends. 
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Introduction 
The re-acceptance of South Africa into the international community in 1994 
represented a watershed in the country's trade history. By signing on to the 
Marrakesh Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
1994, South Africa signalled its commitment not only to liberalise its trade policies in 
accordance with the rules-based international trading regime, but also to restore its 
trade rights and formalise its credentials as a fully-fledged trading nation following 
many years of operating beyond the GATT disciplines. ' Through its membership of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), South Africa has committed itself to a 
systematic opening up its economy to foreign competition and promoting exports and 
inward investment to support growth and employment. 
Most accounts of trade policy in post-apartheid South Africa have employed almost 
exclusively economic rationale to explain trade reform undertaken by the African 
National Congress (ANC) governments since 1994. This research examines the 
shortcomings of these economic analyses in understanding the reasons for trade 
policy reform in democratic South Africa. Although economic explanations are 
undoubtedly pertinent and germane, they do not tell whole story about South Africa's 
trade reform trajectory. It is to the elaboration of the central argument of the thesis 
this introductory chapter now turns. 
Alan Hirsch, "From the GATT to the WTO: The Global Trade Regime and its Implications for South 
Africa, " in Gregg Mills, Alan Begg and Anthoni van Nicuwkerk (eds. ), South Africa in thc' Global 
Economy (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 41. 
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1. The Argument 
This thesis challenges mainstream accounts of trade policy in post-apartheid South 
Africa. 2 These analyses overlook the importance of international and domestic 
political economy factors in explaining trade policy reform in contemporary South 
Africa. The focus of most economic studies on South African trade policy has been 
largely on "whether import substitution, export promotion, or inward industrialisation 
is the correct trade policy approach. "3 The debate has, therefore, placed a 
disproportionate emphasis on economic explanations of trade policy at the expense of 
other crucial considerations such as the role of power in the world economy, the 
dynamic interaction between domestic and international politics, the impact of 
globalisation on national policies and domestic economies, and the effects of domestic 
politics on strategies and outcomes. 4 As such not only are these accounts vulnerable 
on theoretical and empirical grounds, 
5 they also fail to elucidate the role that has been 
played by international and domestic political economy factors in the trade policy 
choices made by the ANC government since the early 1990s. 
2 See for example Merle Holden, "The High Road to Trade Reform, " Indicator South Africa, vol. 10, 
no. 1, (Summer, 1992); Merle Holden, "The Choice of Trade Strategy, " in Nicoli Nattrass and Sampie 
Terreblanche (eds. ), The Political Economy of South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 
1990); and Gunnar Jonsson and Arvind Subramanian, Dynamic Gains from Trude: Evidence from 
South Africa, IMF Working Paper 00/45 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2000); and 
Michael Bleaney, Alan Hirsch, Merle Holden and Carolyn Jenkins, "South Africa, " in Adercola 
Oyejide, Benno Ndulu and Jan Willen Gunning (eds. ), Regional Integration and "(rode Liberali. xalion 
in Sub-Saharan Africa - Volume 2: County Case Studies (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999). 
3 Graham A. Davis, South African Managed Trade Policy - The Wasting of a Mineral Endowment 
(Westport: Praeger, 1994), p. 2. 
4 See for example Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988); Jeffry Frieden and David 
A. Lake (eds. ), International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Richard Higgott, "International Political Economy, " in A. J. R. Groom 
and Margot Light (eds. ), Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter, 
1994); and Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness 
Work (Washington DC: Overseas Development Council, 1999). 
s See Susan Strange, "Protectionism and World Politics, " lntcrnationcil Org(mi: r, tion, vol. 39, no. 2, 
(Spring, 1985), pp. 233-259; Paul Knigman, Strategic Trade Policy and the New International 
Economics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); and Robert Wade, "Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of 
Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective, " New Left Review, no. 217 
(May/June, 1996), pp. 3-37. 
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International experience has shown that sweeping trade policy reforms have been 
introduced following major crises. According to Rodrik: 
If a period of macroeconomic instability is the worst time to undertake 
a trade reform, why are so many countries doing it? The main reasons 
are drawn from the broader domain of political economy. First, a time 
of crisis occasionally enables radical reforms that would have been 
unthinkable in calmer times. The second reason has to do with the role 
of foreign creditors, and of the IMF and World Bank in particular. The 
1980s were a decade of leverage for these institutions vis-ä-vis debtor 
governments, especially where poorer African countries are concerned. 
Cash-starved governments frequently with little conviction of their 
ultimate benefits adopted the trade policy recommendations of the 
World Bank' 
Liberalisation of trade is often portrayed as an unwelcome policy that is foisted upon 
economies by the conditionalities imposed by international financial institutions 
(1FIs). 7 This is not strictly so in the case of South Africa. Trade reform in South 
Africa, unlike in most African countries, has always been dictated by domestic 
considerations. This does not, of course, mean that the `crisis' explanation of trade 
reform is not pertinent to the South African situation. Indeed, as argued in Chapter 3, 
the structural crisis that beset the country since the late I 970s has been a major 
catalyst in the economic policy changes that have been undertaken by the South 
African state in recent years. However, it is worth stressing that these changes have 
not been implemented as part of structural adjustment programmes sponsored by the 
IFIs. That is to say, notwithstanding the neo-liberal ideological offensive to which 
the ANC leadership was subjected to in the early 1990s (see Chapter 5), its economic 
Dani Rodrik, "The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries, " Jorn"rral o/ Ecv, nonrrc 
Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 1, (Winter 1992), p. 89. 
See J. Williamson (ed. ), The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington, [)C-. Institute for 
International Economics, 1994); and Dani Rodrik, "Understanding Economic Policy Re(brm, " Journal 
of'Economic Literature, XXXIV (March, 1996). 
15 
policies were ultimately the product of a home-grown and self-imposed structural 
adjustment programme, not imposed from outside. 
Even so, a crucial question remains unanswered by the multitude of studies on South 
African trade policy carried out over the past decade: Given the relatively ample 
room for manoeuvre it had vis-ä-vis the IFIs when it took power in 1994 why, then, 
did the ANC government embrace and even reinforce the trade liberalisation policies 
initiated by the apartheid regime in the late 1980s, especially in light of some 
evidence that trade liberalisation in South Africa had already reached an advanced 
stage by the end of the 1980s and that the key impediments to rapid export growth 
were unconnected to trade policy? 
This thesis argues that, far more than mainstream accounts of contemporary South 
African trade policy concede, international and domestic political economy 
considerations have played a central part in the ANC government's calculations to 
undertake trade reform to the degree it has. Trade reform in post-apartheid South 
Africa has been the linchpin of a global adjustment strategy pursued by the domestic 
political elites by which they have sought to fulfill South Africa's global, regional and 
domestic political and economic objectives. At the global level, the South African 
state has vigorously pursued trade liberalisation in order to shed its past image of 
international pariah, reintegrate itself into the global economy on the basis of export- 
led growth, and managing the forces of economic globalisation. Restoring South 
Africa's international political and diplomatic respectability has been as important as 
reversing its economic marginalisation in the international division of labour, which 
' See for example Trevor Bell, "Should South Africa Further Liberalise its Foreign Trade? " in Merle 
Lipton and Charles Simkins (eds. ) State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Boul(Ier: 
Westview Press, 1993), pp. 83-127. 
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intensified during the apartheid era. Furthermore, trade reform has been promoted as 
part of a set of policy measures - including fiscal, monetary and foreign 
investment 
policies - designed to win the confidence of 
international and domestic financial 
markets, which were initially skeptical about the ANC government's ability to 
manage the South African economy. `Playing the confidence game' - appeasing 
market sentiment - has become as imperative as actual economic 
fundamentals 
themselves in driving policy. ' 
At the regional level, post-apartheid South Africa has made the pursuit of African 
economic rejuvenation - mainly through the instruments of regional trade 
integration 
- the keystone of its foreign economic policy. 
10 In this respect, the South African 
state has used trade policy reform as a foreign economic policy tool not only to 
rebuild political and economic cooperation with African countries (damaged during 
the apartheid era) but also to advance its hegemonie ambitions, particularly in the 
Southern African region, as well as strengthen the region's leverage vis-a-vis 
multilateral institutions. 
' The extent to which South Africa's regional hegemonie 
ambitions can be achieved, however, lies ultimately with how adeptly the country can 
reconcile these regional aspirations with its domestic pressures. 
At the domestic level, trade reform has been deployed by the decision-making elites 
not only to lock in and entrench the government's neo-liberal macroeconomic 
For a fascinating discussion of how states have been forced to 'play the confidence game' under 
conditions of global financial volatility see Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Econornies 
(London: Penguin Books, 1999), pp. 102-117. 
10 Nkosazana Diamini-Zuma, "South Africa's International Relations 2002/3, " a report presented by the 
South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zama, to the South African 
Parliament, Cape Town, 23 March 2003, pp. 1-2. 
" See Patrick J. McGowan and Fred Ahwireng-Obeng, "Partner or Ilegemon? South Africa in Africa, " 
Journal of Contemporcuy AJirican Studies, 16 2 (1998), pp, 166-195. 
17 
economic policy but also to curtail the power of domestic interests that benefited from 
trade protectionism in the past. In return for their co-operation, the South African 
state has allowed these interests, notably business and labour, enhanced institutional 
representation in economic policymaking, in addition to providing a wide array of 
supply-side measures - including institutional capacity-building, human resources 
development, lower company tax, appropriate exchange rate policy, and trade-related 
technical assistance - to mitigate the negative effects of competitive pressures. 
Indeed, the restrictive nature of corporatism in South Africa - which has tended to 
reduce the role of labour and business in economic policymaking to a purely 
consultative one - has enabled the decision-making elites to manage domestic 
tensions induced by their trade liberalisation policies. This does not imply, however, 
that capital and labour have been generally feeble, hardly so considering South 
Africa's (still) highly concentrated corporate structure and the massive social power 
wielded by the trade union movement. Rather, what is meant is that corporatism has 
provided the state, albeit within the limited confines of an institutional setting, with a 
leverage to bargain with its social partners over economic policy and with a breathing 
space to consolidate its economic reform agenda both at international and domestic 
levels. In this sense trade policy has been employed to serve domestic as much as 
foreign political and economic policy ends. 
2. Explaining Trade Policy 
Trade policy refers to a microeconomic policy that is generally aimed at achieving 
domestic economic objectives for domestic political motives. It can be employed 
either to shelter domestic industry and slow down the rate of its adjustment to global 
18 
economic change, or it can be used as a tool subject the national economy - especially 
its uncompetitive industrial sectors - to foreign competition and quicken its pace of 
structural change. In most developing economies trade policy is seen as a central 
ingredient of industrial policy. Industrial policy concerns those government actions 
designed to foster the development of strategic industries, while trade policy is one 
mechanism of altering the structure of the domestic economy in accordance with 
industrial policy objectives. Trade policy is, therefore, one pillar of a wider industrial 
policy, in addition to other microeconomic policies such as investment policy, 
research and development policy, technology policy, and skills development policy. '2 
Trade economists start from the premise that market conditions determine trade 
policies: trade responds only to market-driven differences in comparative advantage -- 
namely factor endowments and capabilities. They believe that trade ought to be free: 
free trade is considered the `first-best policy' because of its allocative efficiency - its 
ability to move limited economic resources to areas where they can be better 
exploited - and its positive effects on national welfare. Moreover, trade economists 
warn against the negative effects of protectionist policies and draw attention to the 
high costs of rent-seeking and corruption which have followed on inward-looking 
trade regimes. 13 And they argue that there is a correlation between growth and trade 
orientation: countries that are more open and have fewer distortions in their trade 
policies grow faster. 14 Even so, trade economists accept that certain circumstances 
justify state intervention for distributive purposes, for example its order to protect 
12 Davis, South African Managed Trade, pp. 5-1 1. 
See for example Jagdish I3hagwati, Protectionisnj (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1088); 
and Anne Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society, " American Economic Review, 
no. 64 (June, 1974). 
14 Sebastian Edwards, "Trade Orientation, Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries, " National 
Bureau of*Econornic Research, Working Paper no. 3716,1991. 
19 
weak domestic firms threatened by liberalisation. This view, however, sees trade 
intervention as an exception to the general norm and as a policy tool of last resort. 
15 
Many political scientists question the idea propounded by economists that there can 
be an objectively and unquestionably "best" trade policy. They maintain that 
choosing a trade policy is a complex process that demands a balancing of conflicting 
political, economic and ethical claims. According to Moon, three sets of dilemmas 
must be confronted before deciding on a trade policy: the distributional dilemma; the 
values dilemma; and the state goals dilemma. The distributional dilemma derives 
from the fact that not everybody gains from a chosen trade policy. Trade has a 
tendency to change income and wealth distribution, benefiting some individuals, 
groups, social classes and economic sectors at the expense of others. Governments 
are, therefore, invariably called upon to make painful decisions regarding whose 
interests their policies will benefit, and whose interests will stiffer as a consequence of 
these policy choices. 
The values predicament occurs when trade produces outcomes that clash with other 
societal values. In this context trade is essentially seen as a struggle to establish a 
trade-off between economic gain and other societal principles. This makes trade a 
highly contested domain where some citizens may object to the idea that economic 
prosperity is being pursued to the detriment of their cherished social and ethical 
values. The state goals dilemma centres on the conflict between trade and the state's 
quest to achieve other objectives such as preserving its power, security and national 
sovereignty in the international system. These are important strategic goals pursued 
by most governments but which economic theories fail to account for because of their 
15 Ibid., p. 141. 
20 
sole preoccupation with issues of growth and efficiency. 
1 
considerations it can be concluded that: 
On the basis of these 
In sum, trade poses fundamental dilemmas involving choices between 
competing values, alternative income distributions, and disparate 
effects on state goals and capacities. For this reason, no single trade 
policy is unequivocally "best. " Further, economic theory alone cannot 
be a reliable guide to either the most appropriate choice or the most 
likely one. Instead, each nation resolves the dilemmas of trade in its 
own way, as it responds to prevailing theories, the state of markets, and 
the balance of political power. '? 
Trade policy is essentially about domestic politics. Given that it determines the 
relative positions of various social groups in the domestic political economy, trade 
policy is "also the subject of frequent and often highly charged domestic political 
conflict. "" There is a propensity in economic theory to overemphasise the allocative 
aspects of trade policy and downplay its redistributive, political elements. This 
approach is deficient in that it fails to incorporate non-efficiency arguments for 
crafting trade policy. As Strange once admonished, "efficiency never has been, and 
never can be, the sole consideration in the choice of state policies. ""' According to 
Rodrik, a political economy analysis of trade policy ought to have four features. On 
the demand side, it must encompass individual Preferences and the methods by which 
those preferences are aggregated to generate political demands. On the supply side, 
trade policy ought to explain the preferences of polievinakers and the institutional 
arrangements in which they are operationalised. 
`0 In sum, in addition to efficiency 
Bruce E. Moon, Dilemmas of International Trade (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 20-31. 
" Ibid., p. 31. 
Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations (New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1997), p. 49. 
" Strange, "Protectionism and World Politics, " p. 236. 
20 See Dani Rodrik, "What Does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That 
We Do Need To Know?, ' Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper no. 1039 (October 
1994). 
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arguments trade policy must also account for the interests of the state machinery and 
the conflict among different internal social groups. 
Another way of understanding trade policy is to see it as a tool of foreign policy. 
This mercantilist conception of trade policy views trade, and thereby wealth, as a 
source of state power. Trade is thus employed by one state as a weapon to alter the 
behaviour of other states and to advance particular strategic goals in the international 
system. A good example of a country that has used trade policy to advance foreign 
policy ends is the United States (US). Over the past decades successive American 
administrations have used threats of trade discrimination either to intimidate a 
competitor or to penalise an adversary. During the Cold War, the US imposed 
economic sanctions against developing countries considered supporters of or 
sympathetic to communist Russia. 21 In recent years, the US has used trade as a 
mechanism to reward countries that have supported its foreign economic and security 
policies while punishing those that have opposed these policies. Political 
calculations have become as important as economic ones in the determination of US 
bilateral trading arrangements. In Chapter 6, it will be shown that the current Bush 
administration has rewarded countries that have backed its foreign economic and 
security policies while it has penalised those that have failed to support these policies. 
One of the enduring puzzles about trade policy is whether there is a direct relationship 
between trade liberalisation and economic growth. it is now accepted by economists 
that trade reforms, judiciously executed, could yield positive efficiency outcomes in 
the long-term. Yet this does not imply a direct correlation between trade 
21 For a comprehensive analysis of US foreign policy during the Cold War see Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, US Foreign Policy since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2001). 
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liberalisation and economic growth. In reality, it remains unclear if trade leads to 
growth and vice versa. 22 International experience has shown that trade reform is not 
a panacea for economic problems. Trade policy does not create economic growth, but 
it can create an enabling environment for it to occur, for example by promoting an 
efficient allocation of economic resources and playing a supportive role during 
stabilisation through the mobilisation of resources for the government. Fostering 
economic growth requires an integrated strategy that locates trade policy in a wider 
development context that includes other pillars of industrial policy such as investment 
policy, entrepreneurship development policy, training and development policy, 
technology policy, research and development policy. 23 
3. Why Trade Matters 
Not only has trade played a pivotal role in cementing economic relations among 
nations, it has been essential to the development of international relations. 24 The 
history of trade liberalisation has shown that although trade is not necessarily the 
engine of growth, it can create conditions conducive to economic success. There is 
now ample empirical evidence that trade improves productivity, efficiency and 
economic welfare. Previous experience has shown that the world economy grows 
rapidly during periods of trade expansion and slows down when trade levels decline. 
World trade increased almost twice as fast as total world production since 1950, 
accounting for a quarter of all goods and services produced globally. `S 
22 Moon, Diienonas, p. 3. 
23 See Dani Rodrik, "The Limits of Trade Policy Reform", pp. 87-105. 24 Robert Gilpin, The Political Econonry of International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), p. 171. 
ýs Moon, Dilemmas, p. 3. 
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As spelt out in detail in Chapter 1, the supremacy of an outward oriented trade 
strategy over that of import substitution industrialisation is now widely recognised. 
The post war-period demonstrated that countries that pursued an open trade policy 
experienced faster economic growth than those that did not. "' The dynamic 
economies of East Asia - Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan - 
registered exponential growth rates thanks largely to their open trade policies. In 
contrast, those economies (mainly in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East) that 
over-prolonged their inward-looking economic policies found themselves saddled 
with abysmal growth performance. Research has revealed marked differences in the 
significance of trade across nations. Bigger developed countries, which boast 
massive domestic markets of their own, tend to depend less on trade than smaller 
countries. In general, the sheer sizes of larger developed nations enable them to 
fulfill their economic and consumption needs. Smaller nations, however, are 
compelled to undertake higher degrees of trade as "they can neither supply goods to 
meet all their own needs nor provide a market sizable enough for many industries to 
produce in the large volumes required to be efficient. "`'' This explains why trade 
accounts for a significant share of the GNP in developing countries, catapulting trade 
to the heart of these countries' political agendas. 
The expansion of trade, induced by the need by societies to source from abroad goods 
not available at home, has culminated in a variety of outcomes including 
technological diffusion, a demand effect on the economy that generates economic 
growth, gains for individual firms deriving from economies of scale and market size 
26 Brian McDonald, The World Trading System -- The Uruguay Round and R vonul (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998), p. 4. 
27 Moon, Dilemmas, p. 5. 
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growth, a widening of consumer choice, and a decrease in input costs for raw 
materials and manufactured components. Trade has also had a notable cultural 
impact, affecting the values, ideas and behaviour of a society. Economic liberals 
have extolled the virtues of this cultural influence, highlighting the positive role that 
trade plays in disseminating new ideas and spurring technological progress. 
Economic nationalists, however, baulk at this cultural encroachment: they argue that 
trade undermines traditional values while bemoaning its corrosive social effects. 
Furthermore, trade has been a major factor in the evolution of international politics. 
Liberals regard trade as a source for good since they believe that it promotes a 
peaceful co-existence among nations, whereas nationalists view it as a source of 
political friction and a threat to economic sovereignty. 28 
The globalisation of production has had a profound impact on trade. Globalisation has 
inspired a push for the liberalisation of world trade that transcends border issues to 
include matters previously considered by governments the domain of domestic policy. 
As Higgott observed: 
What can be said is that the WTO remit now intrudes more 
substantially into the domestic politics and economics of the 
contracting parties, including the United States, in a manner not fully 
appreciated during the Uruguay Round of negotiations. Under the 
WTO, in marked contrast to the GATT, all parties had to commit to 
full membership and a permanent, `single undertaking' of the rules- 
based nature of the system. Governments that signed on to the WTO, 
in effect, took the whole package. Moreover, this extended beyond 
the traditional instrument of protection - the tariff- to cover a whole 
range of non-tariff barriers. 2 
2 Gilpin, The Political Economy, pp. 71-172. 
`" Richard Higgott, "The Limits to Multilateral Economic Governance" a paper presented before the Council for Asia Europe Cooperation Task Force on Global Governance, Seoul, 26-28 September 
2003, p. 18. 
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As such, the global trade liberalisation agenda is no longer concerned solely with the 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade: it now entails a more ambitious 
agenda that seeks to impose disciplines on a range of issue areas encompassing trade 
and intellectual property rights, trade and the environment, trade and labour standards, 
trade and services, trade and investment, trade and competition policy, trade and 
public procurement, trade and technology, and trade and debt. Given this expansive 
trade agenda, it is not surprising that the WTO, the institutional embodiment of the 
global trade regime, has in recent years become a principal focal point of both the 
proponents and the opponents of globalisation. In sum, globalisation has created a 
situation where trade cannot be dismissed any longer (as, for example, Strange once 
asserted) as a secondary structure in the international political economy, subservient 
to the security, production, financial and knowledge structures. 3 0 Trade has become 
the fulcrum of the global political economy, with important future political, economic, 
social, technological and environmental implications. 
4. A Note on the IPE Analytical Framework 
The approach adopted in this thesis to illuminate trade policy borrows from a range of 
analytical insights found mainly in the disciplines of economics, international 
relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE). The notion of trade policy 
has been dissected at length in the literature. Yet it is astonishing that it is only in 
recent decades that various academic disciplines have begun to draw on each other's 
strengths notwithstanding a great deal of turf fighting that has typified such 
interdisciplinary exchanges. As Odell averred: 
30 Strange, "Protectionism and World Politics, " p. 234. 
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During the 1980s, international trade problems multiplied and gripped 
attention in many countries. Although an extensive literature already 
existed, scholarship on trade policies and politics expanded in 
proportion to the problem: following a trend that began in the 1970s, 
many economists and political scientists turned their traditional tools to 
the subject. As a result, we now have a literature that coheres around a 
common question, but remains, or appears to remain, disparate in the 
theoretical answers it defends and the research methods it employs. 
Fragmentation of political-economic knowledge is not news; as we 
know, the two disciplines parted company during the nineteenth 
century. Even today, much of economics shows no signs of contact 
with political science, and vice versa. The good news is that a better, 
unified theory - combining elements of economics, political science, 
and history - is gradually emerging in the area of international trade 
policy and elsewhere. 31 
This study proceeds from the premise that no single theoretical position can explain 
and answer adequately the central questions posed by this study. In this endeavour 
due sensitivity has been accorded, as far as possible, to the perceptive observation of 
Fine and Rustomjee, keen students of the South African political economy, that "those 
wishing to understand the workings of the South African economy are faced with the 
problem of how to proceed methodologically. Perhaps more than any other economy, 
the difficulty is posed of combining abstract or general propositions and theoretical 
insights with those that are appropriate to the apparent uniqueness of the apartheid 
system. "32 The thesis contends that distinctive racial, political and economic 
peculiarities rooted in the history of the South African political economy call for what 
Strange termed `an eclectic approach' to IPE, a theoretical approach that embraces 
and cuts across divergent insights and traditions. -3 In this respect it is inspired by 
Underhill's caution against "... a tendency to reduce theoretical discussion in IPE to 
31 John S. Odell, "Understanding International 'T'rade Policies An Emerging Synthesis, " Worlcl 
Politics, vol. 43, no. 1, (October 1990), pp. I39-140. 
32 Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee, The Political Econonºy of'South Afiricu -/ om Complex to Industrialisation (London: Hurst and Company, 1996), p. 20. 33 See Susan Strange, An Eclectic Approach, ' in Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds. ), The New 
International Political Econoniv (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 33-49. 
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competing and mutually exclusive, even irreconcilable, ideologies. "34 And it echoes 
Hirschmann's injunction to scholars to become more willing to `trespass' into other 
social disciplines: to become more willing to transcend barriers imposed by their 
intellectual straitjackets and engage with other social disciplines. As he put it, 
"progress with some of the major puzzles in economic-political development requires 
considerable detours and forays into other areas. "" 
This thesis situates itself within the eclectic approach advocated by Strange and 
Hirschmann's clarion call for trespassing. Anchored in what has become known as 
`new political economy' model, the celebration of eclecticism in IPE has been 
evidenced by the upsurge in diverse yet complementary literatures over the past 
decade bent on repudiating, in various ways, theoretical `orthodoxy' in IPE: the 
dominance of IPE by three competing theoretical paradigms (Liberalism, Realism, 
and Marxism) and the propensity to classify scholars according to the theoretical 
paradigm they are considered to be associated with. 
3t' The strength of the new 
political economy tradition resides with its desire to break away from and overcome 
the limitations of the analytical tools and methods used in traditional social sciences: 
it accepts that traditional social science instruments cannot deal adequately with the 
challenges presented by globalisation, especially the role that globalisation has played 
in breaking the distinction not only between the domestic and the international but 
also between the political and the economic; its intellectual spirit is multi-disciplinary 
and theoretical and yet it is rooted in history; its methodology eschews the previous 
dichotomies -- between agency and structure as well as between states and markets --- 
" Underhill, "Introduction: Conceptualising the Changing Global Order, "p. 7. 
15 Albert 0. Hirschmann, Essays In Trespassing -- Economics to Politics and &'t'ond (Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p. vi. 
" For a comprehensive survey of this genre of literature see Richard I iiggott and Anthony Payne (eds. ), 
The New Political Economy of' Glohalisrrtiotr - Volumes 1,2 and 3 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000). 
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that fractured classical political economy into discrete disciplines; it is propelled by a 
progressive normative agenda that is concerned with issues of social equality and 
justice in a globalising world economy. 37 Moreover, the new political economy 
paradigm recognises the salience of the notion of power in the global political 
economy, especially the role that power (depending on how it is distributed) plays in 
creating winners and losers in the global system. '' It is worth noting, however, at 
this stage that while the central importance of theoretical reflection is recognised in 
this research, the strength of the study is its empirical narrative on South African trade 
policy and its contextualisation within an IPE framework. 
5. The Contester! Nature of IPE 
In a seminal paper, Susan Strange questioned the artificial barriers which divorced the 
discipline of politics from that of economics, and which separated international 
politics from national politics in the study of IR . 
31) She asserted that these harriers 
stemmed from the basic assumptions underlying the study of international relations, 
the most important of which is that world politics are conceptually different from 
domestic/national politics and therefore should be studied separately. Furthermore, 
she argued that the close interface of politics and economics in the developing 
international economy had necessitated an inter-disciplinary approach, drawing upon 
the combined insights of both disciplines, to the area of international studies. The 
influential contribution made by Strange's article to the evolution of the area study of 
37 Ibid., pp. ix-xvi. 
18 See Strange, States and Markets, especially pp. 45-138. 
'`' Susan Strange, "International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect, " 
Internnfionaf Affäirs, vol. 46, no. 2, (April 1970), pp. 304-315. 
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IPE is now accepted as a given. 40 In recent decades there has been a phenomenal 
growth in IPE literature. `' Yet there is no general consensus regarding what 
constitutes international political economy. This is partly due to the fact that the 
development of IPE has been characterised by epistemological differences, which 
have been manifested mainly in the differences between, on the one hand, problem- 
solving approaches rooted in behavioural-cum-positivist American IPE and, on the 
other hand, what Cox calls critical theory. Problem-solving theory is actor-oriented 
and it is based on fixed assumptions about the framework or parameters within its 
actions take place. Critical theory, on the other hand, is concerned with historically 
formed structures and operates from a normative framework. 42 
American scholarship has traditionally followed the problem-solving approach to 
theory. This is underlined by its embrace of the neo-classical approach to 
international political and economic questions, which sees the individual actor as the 
agent of choice. This neo-classical approach, advocated by neo-realists and neo- 
liberals, has rested on two assumptions: the evolution of international public goods 
and the role of leadership, especially the hegemonic leadership by the USA, in the 
provision of these international public goods. But American scholarship in 
international political economy has been criticised for serving to distort the debate on 
power relations between the rich and the poor in the global economic order: its 
theoretical preoccupation with interdependence has helped to conceal the asymmetries 
"' See Robert W. Cox, "Take six eggs": theory, finance, and the real economy in the work of Susan 
Strange (1992), " in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair (c(Is. ), Approaches to World Oº'rlc'º' 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 174. 
41 Richard Iliggott, "International Political Economy, " in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds. ), 
Contemporar' Internalional Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter: 1994), p. 156. a' Robert W. Cox, "Social forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, " 
in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, eds. Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 88-89. 
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of power and wealth identified in radical theoretical approaches. 43 However, the 
dominance of American scholarship in IPE has been mitigated by the mushrooming of 
counter-hegemonic scholarship in IPE - rooted mainly but not exclusively in the new 
political economy tradition - that has spawned alternatives to American intellectual 
hegemony. `'4 
To sum up, a number of interrelated theoretical issues are important in the new 
political economy. First, it is necessary to understand the relationship between 
economics and politics in the global context. Second, attention must be paid to the 
issue of level of analysis - the relationship between economic and political structures 
within the domestic and international domains must be explained. Third, the role of 
the state and how it is located within the domestic and international contexts ought to 
be elaborated. Tied to this is the need to emphasise the role of politics, as opposed to 
structure, as a determinant of outcome. The politics that take place within the 
structure of the international system, rather than the structure itself, play an important 
role in illuminating the dynamics of power in the international political economy. 
Consistent with the new political economy approach, this thesis emphasises the 
inseparability of the political and economic domains in contemporary international 
society. It also stresses the importance of the relationship between the domestic and 
international domains of policy-nmaking. Moreover, it challenges the orthodox 
assumption that depicts the institutions of the state and the market as inherently 
EIiggott, "International Political Economy, p. 158. 
44 ibid., p. 166. 
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contradictory and conflictual rather than "... understanding markets and political 
authorities as part of the same, integrated ensemble of governance. .,, 
45 
6. Research Methods 
This research undertaking was underpinned by a number of techniques. The 
principal methods of investigation were analyses of primary and secondary 
documentation, as well as semi-structured elite interviews. Primary documentation 
consulted for this research encompassed official government policy documents such 
as white papers, policy documents and parliamentary submissions prepared by civil 
society groups, regional protocols and treaties, documents detailing South Africa's 
trade negotiation positions, ministerial statements and communiques, annual reports 
of government departments, Hansard records, and archival records of various 
commission of enquiries appointed to investigate and make recommendations on 
aspects of South African trade and industrial policies. These sets of data were 
obtained directly from various sources, including the DTI, the national library of 
South Africa, the library of the South African Parliament, and non-state actors 
concerned with trade policy matters. Useful material was also culled from the 
official websites of government departments and regional organisations. All the 
information was available in English, the language used in the majority of countries in 
Southern Africa. 
Secondary sources included books, academic journals and newspapers. Gaining 
access to South African newspapers was not difficult given that most of the country's 
a' Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, `"Introduction: Conceptualising the Changing Global Order, " in Geoffrey 
R. D. Underhill and Richard Stubhs (eds. ), Political Economy and Me Changing Global Oraler (Ontario: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 4. 
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newspapers operate Internet editions. A wide selection of newspapers was consulted 
but the bulk of the material deployed in the thesis was secured from three major 
publications: Business Dur (national daily) as well as two national weeklies 
Financial Mail and Mail and Guardian. In addition, the research drew on articles 
published by international, mainly British-based newspapers such as Financial Times, 
The Economist and The Guardian. 
A key source of primary data, the technique of a semi-structured elite interviewing 
was selected for two reasons. First, since it does not follow a rigid format, elite 
interviewing "permits greater scope for respondents to answer questions on their own 
terms, "`"' free from the restrictions imposed by data gathering methods used, for 
example, in survey research. Elite interviews, therefore, can inject a qualitative depth 
to the information that has been gleaned from other research sources. Second, elite 
interviews can help the researcher to understand "actors' perceptions of the world in 
which they live, the way in which they construct their world and the shared 
assumptions which shape it... "`17 According to May, a semi-structured interview 
entails the following: 
Questions are normally specified, but the interviewer is freer to probe 
beyond the answers. Qualitative information about the topic can then 
he recorded by the interviewer who can seek both clarification and 
elaboration on the answers given. "' 
"'Tim May, Social Rescmrh Issues, Methods und Processes (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 
1993), p. 93. 
'" Wyn Grant, "Elite Interviewing: A Practical Guide, " Institute for German Studies Discussion Paper 
no. IGS2000/1 1, p. 16. 
48 May, Social Research, p. 93. 
3 
Overall, thirty interviews were undertaken during the course of the research. (A full 
list of all interviewees, and the dates on which they were interviewed, can be found in 
Appendix A). Most interviews took place in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Pretoria, 
while a number of interviews were held with Geneva-based WTO officials too. All 
except five interviews were tape-recorded, and their duration ranged from forty-five 
minutes to one hour. The twenty-five respondents who agreed to be taped consented 
to this arrangement in advance of the actual interview session. The benefit of a taped 
interview is that "it enables you to concentrate more on what the interviewee is saying 
and, also, it provides you with a verbatim transcript of the interview. ' 49 Generally, 
interviewees did not make requests for anonymity except in a couple of cases where 
sensitive information was disclosed `off the record. ' All taped interviews were 
transcribed and analysed and, in cases where additional clarity or information was 
required, subsequent communication with respondents was done telephonically or by 
electronic mail. 
In order to ensure that the sample was as representative as possible, interviewees were 
divided into four categories. The first category consisted of interviews held with 
current senior government officials in the DTI, DFA and DA. A central objective of 
this thesis has been to illuminate the assumptions and calculations that shape the 
worldviews of South African trade policyrnakers relative to those of other actors in 
the country's domestic and foreign trade policy environments. This is necessary if the 
researcher is to comprehend fully the raison d'etre for political and economic 
decisions made by policymakers. According to Grant, elite interviewing "remains the 
ý`' David Richards, Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls, " Politics, vol. 16, no. 3,1996, p. 202. 
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most appropriate technique" to apply in illuminating the "the shared assumptions and 
meanings" which shape the "private worlds" of policy communities. 50 
The second category was made up of interviews with non-state actors either involved 
in the South African trade policy milieu or concerned generally with trade policy 
matters, mainly organised business, organised labour and other civil society groups 
such as policy think tanks. The decision to include this group of interviewees was 
based on the understanding, now widely recognised in IPE, that participation in the 
globalising world economy is no longer the preserve of state actors but includes non- 
state actors as well. 51 This is particularly relevant to South Africa where the domain 
of trade policy has been a theatre of fierce contestation among the government, 
business and labour. 
Constituting the third category were interviews conducted with a few apartheid-era 
former politicians and government officials involved with trade policy. Insights 
gained from these interviews were used to supplement the historical sections of the 
thesis and, in particular, to throw light on motivations for some of the trade policy 
decisions (and non-decisions) that were made during the apartheid period. The fourth 
category entailed interviews done with selected trade officials from the WTO and, for 
a regional perspective, the director of the Southern African Trade Policy Research 
Network. '` The rationale for these exchanges was not only to seek clarity on how 
aspects of regional and global trade processes function but it was also to ascertain 
50 Grant, "Elite Interviewing, " p. 17. 
51 See for example Susan Strange and John Stopford, "States, Firms and Diplomacy, " International 
Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1,1992, pp. 1-15. 
SATRN is a regional network made up of at least one research or academic institution in each of the 
fourteen SADC countries. Collaborating institutions disseminate information and coordinate research 
at a national level, liaise with their governments, and undertake research on designated thematic 
studies; see httl/www. tips. org. zaisatrn/rtners/ 
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how South Africa, and its conduct in world trade since 1994, is being perceived by 
`external' actors. 
The advantages of elite interviews are numerous. For instance, they can assist in 
interpreting documents or reports, in interpreting the motives of decision-makers, and 
in yielding information not documented or available elsewhere. '; Yet choosing elite 
interviewing as a method of data collection has its own drawbacks. One of the 
disadvantages is "whether the selection process of respondents [my emphasis] would 
correspond with the reality of the situation. " 54 There is also the problem of the 
subjective nature of the accounts of interviewees, and the disputable reliability of the 
interviewee stemming from memory failure or political or ideological partisanship. 55 
Another widely recognised concern has to do with access, particularly how to handle 
the issue of `gatekeepers' who might make it difficult for the researcher to make 
direct contact with senior officials. However, given the acquaintance of the 
interviewer with most of the South African trade policymakers the issue of access did 
not present any significant problem. Other difficulties that have been identified 
include "receiving limited and selected data, ' 56 a situation that might be triggered by a 
quest to maintain security or confidentiality. It is hoped that these problems, where 
they have may have arisen, have not adversely affected both the methodological and 
substantive aspects of the thesis. 
Undertaking this study was a challenging venture. A significant portion of the first 
year of the research was spent grappling with what Burnham defines as the problem 
53 Richards, "Elite Interviewing, " p. 200. 
54 Vered Bartov, "Research Design - "A Rough Guide, " in Peter Buniham (ed. ), Surviving they 
Research Process in Politics (London: Pinter, 1997), p. 49. 55 Richards, "Elite Interviewing, " p. 200. 56 Ibid. 
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of "translating a broad interest into a manageable hypothesis which can become a 
guiding thread for a thesis. "s' This is crucial to enabling the researcher to distinguish 
between a broad research area and a research hypothesis. Familiarity with a general 
area of study does not necessarily translate into a definable central research question. 
A central research question serves as the organising principle of research and its 
paramountcy resides with the fact that it helps the researcher to clarify the focus of 
their work, to ask pertinent questions, and to demarcate clearly the boundaries of 
research. In addition to framing a central argument for the thesis, the first year was 
used to conduct a review of literature germane to the research. The audit focused on 
two types of IPE literature: one which dealt with international dimensions of trade 
reform, and another which related specifically to debates about the political economy 
of trade liberalisation in South Africa. Scanning the literature helped the researcher 
to narrow the focus of the research and to produce a tentative chapter outline for the 
study. This was very useful because "it forces you to focus and think about the thesis 
as an integrated whole. "58 
Writing a doctoral thesis is an incredibly exacting enterprise, and it was tempting to 
defer the writing process until after the completion of the research. Yet it is 
important that writing is seen as an ongoing process that is carried out continually 
from the inception to the conclusion of the research. In this respect it is worth 
heeding Burnham's advice that "the fast, effective completion of a thesis demands 
that writing is a habitual process carried on from the outset of research and is not to be 
57 Peter Burnham, "Method and Myth in Political Research: A Practical Guide for Research Students, " 
Politics, vol. 12, no. 1, (April 1992), p. 3. s' Carla Koen, "Beginning Research: The First Year, " in Peter Burnham (ed. ), Surviving the Research 
Process in Politics (London: Pinter, 1997), p. 30. 
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stored until data has been consulted. -59 The notion, propagated by conventional 
methodology texts, that conceives of research as a linear process in which the 
`writing-up' stage can be disconnected from the `research stage' is both flawed and 
misleading. 60 
7. Concepts and Clarifications 
The first part of this thesis's topic - "Re-engaging with the Global Trading System" - 
may be interpreted to imply that South Africa had become a complete autarky during 
the apartheid era. This is not exactly the case. For while apartheid South Africa 
endured international notoriety, it did continue to trade with the world - albeit in an 
extremely hostile and unfavourable international climate. Of course, this does not 
mean that South Africa reaped the benefits of the exponential increase in world trade 
levels in the 1980s. On the contrary, South Africa's share of world exports decreased 
from 1.3 percent in 1980 to 0.7 percent in 1989. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 
2, the economy's relative openness had been constricted by its lopsided character, 
with gold constituting 73 percent of exports in 1980. (" 
The word re-engaging has been used in this context to allude to South Africa's 
reintegration into the rules-based WTO system. South Africa was one of the 23 
founding signatories to the GATT in 1948 (see Chapter 3). Yet many years of 
international ostracism caused by its apartheid policies meant that it was able to 
operate beyond the reaches of GATT disciplines: the country remained largely outside 
"' Peter Burnham, "Method and Myth, " p. 5. 
60 See for example Derek S. Pugh and Estelle M. Phillips, How to Get a PhD -- A Handbook for Students und their Supervisors (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987). 
`'' Hein Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change -- The Political Economy of Ti-ansfor, nation (London: 
Zed Books, 1998), p. 121. 
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the substantial liberalisation achieved in the successive pre-Uruguay Round 
negotiating rounds. As such, South Africa could afford to maintain relatively high 
tariffs and several quantitative restrictions on its imports to sustain its import- 
substituting industrial policies. Moreover, the imposition of trade and other sanctions 
against South Africa by its major trade partners allowed the country to conduct its 
trade policy with little regard to its obligations under the GATT. By signing on to the 
Marrakesh Agreement of the GATT in 1994, South Africa underlined its 
determination to liberalise its trade regime in line with WTO disciplines. 
It is worth noting that although the periodisation of this study starts in 1994, the seeds 
of an outward oriented trade strategy were actually planted in the late 1980s. 1994, 
the year in which the ANC assumed office and South Africa became a democracy, 
heralded an intensification of trade reforms that had already been initiated by the last 
apartheid government. It is for this reason that the latter part of the third chapter 
accords a fair amount of attention to the reform initiatives that dominated the 
domestic trade policy landscape immediately prior to 1994. This thesis is about 
South African trade policy in the democratic era. As intimated earlier, trade policy 
is a microeconomic policy that forms an essential part of a broader industrial policy, 
which encompasses other microeconomic policies such as technology policy and 
research and development policy. But, as Davis notes, "trade policy and industrial 
policy have become so interdependent that trade policy is now almost a synonym for 
industrial policy. This is certainly the case in South Africa"62 A partially 
industrialised country such as South Africa needs more than a trade policy to attain its 
long-term economic ambitions: it requires an integrated industrial strategy that 
62 Davis, South African Managed Trade, p. 6. 
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anchors trade policy in a broader national developmental context. The research is 
sensitive, therefore, to the fact that in the South African context no clear-cut 
distinctions can be drawn between trade policy and industrial policy. 
8. Thesis Chapter Outline 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 reviews relevant theoretical debates 
concerning the contemporary global trade system. Chapter 2 sketches a critical 
analysis of the historical development of South Africa's position in the global political 
economy. Chapter 3 analyses trade policy in South Africa during the apartheid era. 
Chapter 4 explores South Africa's role in the global trade regime within the context of 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Chapters 5,6 and 7 elaborate on the 
central thesis of this study. Chapter 5 examines the trade policy reforms that have 
been implemented by the South African state since 1994 to restructure South Africa's 
previously isolated economy and facilitate its emergence as an outward-oriented 
manufacturing and trading nation. Chapter 6 undertakes a comprehensive assessment 
of South Africa's global trade strategy, focusing on attempts by the South African 
state to reduce the dependence of the country's trade on traditional developed country 
markets and to diversify it by forging trade relationships with new markets in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. Chapter 7 examines South Africa's approach to the Doha 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
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Chapter 1 
The Global Trade System: A Theoretical Survey 
This chapter reviews relevant theoretical debates concerning the contemporary global 
trade system. Situating South Africa in a wider global theoretical context is crucial 
not only in determining its location in the new international division of labour (NIDL) 
that has typified the global economic order in recent decades, but also in assessing 
meaningfully its prospects in the international political economy. As the discussion 
on the IPE analytical framework in the preceding introductory chapter has 
demonstrated, this thesis embraces the `eclectic approach' to IPE advanced in the new 
political economy model. To reiterate, a number of crucial points of departure 
inform the new political economy paradigm. First, in studying international political 
economy the political and economic domains cannot be separated in any meaningful 
sense. Second, although economists see the market as an efficient mechanism for 
processing information to reach a market clearing price, the new political economy 
views it as not self-regulating but as a function of the social conditions in which it is 
embedded. Third, there is a close interface between domestic and international levels 
of analysis. 
The new political economy has developed, in large measure, in response to the 
globalisation of the international economy - especially in the areas of finance and 
production - and the changing character of the inter-state system. From this has 
sprung up numerous fields of inquiry in the field of IPE that have attracted diverse 
theoretical approaches, tackling such themes as the relationship between security and 
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economics, the interface between power and gender, the consequences of economic 
globalisation for the environment, and the importance of technological change and its 
role in the rise of transnational crime. By concentrating on the frameworks or 
historical structures within human activity takes place, and the slow processes of 
change in these frameworks, the new political economy model has undermined the 
politics of international relations that were based on fixed assumptions about the 
nature of the state system . 
63 Additionally, it has thrown light on the notion of 
structural power in the world order and how that power determines the relationship 
between authority and market. As such, although IPE was initially concerned with 
according primacy to economic foundations of power, it gradually changed the way of 
thinking about the world order and encouraged inquiry into other facets of the global 
order. It is the contention of this thesis that the key advantage of the eclectic 
approach is that it facilitates a cross-fertilisation of ideas among different theoretical 
and disciplinary traditions while enabling them to complement each other's strengths 
and compensate for each other's weaknesses. The thesis draws on pertinent 
theoretical insights, notably economic theories of trade, IPE theories, and 
globalisation theories. 
1. The Liberal Theory of Trade 
Historically, the idea of free trade has been predicated on the doctrine of economic 
liberalism pioneered by Adam Smith and subsequently elaborated by theorists such as 
6' Robert W. Cox, "Political Economy and World Order: Problems of Power and Knowledge at the 
Turn of the Millennium, " in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds. ) Political Economy and 
the Changing Global Order- (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 32. 
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David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. '4 The liberal case for free trade derives from 
Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, which argues that rather than seek to 
produce everything they needed countries ought to produce what they are best at. In 
this respect countries are urged to take advantage of their natural factor endowments 
such as land, climate, labour and capital. At the heart of the theory of comparative 
advantage is the principle of specialisation. By specialising, nations can produce 
mutually beneficial trade, even if one country is more efficient than the other in 
producing all goods. 65 The international division of labour is determined by 
comparative costs: countries are prone to specialise in those goods whose costs are 
comparatively the lowest. In other words, countries multiply their wealth by 
exploiting their comparative advantages rather than their absolute advantages. In 
terms of this worldview, international trade is seen a positive-sum game based on a 
harmony of interest. "(' 
Notwithstanding its attractiveness, the liberal theory of free trade is riddled with 
numerous shortcomings. Critics have argued that by assuming that comparative 
advantage is static, this theory could be interpreted in ways that serve to advocate the 
marginalisation of developing countries in the global economy. As McDonald 
observed: 
The way it was sometimes interpreted, it was a recipe for not changing 
or not developing and had an unacceptable semi-colonial ring to it, 
with developing countries being relegated to specialisation in the 
64 Bnice E. Moon, "Ideas and Policies, " in Brian Flocking and Steven McGuire (eds. ), Trade Politics 
International, Domestic and Regional Perspectives (London: Routledge 1999), p. 41. 
`'S Ibid. 
6" Gilpin, The Political Economy, p. 174. 
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production of raw materials for use by the more sophisticated firms in 
developed economies. 67 
As the discussion on strategic trade policy later in this chapter demonstrates, the 
liberal theory fails to recognise the dynamic nature of comparative advantage: 
comparative advantages do not derive exclusively from natural factor endowments; 
they can also be developed - but also damaged - by government policy and other 
artificial means. The liberal philosophy of trade is also undermined by a number of 
its assumptions including: its exclusion of transportation costs and its assumption that 
production factors were domestically mobile but internationally immobile; its 
exaggerated belief in the labour theory of value in that it argued that the amount of 
labour input is the key determinant of the cost of production; and the reliance of the 
law of comparative advantage on a two-country model. `'8 Furthermore, the neo- 
classical trade theory failed to account for the phenomenal growth in the post-war 
period of inter-firm and intra-firm trade, the bulk of which took place between 
industrialised countries. 
2. The Mercantilist Theory of Trade 
The evolution of the nationalist theory of trade can be traced to the mercantile policies 
practised by the European nations - particularly by England with its Corn Laws that 
regulated the trade in agricultural goods - from the sixteenth to the nineteenth 
centuries. `' One of the most celebrated works in the mercantilist tradition is 
Friedrich List's National System of Political Economy, in which he challenged the 
free trade theories propounded by the classical British economists. List questioned 
`'' McDonald, The World Trading System 
, p. 19. 68 Gilpin, The Political Economv, pp. 174-175. 61) Moon, Dilemmas, p. 34. 
44 
the notion of a natural and unchangeable international division of labour founded on 
the principle of comparative advantage. He argued that this labour division was a 
product of historical political and economic power struggles and that Britain, contrary 
to the arguments of free trade theorists, "had actually used the power of the state to 
protect their own infant industries against foreign competition while weakening their 
opponents by military force, and they only became champions of free trade after 
having achieved technological and industrial supremacy over their rivals .,, 
70 For 
List, therefore, the British were deploying the rhetoric of free trade to pursue their 
national economic interests and disguise their ambition to gain unfettered access to 
foreign markets. In his view free trade could be realised only when other countries 
acquired parity with Britain in terms of industrial strength. 71 
Although economic nationalists generally emphasise the need for the state to regulate 
international trade in order to safeguard the national interest, no universal, and 
coherent theory of mercantilism exists. Indeed, as Moon pointed out: 
While liberalism contains an integrated body of precise premises, refined logical 
arguments, and universalistic policy conclusions, mercantilism has always 
consisted of fragmented practical wisdom derived fron an eclectic mix of past 
policy successes, tactical judgements, and a smattering of theoretical ideas. In 
fact, it is awkward to identify the boundaries of mercantilism as a doctrine, 
because `mercantilism' is a name applied after the fact to a compilation of 
diverse arguments in defense of the various commercial (i. e. mercantile) 
policies widely practised in Europe prior to the nineteenth century. 72 
Still, there are certain core assumptions around which proponents of mercantilist 
policies coalesce. First, they disagree with economic liberals on the objectives of 
trade policy. Although liberals extol the allocative efficiency of trade, economic 
70 Gilpin, The Political Economy, p. 181. 
71 Ibid., p. 182. 
72 Moon, "Ideas and Policies, " p. 44. 
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nationalists are concerned about the implications of free trade for national autonomy 
and state power. Second, mercantilists are concerned not only about the impact of 
free trade on economic development, but also about its distributive effects. They 
question the liberal assumption that trade is a positive-sum rather than a zero-sum 
game, and dismiss as fanciful the dependence by liberals on Adam Smith's `invisible 
hand of self-interest' as a distributor of economic wealth. For some mercantilists. 
therefore, the values of stability and equality take precedence over those of 
consumption and aggregate living standards championed by liberals. Third, 
economic nationalists prize a favourable balance of trade, which is central to 
strengthening the state and the domestic economy. 73 
3. The GATT and the Liberal International Economic Order 
The GATT was in part a product of the Keynesian revolution that shaped the post- 
1945 settlement. A substitute for the ill-fated International Trade Organisation, the 
GATT was set up as one of three Bretton Woods institutions - the other two were the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development - to restore "the conditions for an international system which would 
secure the combination of currency convertibility, capital mobility and free trade. "74 
It was agreed by the architects of the post-war pact that the creation of such 
conditions was contingent upon recognising that the institution of the market was not 
automatically self-regulating at the domestic level. For this reason it was considered 
necessary to have periodic state intervention in the economy to correct market 
imperfections. Likewise, it was accepted that government intervention at the 
73 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
74 Diana Tussle, The Less Developed Countries and the World Trading System -A Challenge to the 
GATT (London: Pinter, 1987), p. 1 1. 
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international level was justifiable, although there was no agreement regarding the 
degree of that intervention. 
7 
The key aim of the GATT was to "achieve `freer and fairer trade' through reduction 
of tariffs and elimination of other trade barriers . 
"7`' Operating on the basis of the rules 
of non-discrimination - in the shape of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and national 
treatment principles - and unconditional reciprocity among all contracting parties, the 
GATT played a crucial role in facilitating the progressive liberalisation of 
international trade over successive decades. Nevertheless, significant deviations 
were enshrined in these rules. For example, the GATT Agreement provided for a 
separate system for agricultural trade which "reflected the powerful influence of 
agricultural groups and the resultant policies of government intervention to protect 
domestic prices and producer incomes and to ensure food security. "'7 
The GATT rules also made provision for an array of exceptions, including exceptions 
for preferential trade agreements (Article XXIV) and those for balance of payments 
difficulties (Article XVIII) that have been used by sonic developing countries. 
Exemptions from GATT disciplines could also be justified on the grounds of 
protecting human, animal and plant health (Article XX). Furthermore, a general 
safeguard clause (Article XIX) as well as anti-dumping (Article VI) provisions - 
which have been employed as tools of administrative protection - were also included 
" Ibid. 
"' Gilpin, The Political Economy, p. 191. 
77 Joan F. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of international Economic Relations (New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1997), p. 53 
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in the treaty. 7 These exemptions accorded with Ruggie's notion of `embedded liberal 
compromise': countries could accept and implement GATT commitments - 
progressive tariff reductions - so long as these did not undermine their 
domestic 
economic goals. 79 In this context non-discrimination and multilateral free trade 
did 
not imply a complete elimination of national regulation. It could be argued, therefore, 
that the GATT represented a system of managed liberalisation rather than one of free 
trade. 
Initially the GATT system worked extremely well "because the United States 
possessed sufficient economic and political power to enforce its vision. "80 The US 
played a key leadership role in championing international trade liberalisation in the 
post-war period. At the end of the Second World War, most industrialised countries 
pursued trade policies that depended on high tariffs, quantitative restrictions, 
exchange control and bilateral trading arrangements. In part, this was a legacy of the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff and the virulent economic nationalism of the 1930s. Yet it was 
also a result of these countries' considerable demand for foreign exchange, which was 
essential to their securing the necessary materials for reconstruction. In contrast, 
the US came out of the war not only with its productive capacity unharmed but it also 
boasted an extremely open economy albeit with low levels of imports and exports. 
It was this liberal and open character of the American economy that shaped the 
country's trade policy. In many respects US trade policy mirrored the liberal 
"" Stephen Woolcock, "The Multilateral Trading System into the New Millennium, " in Brian Mocking 
and Steven McGuire (eds. ), Trade Politics - International, Domestic and Regional Perspectives 
(London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 26-27. 
71' See John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism 
in the Post-War Economic Order, " International Organization, 36 (1982), pp. 379-416. 
Robert Reich, "Beyond Free Trade, " Foreign Affulrs, vol. 61, no. 4, (Spring 1983), p. 778. 
Anne O. Krueger, American Trade Policy -- A Tragc'dv in the Making (Washington, DC: The AEI 
Press, 1995), p. 26. 
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orientation of its domestic policy, with its emphasis on competitive and materialistic 
values. And, through the liberalisation of international trade, the US sought to 
remodel the global economy in its own liberal image. The US sponsored trade 
liberalisation across Western Europe in two ways: through the Marshall Plan and 
through its leadership of consecutive rounds of tariff reductions under the GATT. In 
particular, the Marshall Plan was an essential part of the US strategy to multilateralise 
the bilateral trade and payments system that underpinned the European reconstruction 
effort s. 92 However, it is worth noting that notwithstanding its support for free trade 
the US maintained a protectionist domestic trade regime in agriculture as well as in 
clothing and textiles. This inconsistency can be traced to the agreement made by the 
major economic powers, mainly the US and the EU, at the inception of the GATT 
system that its rules would not apply to the agricultural sector: the ban imposed by the 
GATT agreement on import quotas and export subsidies was waived in recognition of 
the `specificity of the agricultural sector. ' 
Likewise the GATT created the Multifibre Agreement, which permitted industrialised 
nations to control textile imports either through the negotiation of bilateral quotas or 
through the application of flexible safeguard measures. Apart from a determination to 
avert a repeat of the devastation wrought by the economic mercantilism of the 1930s, 
foreign policy concerns also played a central part in the endorsement of a liberal 
international trade system by successive US administrations. By assuming the 
leadership of the open multilateral trading system, the US signalled that it was able 
and willing to underwrite the costs of providing international public goods to other 
states in return for their support and cooperation. During the Cold War the US 
92 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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employed trade as a tool of foreign policy in that trade sanctions were imposed 
against developing countries considered to be supportive of or sympathetic to 
communist Russia. Conversely, Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet 
Union led the former to prioritise the economic advancement of its allies and pledge 
to guarantee their security. The US-Japan relationship during this period is 
illustrative of this policy. In a quest to `contain' the spread of Soviet communism, 
the US backed Japan in a number of ways, including: supporting Japanese economic 
growth and paying for its defence requirements; providing Japan with cheap 
technology transfers; and opening its markets to Japanese exports without demanding 
reciprocity. b3 
For much of the post-war period many developed countries deemed it in their material 
interest to ensure that the GATT regime functioned smoothly because they stood to 
gain from the American-inspired economic success. Yet the GATT did not mean 
much to the developing countries, many of which were not signatories to the 
international trade system. For much of the post-war war period developing 
countries adopted a suspicious attitude towards the liberal international economic 
order (LIEG). Partly, this had to do with the import-substituting industrial policies 
that they pursued in the 1950s and 1960s, which were predicated on the post-war 
arguments of export pessimism and infant industry protection (sec Chapter 2). But 
their wariness of the international trade regime was also symptomatic of a wider 
disillusion on their part with the workings of the world economy. Not only were 
developing nations dissatisfied with their position in the emergent post-war liberal 
economic order, they were also frustrated with the inability of the Bretton Woods 
R3 See Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, US Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2001). 
50 
institutions to frame an adequate response to their perceived problems. Developing 
countries maintained that the Bretton Woods system perpetuated the interests and 
needs of the major political and economic powers, particularly the United States, at 
the expense of the concerns of the developing world. 84 And it led them to question 
the theoretical foundations of the GATT system. As Tussie explained: 
LDC's objections to the rules of GATT have centred on the belief that 
the role envisaged for them is one of perpetuating their existence as 
exporters of primary commodities, while the more dynamic industrial 
occupations were reserved for the developed countries. The motive for 
this identification was the theory of comparative advantage which 
provided GATT's intellectual underpinning and which had 
traditionally been expounded in too static a framework. 85 
The political perceptions of the GATT formed by most developing countries 
sensitised them to the fact that their common problems stemmed primarily from the 
underdeveloped nature of their economies and their peripheral location in the global 
economy. They also provoked the realisation that regime change could only be 
brought about by the application of concerted pressure. The creation of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) by the Group of 77 
(G77) developing countries in 1964 represented a turning point in their quest to 
enhance their participation in the international economic governance institutions and 
to improve their position in the global economy. The UNCTAD's institutional 
framework provided a platform for collective action by members of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and the G77 to articulate Third World concerns and to agitate for 
regime change within the international economic institutions. The organisation was 
84 Sec Marc Williams, International Economic Organisations and the Third World (London: harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1999). 
85 Tussie, The Less Developed Countries, p. 3. 
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instrumental, therefore, in championing the interests of developing countries and 
translating their grievances into collective action for transformation. 
"' 
Although developing countries were reluctant participants in consecutive GATT 
negotiating rounds, their involvement in the international trade system increased 
exponentially in subsequent decades. This represented a significant departure from 
previous years when most developing nations regarded the GATT as `a rich man's 
club' that was concerned exclusively with the interests of developed countries. Four 
factors accounted for this change of stance. First, the realisation that special and 
differential treatment granted to poor countries in the mid-1980s did not improve their 
economic position significantly. Second, the rise of the newly industrialising 
countries (NICs) such as Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan highlighted growing 
economic differentiation among developing countries, with the NICs showing a clear 
interest in an open trading system. Third, growing citizen exposure to information 
about the opportunities available in other countries. Fourth, heightened pressure 
placed by the IFIs on countries pursuing inward-looking trade strategies. 
87 
4. The `Myth' of Free Trade 
Neo-liberal institutionalism places a great deal of importance on the value of 
international regimes. Like neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism contends that 
states are the key actors in the global system. It argues that the extent to which states 
communicate and cooperate is dependent on "human-constructed institutions, Which 
"`' See Marc Williams, Third World Co-operation - The Group of 77 in UNCTAD (London: Pinter, 
1991), pp. 57-76. 
', ' Rudiger Dornbusch, "The Case for Trade Liberalisation in Developing Countries, " Journal o/ 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter, 1992), pp. 69-70. 
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vary historically and across issues, in nature (with respect to the policies they 
incorporate) and in strength in terms of the degree to which their rules are clearly 
specified and routinely obeyed. "8' Moreover, neo-liberal institutionalism is 
concerned about the effects of institutions on state action and about the causes of 
institutional change; institutions are important for the actions of states partly because 
they affect the incentives facing states - even if those states' interests are defined 
independently. Formal and informal rules play a prominent role in the neo-liberal 
institutionalist account. In this context, an open international economic environment is 
considered to be conducive to peaceful behaviour because it provides incentives for 
mutually satisfying exchange under arranged sets of rules. `' Central to the neo-liberal 
institutionalist arguments is the notion of `hegemonic stability' theory. Hegemonic 
stability theory is based on the premise that the presence of a single dominant state, a 
hegemon, in the international system has beneficial effects for all states. An able and 
willing hegemonic power is central not only to preventing disorder in the international 
system but also to providing public goods for the weaker states. "" 
Neo-liberal institutionalism has come under fierce criticism in IPE literature. Robert 
Cox considers international regimes problematic in that they take the existing order as 
given, not as something to be criticised and changed. fie points out that regimes 
stress institutional co-operation but have less to say about attempts to change the 
structure of the of world economy: their starting point is the co-existence of the state 
system and the world capitalist economy. As such regimes serve "to stabilise the 
world economy and have the effect of inhibiting and deterring states from initiating 
gs Robert Keohane, "Neo-liberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics, " in Robert Keohane 
(ed. ) International Institutions and State Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 2. '`' Ibid., p. 11. 
90 See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984) 
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radical departures from economic orthodoxy. ""I For Susan Strange, regimes 
obfuscate and obscure interests and power relationships in the international system 
and "serve as instruments of the structural strategy and foreign policy of the 
dominant state or states .,, 
92 She also denounces regimes for being value-laden in that 
they assume that all states desire greater order and managed interdependence. 
Furthermore, she contends that regimes perpetuate a state-centred paradigm because 
they do not take into account the role of non-state actors in the global system. As 
such, regimes risk over-emphasising the positive aspects of international cooperation 
at the expense of those that are negative. 93 
While conceding the pivotal role played by America's hegemonic leadership in 
sustaining the post-war liberal international economic order, she points to a dilemma 
- the `hegemon's dilemma' - presented by this role in that by maintaining the global 
economic order the US sowed the seeds of its decline. 94 The decline of US hegemony 
originated in the enormous structural changes that reconfigured the global economy in 
the 1970s, palpably demonstrated by the resurgence of Europe, the emergence of 
Japan as a great economic power, and the ascendancy of the NICs. 
These structural changes were marked by a fundamental realignment in the industrial 
hierarchies of the world that presented a severe challenge to the traditional GATT 
system and necessitated a review of the manner in which it had been operating. This 
challenge is summed up by Reich who points out that: 
`' Robert W. Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order, " in Robert W. Cox (cd), Approaches to World 
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 494-523. 
`'` Susan Strange, "Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis, " in Stephen D. Krasner (ed. ), 
International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 342. 93 Ibid., pp. 344-349. 
94 Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 22. 
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During the 1970s trade accords became progressively less coherent or 
conclusive because the premises on which the post-war free-trade ideal 
had been founded were no longer applicable to large segments of 
industrialised economies. The GATT, which condones or condemns 
trade practices exclusively by reference to market standards, has little 
to say about the growing fraction of trade conducted largely outside 
market channels, such as transfers of raw materials and intermediate 
goods within multinational firms and issues concerning wholly or 
partly public enterprises. '' 
The decline of US hegemony coincided with the erosion of support for the ideal of 
free trade on the part of the US and its major trade partners. According to Higgott: 
The decline in the USA's position as hegemon of the LIEO would also 
appear to have been accompanied by a decline in its support for the 
principles and norms that have underpinned the LIEG - especially 
those principles and norms, enshrined in GATT, that have guided the 
international trading regime in the post-war period. The first of these 
was a commitment to a liberal and open approach to trade. Secondly, 
there was the US commitment to multilateralism as a way of reducing 
trade restrictions. Perhaps the third principle of US policy in this 
period should be noted. The US, again in contrast to European allies, 
favoured a legal-codified approach to regulating the international 
trading system whilst the Europeans favoured a negotiating approach 
which preserved their sovereign administrative discretion. 
`'' 
The resurgence of trade protectionism in the 1980s raised questions about the future 
viability of the liberal, multilateral international economic order in which the GATT 
was anchored. The idea that the GATT could de-legitimise defection from the liberal 
international trade system by ensuring cooperation and reciprocity between countries 
through the implementation of common rules and norms had been discredited by the 
increasing instances of defection from these regimes by the dominant economic 
actors, which found their multilateral commitments to be at odds with their national 
Reich, "Beyond Free Trade, " pp. 180-781. 
Richard Higgott The World Economic Order: The Trade Crisis and Its Implications for Australia 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs), p. 15. 
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interests. `'? The growing pursuit of narrow national interests at the expense of 
multilateral obligations vindicated the view that the notion of free trade was a `myth' 
and that "efficiency never has been, and never can be, the sole consideration in the 
choice of state politics. "` 8 
5. The New Protectionism 
The GATT system was severely tested by the rise of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the 
1980s. Ironically, the rise of the new protectionism was a consequence of the 
tremendous success that had been achieved by the GATT in liberalising global trade. 
Given that the progressive liberalisation of trade undertaken under the auspices of the 
GATT meant that governments could no longer deploy tariffs and quotas as 
instruments of domestic economic policy, numerous states resorted to the use of non- 
tariff barriers - such as health and sanitary regulations, national standards, customs 
procedures and government procurement policies -- to protect their economics from 
international competition. `'`' In addition to NTBs, the new protectionism assumed 
the shape of voluntary export restraints (VERs), which "were developed as a response 
to pressure for protection from import-sensitive industries. """' The use of VERs was 
championed particularly by the US, which was concerned about the adverse effects 
that the surge of exports from Japan and other Asian NICs were having on its 
domestic economy. The growth of the new protectionism posed a serious threat to 
97 Ibid., p. 34. 
See Susan Strange, "Protectionism and World Politics, " International Oiguni: ation, vol. 39, no. 2, 
(Spring, 1985), p-236- 
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the GATT system in that the GATT had been set up to regulate import restrictions and 
tariffs, not NTBs and VERs. 10' 
6. Strategic Trade Policy 
The 1980s witnessed a strategic shift in economic thinking about trade policy, which 
was "due in part to the development of new analytical tools and in part to two trends 
in the post-war trading environment. One is the growth of economically weak 
countries to positions of influence comparable to that of the largest post-war powers. 
The other is the conglomeration and multinationalisation of corporate enterprise. -102 
The rise of strategic policy challenged the assumptions of orthodox trade theory and 
debunked the notion of free trade based on static comparative advantage, a central 
tenet of the liberal economic doctrine. Propounded by New Trade theorists such as 
Paul Krugman, strategic trade theory argues that the economic changes that have 
taken place in the international political economy over the decades have necessitated a 
departure from the economic analysis on which the idea of free trade has been based. 
The changing international economic environment is characterised mainly by 
oligopolistic competition and strategic interaction. This has created an imperfect 
trading environment and made comparative advantage arbitrary. In essence, strategic 
trade theory acknowledges that comparative advantage is no longer static: it can no 
longer be based solely on natural factor endowments but ought to take account of 
other factors. For Higgott, what is: 
101 Ibid., p. 73. 
102 David J. Richardson, "The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy, " International 
Organization, vol. 44, no. 1, (Winter 1990), p108. 
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Particularly important is the manner in which changes in the 
international division of labour allow and encourage governments to 
help manufacture a comparative advantage based on such factors as 
capital's ability and willingness to relocate on the basis of state 
sponsored inducements or marginal leads in narrow technological 
races. ' 03 
In a world of imperfect competition and dominance of oligopolistic firms, therefore, 
the ideal of perfect competition enunciated by liberal trade theory has remained 
impossible if not unrealistic. 104 As Gilpin explained: 
In the perfectly competitive world of orthodox trade theory, the 
number of actors is too large and their individual size too small to 
determine economic outcomes; in such a market economic decisions 
are based principally on variables such as the price, quality, and 
characteristics of goods. A strategic environment is one composed of a 
relatively few large actors; in such an imperfect or oligopolistic 
market, powerful actors can significantly influence outcomes. 1115 
It is for these reasons that strategic trade theory advocates intervention by the state - 
through policy measures such as protection and subsidies - in order to influence the 
international strategic environment in ways that provide advantage to the home 
country's oligopolistic firms. By espousing an "activist trade policy, " strategic trade 
policy can benefit a country through a capture of the "rents" created by an 
oligopolistic trading situation. 1'6 The state has an incentive, therefore, to intervene in 
order to protect those industries which produce rents and which arc considered to 
have strategic value for international competitiveness. 
103 Higgott, The World Economic Order, p. 24. 
104 See, for example, Paul R. Krugman, Strategic Trade Polic, v and the New /nternutional Econoinics 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986); Gene M. Grossman and J. David Richardson, Strategic Trade Polier: A 
Survey of issues and Early Analysis (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 199S). 
Gilpin, The Political Economy, p. 215. 
10ý Krugman, Strategic Trade Policy, p. 12. 
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7. Trans nationalisation of Production 
The world economy has undergone far-reaching structural change over the past 
decades. This structural change has facilitated the rise of the New international 
Division of Labour (NIDL)t07 in the international economic system. The traditional 
international division of labour, which was characterised by the concentration of 
manufacturing industrial sites in Western Europe, the US and Japan, has been 
supplanted by the NIDL which has been typified by the relocation of segments of 
industrial production from industrialised to lower-wage developing countries. 
Advanced industrial processes, which previously were carried out domestically, have 
been increasingly enmeshed in global production chains. Production has become a 
transnational process -- no longer a national phenomenon. 
The germination of the NIDL can be ascribed to a combination of conditions in the 
historical development of the world economy, which have "brought into existence a 
world market for labour and a real world industrial reserve army of workers, together 
with a world market for production sites. ""'' These conditions have included, among 
other things, the limitless expansion of reserves of disciplined and low-wage labour in 
the developing countries which foreign companies have not hesitated to tap, the 
increasingly advanced subdivision of the production process which has made possible 
the execution of fragmented operations with relatively low levels of skill, and the 
i"7 For a detailed discussion of the concept of new international division of labour see James A. 
Caporaso, "The International Division of Labour: A Theoretical Overview, " in James A. Caporaso 
(ed. ), A Changing International Division a Lahour (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987), pp. 1-41; Iýolker 
Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye, The New International Diavision of L «hour: Strucfurti( 
Unemployment in bath strialised Countries and Inctusirialistzlion in Developing Countries (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
108 Ibid., p. 13. 
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growing sophistication of transport and communication technologies which have 
facilitated the entire or partial production of goods anywhere in the world. 
The NIDL has entailed an increasingly internalised structure of production. Intra-firm 
trade -- that is, cross-border transactions among the subsidiaries of the same 
multinational corporation (MNC) -- has increasingly replaced arm's-length 
transactions. It has been estimated by the UNCTAD that intra-firm trade constitutes 
between a quarter and a third of total world trade. " Given that intra-firm trade is 
subject to the internal decisions of MNCs, and not to external market prices, it creates 
comparative advantages for MNCs due to market strategies such as domestic sourcing 
and transfer pricing - namely, the use of internal, rather than market, prices to 
conduct transactions among subsidiaries of the same multinational firm. As well as 
fostering differentiation among products, intra-firm trade has promoted economies of 
scale in production. Product differentiation has enabled firms to specialise in each 
segment of the production process and has helped them to deepen their penetration of 
global markets. "" 
A crucial aspect of the NIDL has been the growth of trade not only between 
developed and developing countries, but also among the developing countries. This 
can be ascribed largely to the increasing capacity of developing countries - whose 
erstwhile role in the world economy was restricted to exporting primary products to 
produce manufactured goods as well as engage in trade in services. The impressive 
economic growth rates attained by East Asia's NICs --- such as Singapore, Taiwan, 
° See UNCTAD (1995), World Investment Report 1995: Mnjmkl/inilal ('orporalionzs ummd Competitiveness (New York: United Nations, 1995). 
1 "' David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Glohul 7ra,, /nrmalions. 
Politics, AeonomWS and ('u/hure (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp 174-175. 
60 
Hong Kong and South Korea - in the 1980s bear testimony to the success of their 
export-led trade strategies. Yet many developing countries, most of whose economies 
are still dependent on the export of primary goods, have failed to achieve the high 
levels of industrialisation and economic prosperity secured by the East Asian NICs 
and, to a lesser extent, Latin American NICs. It could be argued, therefore, that the 
incorporation of the NICs as exporters of manufactures in the NIDL has reconfigured 
the patterns of stratification of in the world economy: the world economy is no longer 
polarised between industrialised and developing economics, it also exhibits 
asymmetries and inequalities between the previously monolithic group of developing 
countries. 
8. The New Regionalism 
Coinciding with the NIDL has been the emergence of the new regionalism in the 
international political economy. Propelled primarily by the forces of globalisation, 
the new regionalism has been a crucial analyst in the disintegration of the old 
regionalism, a product of ideological rivalry between the capitalist and the socialist 
worlds. ' 11 Its distinctive characteristic has been a trend towards the `triadisation' of 
the world economy - that is, the overwhelming concentration of trade and capital 
flows around the three growth poles of Europe, North America, and East Asia. This 
regional pattern has been underscored by the fact that seventy five percent of the total 
accumulated foreign direct investment (FDI) stock, as well as sixty percent of FDI 
flows, were located in the three regional blocs in the early 199()S. 112 
"' Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, Regionalism and World Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 1996), p. 259. 
112 See UNCTAD (1993), World Investment Directory 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1993). 
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The triadisation of the global economy has ignited a debate on the relationship 
between the new regionalism and globalisation over the past years. Is the new 
regionalism an essential part of, or an alternative to globalisation? Does the new 
regionalism enhance or reduce commitment to multilateralismr Critics of regional 
integration see the new regionalism as a challenge to multilateralism. They argue that 
regionalisation strengthens disintegrative elements in the world economy, 
encouraging the emergence of protectionist blocs. 113 They also maintain that regional 
integration projects discriminate against third parties because of the regional 
preferences - for goods, services and capital - prescribed by such integration 
agreements. Proponents of regionalism, on the other hand, view regional and 
multilateral processes as mutually exclusive. Regionalism, they contend, does not 
only complement multilateralism, but it is also a vehicle through which countries can 
engage meaningfully with the processes of globalisation. ' 14 Regionalist projects are 
thus not seen as rivals to globalism, but rather as forerunners to wider liberalisation 
and multilateral co-operation. Moreover, supporters of regional integration espouse 
open regionalism, which means that policy is directed towards the elimination of' 
obstacles to trade within a region - trade creation not trade diversion. 
Whatever the merits or otherwise of the preceding arguments, it is clear that both the 
forces of regionalisation and globalisation have shaped the world economy since the 
inception of the last decade. It is this realisation that has spurred the proliferation of 
regional integration arrangements in the international economy, particularly in the 
'" Cord Jakobeit, "The Theoretical Dimensions of Regional Integration: Have the Motives for 
Developing Countries Changed'?, " in Heribert Dieter (ed. ), The Regionalisation of the World Econotnr 
and Consequences for Southern Africa (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 1997), pp. 9-17. 114 See Percy Mistry, "The New Regionalism: Impediment or Spur to Future Multilateral ism?, " in 
Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds. ), Globalisvn and the New Regionalism 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 116-154. 
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developing world. Developing countries committed to integrating their economies at 
the regional level have sought to fashion integration strategies that are responsive to 
their specific conditions and difficulties. 
9. Regionalisation in the Age of Globalisation 
The twin trends of globalisation and regionalisation are playing an increasingly 
important role in shaping the world economy. ' 15 Both concepts describe different but 
overlapping processes. The process of globalisation has "accelerated an integration of 
national goods, services, as well as capital and financial markets into a single global 
market. " 116 Globalisation trends tend to reduce both national autonomy and economic 
actors' scope for action. As the functions of the national state arc reconfigured, and in 
some cases diminished, problems are increasingly tackled at the supra-national level, 
where the approach can be both global and regional. Regionalisation, on the other 
hand, refers to those processes which "deepen the integration of particular regional 
economic spaces. "' 17 A number of factors are taken into account when measuring the 
extent and depth of regional integration, including trade flows, investment, aid and 
people. Like globalisation, regionalisation is usually uneven in its impact. As such, 
deepening integration might lead to growing polarisation if the issue of inequality and 
unequal development among regional states is not addressed. 
11s Jakobeit, "The Theoretical Dimensions, "pp. 9-10. 
16 Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, Global 7ran., fbrmatios, pp. 3-5. 117 Gamble and Payne, Regionalism and World Order, p. 258. 
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It is important to distinguish between policy-induced and market-induced regional 
integration processes. Policy-induced processes are arrangements based on treaties. ' 1' 
In this context, regional integration projects are devised by policy-making elites in 
response to changes in the world economy. The resultant treaty codifies the economic 
framework that has been agreed upon through negotiation and bargaining. State- 
driven regionalist projects seek to manage the substance and direction of social 
change represented by the globalisation and regionalisation trends. Market-induced 
integration, on the contrary, produces an economic regionalisation that is driven 
mainly by private actors. ' 19 Consequently, it can be argued that regional integration 
represents not only a reaction to the increasing globalisation of the economy, but also 
as a reaction to growing problems in specific policy areas. Regional integration 
represents an attempt to strike a balance between, on the one hand, exploiting the 
advantages of free trade and growing markets and, on the other hand, safeguarding the 
ability of the state to craft and implement social policies intended to mitigate the 
negative aspects of economic globalisation. 
One of the notable features of the contemporary global political economy since the 
end of the Cold War has been the rise of the `new regionalism. ' 20 Propelled 
primarily by the forces of globalisation, the new regionalism has been a crucial 
catalyst in the breakdown of the old regionalism, which was characterised by the 
division between the capitalist and the socialist worlds. It has coincided with 
fundamental changes to the world economy. First, there has been a trend towards the 
triadisation of the world economy: the great majority of merchandise and capital 
"x Heribert Dieter, `Regionalisation in the Age of Globalisation: What Limits Are There to Economic 
Integration in Southern Africa?, " in Heribert Dieter (ed. ), The Re gionalisution of the World Econonrv 
and It. Consequences fier Southern Africa (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 1997), p. 206. 119 Ibid. 
'20Ibid., p. 201, 
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flows in the world economy take place between the three poles of Europe, North 
America, and East Asia. Second, the new regionalism has been typified by a growing 
integration of previously marginalised developing countries into the capitalist world 
economy - even though a large number of these developing countries are still 
excluded from the globalisation processes. Third, global economic actors have 
become more diverse. Participation is no longer confined to state actors - it includes 
non-state actors as well. In this regard, transnational corporations have played an 
increasingly prominent role in the world economy. Furthermore, integration projects 
in the new regionalism have been typified by trade strategies oriented towards the 
world market, rather than towards import substitution as was the case during the first 
wave of regional integration. This reflects the ascendancy of neo-liberal thinking, 
which has strongly influenced the operations of key international economic 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. 121 
Over the past years, the debate on the relationship between globalisation and the new 
regionalism has become more pronounced. Is the new regionalism an essential part 
of, or an alternative to globalisation? Does the new regionalism enhance or does it 
reduce commitment to multilateralism? Critics of regional integration see the new 
regionalism as a challenge to multilateralism. They argue that regionalisation 
strengthens disintegrative elements in the world economy, leading to the emergence 
of protectionist blocs. 122 They also maintain that regional integration projects 
discriminate against third parties because of the regional preferences - for goods, 
services and capital - prescribed by such integration agreements. The proponents of 
regionalism, however, point out that regional and multilateral processes are not 
121 Gamble and Payne, Regionalism and World Order, p. 249. 122 Jakobeit, "The Theoretical Dimensions, " p. 17. 
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mutually exclusive. Regionalism does not only complement multilateralism, but it is 
also a vehicle through which countries can engage meaningfully with the process of 
globalisation. 123 Regionalist projects are not seen as rivals to globalism, but rather as 
forerunners to wider liberalisation and multilateral co-operation. Furthermore, the 
supporters of regional integration advocate open regionalism, which means that policy 
is directed towards the elimination of obstacles to trade within a region, while 
ensuring that external tariff barriers to the rest of the world are not increased. They 
argue that the central goal of economic policy ought to be the maintenance and 
improvement of international competitiveness: the economy must not be insulated 
from foreign competition. 
The parallel dynamics of globalisation and regionalisation have gained ground in both 
the industrialised countries and the developing world. However, the previous 
experience of regional integration in the developing countries has highlighted a need 
for integration approaches that are sensitive to their unique development problem s. 124 
It has drawn attention to the danger of relying exclusively on integration approaches 
that have been too narrowly focused on the Western European experience. Thus, 
there has been a growing recognition among developing countries seeking to integrate 
their economies at the regional level of the necessity to develop integration strategies 
that are responsive to their specific conditions and difficulties. 
t73 See Percy Mistry, "The New Regionalism: Impediment or Spur, " pp. 1 16-154. 124 Jakobeit, "The Theoretical Dimensions, " p. 12. 
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10. The State and Outward-Oriented Development 
The remarkable economic achievements of East Asia's NICs in recent decades have 
awakened a scholarly interest in the role of the state in economic development. It is 
now widely recognised in the literature that the institution of the state has been a 
crucial factor in the success of outward-oriented development strategies pursued by 
countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. 125 In these countries, the state 
directed the process of industrial accumulation by "channelling capital into risky 
investments, enhancing the capacity of private firms to confront international markets, 
and taking on entrepreneurial functions directly through state-owned enterprises. "126 
The success of East Asia's developmental states has been ascribed to two related 
factors. First, their powerful strength vis-ä-vis societal interest has bestowed upon 
them a degree of autonomy that has enabled decision-making elites not only to define 
developmental goals independently but also to insulate themselves organisationally 
from societal pressures. Second, their relative autonomy provided them with the 
capacity to take advantage of their control over the production process to influence 
actor behaviour and mobilise social support for their policies. 
The autonomy enjoyed by the East Asian NICs has been attributable mainly to their 
Weberian state institutions. The emphasis on highly meritocratic and selective 
recruitment of bureaucratic personnel has instilled a sense of commitment and 
corporate coherence. Corporate coherence has fostered conditions where the pursuit 
125 See, for example, M. Alam, Governments anti Markets in Economic Development . Strategies. Lessons from Korea, Taiwan und Japan (New York: Praeger, 1989); C. Lee and 1. Yamazawa, The 
Econnºnic Development of Japan and Korea (New York: Praeger, 1990). 
'", Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural 
Change, " in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds. ), The Politics o/ Economic Adjustment 
International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1992), p. 158. 
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of corporate goals has been rewarded while the maximisation of individual self- 
interest has been discouraged. This has, in turn, enhanced the insulation of 
bureaucratic incumbents from societal influence. Yet the insulation of the 
bureaucratic apparatus from societal pressures in the NICs does not mean that these 
states have been disembedded from their social networks. On the contrary, the 
autonomy of the NICs has been based on informal social ties as it has been on formal 
bureaucratic structures. As Evans states, "it is an autonomy embedded in a concrete 
set of social ties which bind the state to society and provide institutionalised channels 
for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies. " 127 These social 
networks have played a key role in imbuing the state apparatus with "an internal 
coherence and corporate identity that meritocracy alone could not provide, "128 
The experience of East Asia's NICs has stood in sharp contrast to the pronouncements 
of advocates of market-oriented growth strategies such as the World Bank, who have 
always downplayed the role of the state in the rapid industrialisation of the newly 
industrialised countries. Although the World Bank has reluctantly conceded that the 
state can intervene, and has intervened successfully in some economics, it has 
suggested that "the pre-requisites were so rigorous"121' that they were unlikely to he 
duplicated elsewhere in the developing world. Successful state interventions have 
been, therefore, depicted as "market-conforming, "'" implying that they have 
produced similar results to those that would have been yielded by the market if it had 
been functioning flawlessly. Even if its analysis is open to debate, the World Bank 
has nonetheless been compelled to admit that the problems of its clients "may arise, 
127 [bid., p. 164. 
'29 Ibid., p. 153. 
12) World Bank, The East Asian Miracle. Economic Growth and Public Police (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 6. 
' `° Ibid., p. 21 
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not just from bad policies, but from institutional deficiencies correctable only in the 
long-term. ' 31 
The success of the NICs has attracted the interest of many developing countries, most 
of which have sought to emulate their policies. However, several international 
factors unique to the development East Asia's `economic tigers' are likely to make a 
replication of their experiences in other parts of the developing a very distant 
possibility. First, the NICs, especially Korea and Taiwan, used their geo-strategic 
significance during the Cold War to win preferential access to the US markets without 
having to reciprocate by opening their own markets. This provided a vast captive 
market for their export commodities. Second, in line with their roles as bulwarks 
against communism these states took advantage of US military and economic aid to 
bolster their domestic savings and low patterns of consumption. Third, they 
embarked upon export-led growth when most industrialising countries were still 
pursuing import-substitution policies. These special conditions provided a unique 
geopolitical and economic context in which the developmental goals of the NICs have 
been realised. It is unlikely, however, that this success can he attained elsewhere in 
the post-Cold War period. The end of the Cold War has implied that developing 
states cannot continue to enjoy preferential treatment -- in terms of market access as 
well as economic aid -- similar to that provided by the US to its client states during the 
Cold War. Moreover, the relentless pursuit of trade liberalisation on a global scale 
within the WTO since the early 1990s has meant that individual states will be under 
growing pressure to adopt more liberal trade and investment policies. 132 
131 Evans, The State as Problem and Solution, " p. 141. "' See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Econoniv 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 6_7. 
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11. The Global Push for the Liberalisation of Trade and Investment 
The ascendancy of neo-liberal economic ideology in the 1970s and 1980s represented 
a decisive attack on the notion of `embedded liberalism, ' the normative framework 
that underpinned the interventionist economic practices of the post-war period. 133 The 
advocates of neo-liberalism, inspired by the ideas of economic thinkers such as 
Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek, were critical of the Keynesian welfare 
state and blamed it for most of the problems afflicting the global economy. They 
sought to construct an international economic order that would "promote freer 
markets and more orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. "134 In the domain of 
international financial markets, not only were the proponents of neo-classical 
economics opposed to the imposition of capital controls on financial movements, but 
they also admired the way international financial markets disciplined government 
policy and forced states to adopt conservative macroeconomic policies. Moreover, 
they argued that a liberal international order would "promote a more efficient 
allocation of capital by allowing capital to move across borders where it could be 
most productively employed. " 135 
The mobility of financial operations has made it difficult to exercise political 
management over the liberal financial order.; " This is because the liberal financial 
order, unlike the liberal trade order, is not subject to collective action problems such 
as `prisoners' dilemma dynamics and `free riding' behaviour. lt is these collective 
action problems that complicate efforts to reduce trade barriers. For example, in the 
133 Eric Helleiner, "Freeing money: why have states been more willing to liberalise capital controls than 
trade harriers, " Policy Sciences, vol. 27, no. 4 (1994), p. 301. 
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trade domain one of the crucial benefits of an open trading order -- access to foreign 
markets - cannot be realised without collective action: that is, without efforts on the 
part of other states to reduce their trade barriers. The mobility of finance, therefore, 
ensured that it was competition and deregulation (the competitive deregulation 
dynamic) rather than cooperation that encouraged the emergence of an open, liberal 
international financial order in the 1970s and 1980s. It made it possible for the open 
financial regime to be implemented unilaterally through liberalisation and 
deregulation rather than through cooperation. What this point underscores is that it is 
pointless to regulate international trading system effectively if the benefits derived 
from trade liberalisation can be nullified by the volatility of international financial 
markets. 
It is worth noting that it is national states -- led by Britain and the US - that were the 
main driving political force behind the globalisation of financial markets. '" 
According to Helleiner, states supported financial globalisation in the post-war era in 
three ways. First, by giving freedom to market actors. The resurgence of 
international capital mobility was partly a consequence of the leading role that 
American and British states played in removing controls on the international 
movement of private financial capital. Second, by putting in place mechanisms for the 
prevention of major financial crises. The growth of the unregulated Eurodollar 
market was instrumental in inspiring other foreign financial centres to follow the lead 
of Britain and the US by liberalising and deregulating their own financial systems. 
The drive towards financial liberalisation was, however, counter-balanced by the 
decision to make the state a lender-of-last resort in the event of severe international 
'" This assertion does not, of course, downplay the important roles that other factors such as 
international firms and technological innovation have played in propelling economic globalisation. 
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financial crises. This was demonstrated clearly by the intervention of the US Federal 
Reserve in the 1982 debt crisis, sparked off by Mexico's debt default, and in its 
subsequent decision to provide a rescue package to enable Brazil and Argentina 
overcome their liquidity crises. These actions played a crucial role in maintaining the 
momentum of financial globalisation. Lastly, by choosing not to implement more 
effective controls on financial movements. The reluctance to impose more effective 
controls on financial movements, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, was also a catalyst in the deregulation and liberalisation of international 
financial markets. 13x 
The exponential rise of transnational capital mobility between the late 1970s and the 
early 1990s laid the basis for the erosion of national financial barriers by offshore 
markets and the multinational firms. 139 The erosion of national financial barriers 
enhanced the capability of market operators to develop evasion and exit strategies. 
As Pauly and Goodman elucidate: 
Multinational structures enabled firms to evade capital controls by 
changing transfer prices or the timing of payments to or from foreign 
subsidiaries. The deepening of financial markets meant that firms 
could use subsidiaries to raise or lend funds on foreign markets. If 
controls in a country became too onerous, MNEs could also attempt to 
escape them altogether by transferring activities abroad, that is, by 
exercising the exit option. 140 
The ever-present threat to exercise the exit option has increased the influence of fines 
in relation to economic policymaking and has strengthened the bargaining position of 
"" Eric Helleiner, "Explaining the globalisation of financial markets: bringing the states hack in, " 
Review of Political Economy, vol. 12, no. 2, (Spring 1995), pp. 315-341. 
ý, 139 John B. Goodman and Louis W, Pauly, Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic 
Management in an Age of Global Markets, " World Politics, vol. 46, no. 1, (October 1993), p 58. 140 Ibid. 
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firms vis-ä-vis national governments. Parallel to the broader momentum towards 
financial globalisation was a rising trend towards greater trade openness, especially 
among the developing countries. The widespread skepticism about open trade that 
had prevailed among the developing countries for much of the postwar period made 
way for an enthusiastic embrace of neo-liberal free market policies. It underlined a 
recognition of potential benefits of a liberal international trading system to national 
economies. The growing acceptance of neo-liberal trade policies in the developing 
world was triggered by a number of global developments, including the debt crisis of 
the 1980s, the diminishing amount of official development aid, the collapse of former 
socialist economies, and the failure of inward-looking economic policies - whose 
deficiencies were exposed by the success of East Asia's export-oriented economies. 
Accordingly most developing countries, both as part of a domestic strategy and under 
pressure from the World Bank and IMF undertook extensive policy reforms designed 
to reduce trade barriers and to open up their economies to foreign competition. 
The notion of growth through trade assumed a status of orthodoxy in development 
circles during the 1980s. Based on neo-classical trade theory, particularly the 
Ricardian model of dynamic comparative advantage, growth through trade prescribed 
outward oriented or export-led development strategies for developing countries. It 
was touted by the World Bank as central to the successes of the NICs, primarily 
because "an outward orientation increases efficiency in the allocation of resources, 
competitiveness of goods produced, and flexibility to adapt to the ever-changing 
opportunities and constraints thrown up by the international economy -- including 
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rapid adjustment to the severe external shocks of the 1970s. "'4' The rise of export- 
oriented industrialisation (EOI) strategies represented a fundamental departure from 
the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) development model that was pursued 
vigorously by most developing countries in the post war period. Predicated on the 
ideas of the NIEO programme propounded by Raul Prebisch in the 1950s, the ISI 
model advocated "measures of a comprehensive, integrated, and regulatory character, 
designed to manipulate and direct international economic activities in such a way as 
to produce outcomes considered to be more favourable to the developing countries 
than those produced by current international market mechanisms. " 142 
The NIEO represented a challenge to the post-war liberal economic order as it 
articulated demands for a new international economic order that was responsive to the 
needs of the developing world. This challenge to the liberal international economic 
order attempted to achieve a number of objectives, including influencing the 
intellectual climate and canvassing support for certain ideas considered by the 
developing countries to be conducive to economic development, as well as increasing 
the influence of developing countries in decision-making by restructuring the 
international economic organisations. In this respect, the NIEO supported, amongst 
other things, preferential and non-reciprocal trade arrangements calculated to secure 
favourable terms of trade as well as bigger access to the markets of industrialised 
countries. The NIEO was thus an antithesis of the export-lcd growth strategies 
espoused by the World Bank in the sense that instead of supporting the integration of 
developing countries into the world economy in accordance with the principle of 
141 John Gerard Ruggie, "International Interdependence and National Welfare, " in John Gerard Ruggie 
(ed. ), The Antinomies of Interdependence. - National Welfare and the international Division of Labotn" 
(New York: Columbia University Press), p. 10. 
142 Ibid., p. 11. 
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unrestricted free trade, it called for their integration "on a more planned basis, with 
redistributive principles directly guiding the allocation of resources. " 43 
12. Economic Globaüsation: The End of the National State? 
The theoretical debate concerning whether globalisation has led to a decline of the 
national state remains inconclusive. In essence, arguments have revolved around 
three ends along a continuum. At one end of the continuum are `globalists' such as 
the American business thinker Kenichi Ohmae, who suggest that there is an 
irrevocable decline in the power and importance of the state. For Ohmae the process 
of globalisation is creating an inexorable shift towards what he describes as a 
"borderless world. " Based on his analysis of the behaviour of some of the major 
MNCs, he draws the conclusion that national boundaries arc becoming meaningless 
and that the only role left for states to perform is to appease the needs of business by 
providing infrastructure and public goods at the lowest possible cost. 144 
A less globalist but still declinist argument is advanced by Susan Strange, who 
contends that structural changes in the international political economy have led to a 
diffusion of power and authority between states and other non-state actors, especially 
firms, in the world economy. She notes that: 
the impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the post war 
period by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the 
cooperative decisions of governments, are now more powerful than the 
states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is 
supposed to belong. Where states were once masters of markets, now 
it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over 
143 Ibid., pp. 
144 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power « ncl Strategy in the /nterlinked Economy (New 
York: Free Press, 1990). 
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the governments of states. And the declining authority of states is 
reflected in a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and 
associations, and to local and regional bodies, and in a growing 
asymmetry between the larger states with structural power and weaker 
ones without it. '45 
Strange identifies the "accelerating pace of technological change" and the "salience of 
money in the international political economy" as the major causes of the shift in the 
state-market balance of power. 
140 In her view, these structural changes have enhanced 
the importance of firms in the global economy, and have reconfigured the relationship 
between states and firms by ending competition for territory between states in favour 
of competition for shares in the world market for goods and services. Thus, it has 
become imperative for states to bargain with firms, and vice versa, for market shares 
and over the terms of foreign direct investment. This is due to the fact that although 
states still have resources to control the territory that defines the boundaries of a 
national market, they cannot exercise control over globalised production for world 
markets. As such, the change in the production structure has necessitated a triangular 
form of diplomacy that involves state-to-state exchanges, firm-to-firne exchanges and 
state-to-firm exchanges. 147 
At the other end of the continuum are the arguments of scholars who believe that in 
many respects globalisation an exaggerated `myth. ' Spearheading this line of 
argument are Hirst and Thompson who, in their analysis of economic globalisation 
theories, conclude that the national state still occupies a central position in the 
international political economy. While they admit its changing role, they assert that 
the institution of the state has never remained static anyway. Moreover, they assert 
145 Strange, The Retreat of the Stute, p. 4. 
146 Ibid., p. 7. 
147 See Susan Strange and John Stopford, Rival States, Rival Firrr: s: Corrtpetition fJr World Market 
Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1-29. 
76 
that the fact that states still maintain exclusive control over their populations and 
territories, coupled with the fact that they remain central to any supranational 
governance, means that the state will continue to endure rather than wane. For Hirst 
and Thompson: 
nation-states are now simply one class of powers and political agencies 
in a complex system of power from world to local levels, but they have 
a centrality because of their relationship to territory and population. 148 
Various other theoretical arguments have been marshalled in this analytical mode. For 
example, Sassen questions the tendency to define the nation-state and the global 
economy as mutually exclusive entities. She argues that it is the state that has actively 
created `strategic spaces' where global processes take place. She maintains that these 
strategic spaces remain based within national territories in the sense that the legal 
mechanisms through which globalisation is implemented are often part of the state 
institutions. Likewise, the infrastructure that is used to facilitate capital mobility is 
located in the various national territories. The state, therefore, has been an active 
participant in globalisation processes even though it has emerged altered by its 
participation. Its' sovereignty remains part of the international system, but it is now 
located in various transnational institutions and regimes as well as in international 
human rights codes. 149 
Furthermore, Sassen contends that globalisation and governmental deregulation do no 
suggest an absence of regulatory institutions and regimes for the governance of global 
processes. Instead, there have emerged private regulatory systems represented by 
powerful non-state entities such as debt security or bond-rating agencies -- for 
14' Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalisation in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 190. 141' Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of'Glohalisatio (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), pp. 28-29. 
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example Moody's Investors and Standard and Poor's Ratings. These agencies wield 
significant clout relative to the state because of their "distinct gatekeeping functions 
for investment funds sought by corporations and governments. "150 In a globalising 
world, they have enormous power not only to determine countries where financial 
dealers should invest their funds but they also play a key role in promoting neo-liberal 
financial orthodoxy. 
In the same vein, Scholte asserts that the state in the era of globalisation has been 
characterised by subtle interplays of continuity and change. Continuity has been 
maintained in the sense that inter-state relations still constitute the thrust of 
governance mechanisms in the globalising world. But there has also been noticeable 
change in the character of the state in terms its capacities, policy-making processes 
and constituencies. Although globalisation has contributed to the end of sovereign 
statehood as it is understood in conventional terms, it has also led to the growth of 
multilateralism and supranational constituencies, a decline in interstate warfare and 
the internationalisation of the state. 151 
The internationalisation of the national state does not, however, necessarily translate 
into the reduction of its power. Using the Latin American region as her reference 
point, Nicola Phillips shows that the national state has been simultaneously weakened 
and strengthened by the globalising forces. 152 She calls this phenomenon the 
"paradox of state power, " which means that "the power of the state is enhanced by the 
1i0 Ibid., p. 16. 
Jan Aart Scholte, "Global Capitalism and the State, " International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 3, (1997), 
p. 428. 
152 Nicola Phillips, "Globalisation and the "Paradox of State Power": Perspectives from Latin 
America, " CSGR Working Paper No. 16/98 (November 1998), pp. 1-28. 
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same processes which are assumed to undermine its authority. "153 In the Latin 
American context, this happened when the internationalisation of the state made it 
simultaneously more and less powerful: globalisation reduced the policy-making 
autonomy of the state at international and regional levels while it enhanced it at 
national level. The engagement with the globalisation forces made it possible for the 
state to redefine its relations with societal interests - who were previously opposed to 
its macroeconomic management. Furthermore, international engagement enabled the 
state to `lock in' domestic political and economic reforms through binding agreements 
with the IFIs - thereby removing the influence of domestic societal interests on 
policy-making. Based on this empirical evidence, Phillips questions the argument 
that the globalisation process has forced the state to retreat or has rendered it 
irrelevant. "Rather, the process is one of the reorientation of the national state, both 
institutionally and territorially defined. What is clear is that the condition and 
direction of the world economy in recent years poses a fundamentally new situation 
for governments.... "154 The nature of adaptation strategies that the national state 
deploys to respond to globalisation trends will to a large extent determine its position 
and fortunes in the international system. 
Similarly, Higgott and Reich reject absolutist conceptions of the state, which assume 
that both authority and legitimacy reside in the state. They argue that the relationship 
between power, on the one hand, and authority and legitimacy, on the other hand, is 
not only fluid and varied in substance but it also contingent in form. 'Therefore, 
although globalisation poses a challenge to our accepted understanding of the 
relationship between authority and power it does not herald the end of the national 
153 Ibid., p4. 
"' Ibid., p. 21. 
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state. "States are not passive actors, nor are they always in retreat, but their room for 
manoeuvre is always contingent. "ßs5 It could be inferred then that while globalisation 
has made it difficult for states to exercise exclusive national control over certain 
traditional policy instruments and functions, this does not imply that the state is no 
longer a central actor in the international political economy. Nor does it mean that the 
state has become irrelevant in the era of globalisation. Indeed, it is states that created 
the framework for globalisation. '56 States supported globalisation in the post-war era 
by giving freedom to market actors through their liberalisation programmes, by 
putting in place mechanisms for the prevention of major financial crises, and by 
choosing not to implement more effective controls on financial movements. 1 57 
The resurgence of globalisation in the post-war period was partly a consequence of 
the "role that American and British leadership played in opening up financial 
markets. "158 The growth of the unregulated Euromarket was instrumental in inspiring 
other foreign financial centres to follow the lead of Britain and the US by liberalising 
and deregulating their own financial systems. The drive towards financial 
liberalisation was, however, counter-balanced by the decision to make the state a 
lender-of-last resort in the event of severe international financial crises. This was 
demonstrated clearly by the intervention of the US Federal Reserve in the 1982 debt 
crisis, sparked off by Mexico's debt default, and in its subsequent decision to provide 
a rescue package to enable Brazil and Argentina to overcome their liquidity crises. 
155 Richard Higgott and Simon Reich, "Globalisation and Sites of Conflict: Towards Definition and 
Taxonomy, " CSGR Working Paper No. 01/98 (March 1998), pp. 42-43. 
151, Robert W. Cox, "Political Economy and World Order: Problems of Power and Knowledge at the 
turn of the Millenium, " in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds. ), Political Economy and 
the Changing Global Order (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 25. "' Eric Helleiner, "Explaining the globalisation of financial markets: bringing the states back in, " Review of Political Economy, vol. 2, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 320-328. 158 Benjamin J. Cohen, "Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance, " World Politics, vol. 48 
no. 1 (January 1996), p. 277. 
80 
These actions played a key part not only in restoring stability in the emerging global 
financial markets but also in maintaining the momentum of globalisation. The 
reluctance to impose more effective controls on financial movements, following the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, was also a catalyst in the deregulation and 
liberalisation of international financial markets. Those states that benefited from 
financial openness were opposed to a restoration of capital controls. 
The EU integration process exemplifies yet again the influential part played by 
national states in fostering economic liberalisation and integration. The creation of the 
European Community was primarily a political and state-driven project, designed to 
achieve peace and to secure the cohesion of Western Europe following the destruction 
caused by the two world wars. 159 It was believed that through functionalist inter- 
governmental co-operation states would gradually realise the benefits of economic 
integration - and ultimately of political union. In their analysis of the process of 
European monetary integration, Eichengreen and Frieden found no economic 
evidence that provides a clear case for or against monetary integration. On the 
contrary, they concluded that the push for monetary union was motivated by political 
considerations that had to do mainly with inter-state bargaining, linkage politics and 
domestic distributional issues. 160 
All these factors have led Susan Strange to conclude that the creation of the 
Eurodollar market in London, and the subsequent emergence of what she calls a 
`global financial casino' in the mid-1980s, was the culmination of a plethora of policy 
"`' Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of'ldcns - Monetrny Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 166. 
Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Frieden, The Political Economy, o/ Eun-opea,, Mo,, eta, v Unification (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 9-1 1. 
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decisions and `non-decisions' made by the political authorities over the decades. ' 
These decisions and `non-decisions' were based on political calculations that were 
designed to appease key domestic constituencies. National concerns, therefore, have 
always been influential in determining state strategies and approaches to globalisation 
and liberalisation. 
13. Conclusion 
This chapter has sketched a broad survey of the pertinent theoretical debates about the 
contemporary world trading system. To this end, it has drawn on economic theories 
of trade, IPE theories and globalisation theories. The analytical framework applied in 
this thesis is anchored in the new political economy paradigm. This is premised on 
several departure points. First, it maintains that in studying international political 
economy the political and economic spheres cannot be separated in any significant 
way. Second, while economists conceive of the market as an efficient mechanism for 
processing information to arrive at a market clearing price, the new political economy 
views it as an important part of the social and political conditions in which it is 
embedded. Third, it asserts that there is a close connection between domestic and 
international levels of analysis. 
To a large degree, the new political economy has grown in response to the 
globalisation of the international economy -- particularly in the areas of finance and 
production - and the changing nature of the inter-state system. This has thrown up 
several fields of inquiry in the IPE discipline that have attracted diverse theoretical 
161 See Susan Strange, Mad Money (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp. 5-10. 
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approaches, dealing with an array of themes including the relationship between 
security and economics, the interface between power and gender, the ramifications of 
economic globalisation for the environment, and the significance of technological 
change and its role in the rise of transnational crime. Moreover, the new political 
economy has illuminated the notion of structural power in the global order, 
concentrating in particular on how the distribution of that power determines the 
relationship between authority and market. Having outlined the theoretical context in 
which South Africa's location in the international political economy and its prospects 
in the global trade system will be considered, this thesis now moves on to Chapter 2 
which traces the historical development of South Africa's position in the global 
political economy. 
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Chapter 2 
South Africa and the Global Political Economy: A Historical Analysis 
This chapter sketches an analysis of the historical evolution of South Africa's position 
in the global political economy. In particular, it sets out to explain why a trading 
nation that once boasted consistently phenomenal economic growth rates -- 
particularly during the initial phases of its post-war accumulation strategy in the 
1960s - descended so precipitously into a marginal country on the periphery of the 
world economy. The general point highlighted by this chapter is that South Africa's 
location in the NIDL cannot be understood fully without reference to the country's 
historical economic vulnerabilities. It is argued that the roots of South Africa's 
present economic difficulties can be traced to the accumulation strategy, based on 
import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) and dependency on cheap labour, pursued 
by successive apartheid governments in the post-war period. Although it was touted 
as a strategy to reduce South Africa's economic dependence on Britain and foster 
international competitiveness, in reality the post-war growth model was aimed at 
safeguarding the economic interests of the country's white minority population. 
In general terms, South Africa's industrial development was influenced by the growth 
models of advanced countries in that it was based on the Fordist logic of linking the 
extension of mass production with the extension of mass consumption. However, 
accumulation in South Africa differed in one crucial respect: both production and 
consumption were racially structured. The international political isolation of South 
Africa in the apartheid era encouraged self-sufficiency as the overriding aim of 
government policy. In line with this objective, the apartheid state aggressively 
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implemented a highly protectionist trade strategy (see Chapter 3) tailored to 
consolidate alliances with fractions of the capitalist class and promote employment 
and high incomes among the relatively skilled and educated white minority. 
Notwithstanding the impressive levels of industrialisation and economic growth rates 
it yielded - especially in the 1960s this exclusionary accumulation regime has been 
harmful to South Africa's long-term economic development. Not only has it beset 
South Africa with a structural economic problems from which it will take many 
decades to recover, but it has also jeopardised its possibilities in the globalising world 
economy. 
1. Origins of Global Economic Incorporation 
According to Bundy, pre-capitalist societies in South Africa were sucked gradually 
"into an expanding world economy, with commodities produced under slavery, 
peasant farming, and nascent commercial agriculture. " 162 The discovery of diamonds 
in 1867 and gold in 1886, however, changed the pace and direction of economic 
development, launching South Africa on the path of modern economic development 
and integration into the global economy. Although diamonds led the way in South 
Africa's rapid capitalist economic growth, it was gold mining that propelled the 
country's industrial revolution, accounting for two-thirds of the exports from the 
country within twenty years. '63 British imperialist interventions played a pivotal role 
in the development of South Africa's capitalist mining industry and its expanding 
linkages with the world economy. Primarily, these consisted of massive infusions of 
162 Colin Bundy, "Development and Inequality in Historical Perspective, " in Robert Schrire (ed. ) 
Wealth or Poverty? - Critical Choices for South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
p. 26. 
16' Francis Wilson, "Minerals and Migrants: How the Mining Industry has Shaped South Africa, " 
Daedalus vol. 130, no. 1, (Winter 2001), p. 101. 
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British capital into the mining industry, establishing mining as the flagship of the 
South African economy for the next century. 164 
South Africa's spectacular industrial transformation shares certain attributes with 
other examples of rapid industrialisation in the late nineteenth century - such as 
Tsarist Russia, Imperial Germany, and Meiji Japan. 165 In true Gerschenkronian1`'`' 
fashion, capitalist development in South Africa evolved without the preliminary 
prehistory of accumulation and proletarianisation. Although South Africa had 
acquired high levels of foreign capital and technology, it did not have the requisite 
amount of workers to draw into wage labour. This necessitated political intervention 
on the part of the state in order to enforce the proletarianisation of the African 
167 As Trapido observed: 
Incipient industry made the familiar complaint of labour shortage and 
the government, in attempting to make regular and manageable the 
supply of labour, both strengthened the industrial workers' ties with 
the rural area and increased the dependence of rural population upon 
employment in towns. Taxes were imposed on the village as a whole 
and internal passports were introduced to prevent evasion. While this 
device of course raised revenue, its major intention - and its major 
effect - was to ensure an urban labour force which remained rurally 
orientated, migrant and comparatively passive. 1 
State intervention sought to ensure that industrialisation achieved one overriding goal: 
to generate rapid accumulation while extending protection to the white minority 
against competition from the black majority. To this end, in addition to European 
immigrant labour, which provided the semi-skilled and skilled labour required by the 
164 Bundy, "Development and Inequality, " p. 29. 
165 See Stanley Trapido, "South Africa in a Comparative Study of Industrialisation, " Journal of 
Development Studies vol. 7, no. 3,1971, pp. 309-320. 
"'" See Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Baekwardºress in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962). 
167 Colin Bundy, "Development and Inequality, " p. 29. 
"'" Tra ido "South Africa in a Comparative Stud p Y, " p. 3 11 
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industry, a need for a steady supply of unskilled labour was identified. This laid the 
basis for the development of a racially fragmented labour force - consisting of skilled 
and semi-skilled white workers as well as unskilled African labour - created through 
the enforcement of repressive measures. The pivotal part played by coercive migrant 
labour -- the lifeblood of capitalist mining -- in moulding South Africa's industrial 
transformation cannot be over-emphasised. Certainly, as Wilson stated, "there is no 
other country in the world whose urban industries, whether mining or manufacturing, 
have employed such a large proportion of oscillating migrants for so long a period of 
time"I"9 The recruitment of black labour has since 1899 been carried out by the 
Chamber of Mines through monopolistic hiring practices that suppressed black 
miners' wages for two generations. Underpinning the repressive labour regime was 
the compound system, which was employed to ensure that African miners - especially 
those recruited outside South Africa in the twentieth century -- "move continually 
throughout their working life between their rural families an their all-male mining 
barracks .,, 
17" The key motive for this worker oscillation was to hamper the miners' 
ability to gain urban political skills while weakening the social structure of the 
peasantry. 
Over the next five decades, South Africa's accumulation strategy was based on 
mining and, to a lesser degree, agriculture; manufacturing industry then constituted a 
peripheral aspect of the economy. ' 71 At its embryonic stage, the mining sector was 
faced with two key needs, namely "a hefty flow of capital to establish and run mines, 
Wilson, "Minerals and Migrants, " p. 103. 
"o Trapido, "South Africa in Comparative Study, " p. 312. 
Hein Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change-- The Political Economy of' Transfvrrnatron (Cape 
'Town: UCT Press, 1998), p. 8. 
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and a reliable, cheap labour supply to keep the profit margin attractive . 
"17` The first 
requirement facilitated the integration of the South African economy into the world 
economy as a primary product exporter and net recipient of foreign investment, while 
the second one engendered a racialised model of social and labour relations. As such 
the advent of capitalist mining as the dominant feature of the South African economy 
was accompanied not only by the gradual removal of economic independence of the 
African peasantry, but also the imposition of systematic divisions in society. ' 73 The 
most striking facet of the industrialisation process in South Africa, which 
distinguishes the country from other late industrialisers, is that in spite of the massive 
amounts of capital it generated and attracted to finance industrial development it did 
not incorporate the dominant part of its proletariat into its social and political systems. 
Unlike other industrialising societies, which eventually integrated all their citizens 
within their legal and socio-political regimes, successive white South African 
governments systematically excluded black people from incorporation. 174 
2. The Post-War Accumulation Strategy 
Historically, the South African state has intervened considerably to influence 
industrial development. 175 State intervention in South Africa can be traced to the rise 
to power of the Pact government in the mid-1920s, a product of an electoral alliance 
between the socialist-inclined Labour Party and the nationalist-oriented National 
Party. Not only did the Pact regime's ascent to office provide the first meaningful 
t72 Ibid., p. 9. 
171 Ibid. 
174 Trapido, "South Africa in a Comparative Study, " p. 313. "s See Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins, "Introduction, " in Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins (eds. ), 
State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa ((Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 1-34; For a 
comprehensive historical discussion of this question see F. J. Van E3iljon, State /ntere/i'rence in South 
Africa (London: P. S. King and Son Ltd, 1969). 
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challenge to British colonial capitalism, it also coincided with a shift in the economic 
ideology of the government "from economic liberalism to economic nationalism in 
the form of increased state intervention and protective external policies. " 170 
However, the ascendancy to power by the National Party (NP) in 1948 raised the 
degree of intervention to unprecedented levels. Under NP rule, state intervention was 
not confined to the regulation of the international flow of goods, capital and 
technology; it extended to domestic factors of production such as the mobility of 
labour and of capital, especially the allocation of property rights. '77 
Two key domestic factors propelled the apartheid state towards its selection of 
accumulation strategy. The first was domestic politics: white minority rule applied 
pressure on policymakers to implement strategies that would improve white living 
standards. The other factor was the integration of the economy into the global 
economy as a mineral exporter, which facilitated the importation of the capital goods 
required to increase manufacturing. 178 From the outset, these terms of South Africa's 
global economic incorporation - as a traditional commodity exporter (preponderantly 
gold) as well as an importer of capital goods and foreign investment -- rendered the 
country susceptible to the vagaries of the world economy in three crucial ways. First, 
in its heavy dependence on foreign investment to fuel economic expansion. Second, 
the dominance of its export sector by gold, which has traditionally accounted for half 
the total value of exports, and other mineral products. Needless to say, such 
overwhelming reliance on precious commodities has been dangerous given volatile 
global market conditions. Third, the economy's high dependence on imports of 
"`' Sample Terreblanche and Nicoli Nattrass, pp. 8-9. 
177 Lipton and Simkins, State and Market, p. 1. 
"' Stephen Gelb, "South Africa's Economic Crisis: An Overview, " in Stephen Gelb (ed. ) South 
Africa's Economic Crisis (Cape Town: David Philip, 1991), p. 15. 
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capital goods and technology has exposed it to periodic balance of payment 
difficulties. 17c' 
The post-war accumulation strategy was based on two crucial pillars: an 
industrialisation strategy based on import-substitution and reliance on cheap African 
labour. South Africa was one of the world's first middle-income countries to 
explicitly pursue ISI (see Chapter 3). Apart from being chosen as the means to 
facilitate South Africa's national economic development, ISI was designed "to assist 
with developing greater economic independence from Britain and with creating 
employment for whites in manufacturing. "1RO The industrialisation path was 
influenced by the growth models of advanced countries, at least in so far as it was 
based on the Fordist logic of linking the extension of mass production with the 
extension of mass consumption. Yet accumulation in South Africa differed in one 
crucial respect: the expansion of mass production of consumer goods was linked to 
the growing consumption power of the white minority. 
A central feature of the accumulation strategy, therefore, was that it was racially 
based. This prompted Stephen Gelb to characterise the post-war growth model as 
`racial Fordism, ' since "it focused on extending industrialisation by means of the 
production of (previously imported) sophisticated consumer goods primarily for the 
white South African market. -"s' Racial supremacy defined the structure of economic 
institutions: white people experienced a continual rise in their living standards, even 
as the economic position of blacks deteriorated. The growth model was buttressed by 
179 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, pp. 120-121. 
"° Michael Bleaney, Alan Hirsch, Merle Holden and Carolyn Jenkins, "South Africa, " in Adercola 
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in Sub-Saharan Africa (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 397. 
"" Gelb, "South Africa's Economic Crisis, " p. 2. 
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gold exports and other precious commodities, which enjoyed stable prices on the 
global markets. The fixed international price of gold -- based on a gold-exchange 
standard adopted at Bretton Woods in 1944 - acted as a stabilising influence on 
accumulation, minimising its fluctuations. 12 It is this factor that distinguished South 
Africa's international situation during the post-war era from that of other exporters of 
primary commodities: for as long as world prices for precious metals remained stable, 
the state was not overly concerned about the inability of the South African 
manufacturing industry to become globally competitive and to develop meaningful 
export capacity. 
Another remarkable facet of South Africa's post-war accumulation strategy was that 
the apartheid state did not emulate the example of East Asian NICs by adopting a 
direct role throughout the economy. As discussed in Chapter 1, the East Asian NICs 
propelled their industrial accumulation processes by intervening in investment and 
production decisions, as well as by funnelling indirect subsidies through the financial 
system in order to finance export-led growth. Focusing on the production of labour- 
intensive goods for the export market enabled the NICs "to absorb into industrial 
employment the `labour surplus' moving out of the agricultural sector. " 193 The South 
African growth model, on the other hand, consisted of a `hands-of' role for the state, 
focusing merely on fostering maximum circumstances for the achievement of 
industrial growth. Moreover, accumulation was capital-intensive, restricting the 
ability of the economy to soak up surplus labour. 184 
I2 Ibid. 
"" Ibid., p. 15. 
194 Marais, South Africa: Limit. to Change, pp. 21-22. 
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The post-war accumulation strategy delivered unprecedented economic prosperity for 
South Africa's white minority, cementing a class coalition that kept white rule intact 
for decades. The state apparatus was used to dispense largesse --- subsidies, loans and 
cheap labour - to the agricultural sector, the NP government's traditional electoral 
support base. 1ý' An extensive affirmative action programme was implemented to 
shore up the burgeoning Afrikaner capitalist class and to improve the social and 
economic status of the wider Afrikaner population, especially the working class. The 
apartheid state also interceded "with vigour to aid the survival of marginal capitalist 
enterprises (particularly in agriculture) and assist the birth of new, mostly Afrikaner- 
owned, ones. "' 16 In sum, racialised corporatist arrangements were implemented to 
bolster the economic position of South Africa's white minority and secure its political 
support: As Schreiner explained: 
Economic policy which focused on inward industrialisation and import 
substitution reflected a workable compromise between white labour, 
business and the state. With the economy buoyed by high foreign 
exchange earnings through gold sales, manufacturing capital was 
offered labour peace and relatively high profit margins manipulated 
through tariff protection arrangements. White labour settled for job 
reservation, high wages and access to a luxurious and diverse 
consumer market while the state, for its part, was guaranteed ongoing 
political support. 187 
Furthermore, the propulsion of the Afrikaner capitalist class into the pinnacle of the 
mainstream economy - through the extension of Afrikaner participation in mining, 
industry and commerce, previously English-dominated economic sectors, and the 
intensification of interlocking directorates -- induced a growing coalescence of 
interests and policy preferences between Afrikaans and English business. This 
'xs Trapido, "South Africa in a Comparative Study, " p. 317. 
186 Marais, South Africa, Limits to Change, p. 138. 
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rapprochement between the English and Afrikaans capitalist classes inaugurated a 
departure from the mutual suspicion that characterised their relationship during the 
Verwoerd era, making it easy for them to communicate shared positions to the 
government. 188 Although the growth model ushered in affluence for white South 
Africa, it imposed serious social, political and economic constraints on the African 
majority. As Marais eloquently stated: 
In African communities, the effects were the reverse, with the great 
majority of Africans ruled out of the circuits of production, 
distribution, and even consumption. Access to skilled jobs was heavily 
restricted, through discrimination in the workplace and an education 
system, until the 1970s, was explicitly designed to equip Africans only 
with the rudiments required for entry into the lower ranks of the labour 
market. Class formation in African communities was curbed, 
flattening class differentiation in the townships. Some segmentation 
did occur within the African working class, as a semi-skilled urban 
layer emerged. The state had closed off access to most accumulatory 
activities and continued to drive African businesspeople from the 
189 central business districts... 
3. The `Great Boom': 1961-1965 
At the height of South Africa's post-war growth model, the economy registered a high 
GDP increase, averaging 6 percent between 1960 and 1969 (Sec Graph 1). During the 
period from June 1960 to June 1965 South Africa's GNP rose from R5,200 million to 
R7,700 million -a 48 percent increase - making South Africa and Japan the highest 
growing economies in the world then. ' 90 This robust growth cycle continued until the 
early 1970s and generated massive infusions of foreign investment most of which 
189 Louwrens Pretorius, "The Head of Government and Organised Business, " in Robert Schrire (ed. ), 
Malan to De Klerk - Leadership in the Apartheid State (London: Hurst and Company, 1993), p. 232. IX) Ibid., p. 29. 
190 Hobart D. Houghton, The South African Economy (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1967), 
p. 198. 
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was funnelled into the manufacturing sector. By 1970 the manufacturing sector had 
become considerably diversified. As Black remarked: 
Manufacturing was also growing at this time in relation to total output. 
Its share of GDP rose from less than 13 percent in 1946 to over 23 
percent by 1970. Thus in a period when manufacturing was growing 
rapidly and the process of import substitution was being accompanied 
by considerable diversification into more advanced sectors it was 
possible to argue in the mid-sixties that given the built-in propelling 
force of industrialisation on the one hand, and the positive national 
approach to modern economic development on the other, it appears 
that economic growth will not constitute a major problem in South 
Africa during at least the next twenty years. 191 
Yet the problem was that the bulk of the manufacturing sector was beset by structural 
deficiencies. First, growth was capital-intensive. This meant that the growth model 
was failing to absorb the growing rise in unemployment generated by the apartheid 
state's racial policies. Second, racially fragmented income distribution restricted the 
development of a wide mass market for domestically produced goods. Third, 
manufacturing did not become outward-oriented. As such, expansion of the 
manufacturing sector depended heavily on the importation of capital goods. A 
conspicuous aspect of South Africa's accumulation strategy was that notwithstanding 
the policies of import substitution, import intensity (imports as a proportion of GDP) 
in general did not change: imports still made up almost 24 percent of GDP in the late 
1970s. 192 This meant that only the profile, not the intensity, of imports changed. 
191 Anthony Black, "Manufacturing Development and the Economic Crisis: A Reversion to Primary Production? " in Stephen Gelb, South Africa 's Gcono»: rc Crisis p. 151. 192 Ibid., p. 161. 
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Graph 1- Average Growth Rates, Real GNP (1980=100) 
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Reliance on capital goods imports severely reduced the manufacturing sector's 
inability to access markets, thereby not only heightening the vulnerability of the 
economy to external pressures but also triggering chronic balance of payments of 
crises. Worse, the collapse in 1971 of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates, which provided for the convertibility of the dollar into gold at a fixed price, had 
adverse effects on export earnings as the price of gold began to fluctuate freely on the 
global market. 193 Fourth, whereas manufacturing's contribution to GDP in the early 
1960s was virtually double that of the mining and agricultural sectors put together, it 
generated a miniscule share of foreign earnings (See Graph 2). By the mid-1970s, 
agriculture and mining constituted two-thirds of exports; a decade later mining, 
193 Gelb, "South Africa's Economic Crisis, " p. 21. 
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although accounting for 11 percent of GDP, contributed 70 percent of foreign 
exchange earnings. 194 
Graph 2- Gross Domestic Product and Manufacturing Growth 
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4. The Accumulation Strategy Founders 
The early 1970s witnessed a precipitous decline in South Africa's economic growth 
rate, shrinking per capita economic growth to less than zero. In the subsequent 
decade, the annual GDP growth rate decreased to 1.9 percent, while during the 1980s 
as a whole it averaged a mere 1.5 percent. 1 95 Mainstream accounts attribute the sharp 
194 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 30. 
195 Ibid. 
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economic downturn to constraints the apartheid system placed on free market 
enterprise and a world recession induced by the 1974 OPEC-led oil Increases. 
196 Yet 
a rigorous analysis of the underlying causes of the economic crisis shows that while 
the role of the oil price hike could not be ruled out, the fundamental problem rested 
with the structure of the economy. The pitfalls of racial Fordism had become 
apparent by the beginning of the 1970s. Partly, this was the result of the racially 
based mode of regulation, exemplified by a growing nexus between skill shortages 
and dwindling productivity growth. 
197 A related problem was the failure of South 
Africa's manufacturing sector to create a significant export base, leading to the 
appointment of the Reynders Commission in 1972 to come up with recommendations 
on how to improve export trade performance (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, the rising 
costs of capital goods imports, coupled with growing instability in export earnings, 
exerted tremendous pressure on South Africa's balance of payments position. In 
addition, the economic boom of the 1960s - which had been driven by huge inflows 
of foreign investment - had begun to peter out, thanks to the growing outflows of 
capital set off by deepening domestic political instability. Lastly, South Africa was 
simply living beyond its means, consuming more than it was able to produce. 
1" 
Towards the end of the 1970s it had become evident that the economic difficulties 
attendant to the apartheid growth model had reflected a serious structural crisis, 
connecting the economic, social and political aspects. The deliberate and systematic 
exclusion of the overwhelming majority of the population from the mainstream 
political economy set in motion a series of popular struggles calculated to challenge 
See, for example, Stuart Jones and Andre Muller, Thc South African Economy 19/0.90 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1992), pp. 296-297. 
1' Gelb, "South Africa's Economic Crisis, " p. 19. 
""' Ibid., p. 210-211. 
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the legitimacy of the apartheid state. These popular resistance actions were propelled 
by a number of developments. The first was closely linked to the economic crisis. 
The exponential rise in unemployment levels, combined with steep inflation that 
economically strangulated the African population, triggered a chain of damaging 
strikes in 1973. The second development was the advance of national liberation 
struggles in southern Africa. The attainment of independence in Angola and 
Mozambique in 1975 bolstered the morale of Africans while engendering a siege 
mentality among custodians of the apartheid state. Tied to this was the phenomenal 
growth and popularity of the Black Consciousness Movement, which mobilised the 
black majority against white racial supremacy. 199 
Although it did not induce the collapse of the growth model, this multi-faceted crisis 
underscored the reality that the inward-looking growth strategy pursued by the South 
African state had become harmful; notwithstanding the impressive levels of 
industrialisation and rates of economic growth it had yielded. This is to not to 
suggest that ISI was not suited to South Africa's circumstances. However, the 
problem with South Africa's policy of import-substitution was that it was over- 
prolonged; it became an end in itself, rather than a means to an end. And this was 
particularly clear in the 1970s when the apartheid state, reeling from international 
pressure, tried to shift away from import-substitution to import-replacenment -- nearly 
moving the economy towards autarky. 
A related problem with IS] was that it fostered massive inefficiencies, as well as 
unproductive rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. More importantly, the apartheid 
199 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 39. 
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policies that underpinned ISI sharply distorted labour markets and led to a poor 
distribution of skills and opportunities. The obsession with capital-intensive 
industrialisation meant that investment in human capital was ignored: this approach 
ran counter to the policies of newly industrialising countries -- in East Asia and Latin 
America - which emphasised the centrality of human capital development to 
successful industrialisation. In sum, the post-war growth model was successful in 
terms of enabling the state to realise its socio-political political goals, even though it 
was less effective in accomplishing the objectives of international competitiveness 
and employment creation. 200 
5. Repairing the Damage? 
A coalescence of factors, including growing fissures between the state and capital 
over the post-war growth model, mounting pressures exerted by popular organisations 
in the mid-1970s, as well as changes in the regional and global contexts, necessitated 
an urgent need to resolve the contradictions spawned by the post-war growth model. 
Faced with a deepening crisis, the South African state, with the support of capital, 
embarked upon reform initiatives "aimed at shoring up the two fundamental 
foundations of state power in capitalist society -- coercion and consent - and at 
reshaping the spheres of production, distribution and consumption in order to 
resuscitate faltering economic growth. "`"' The post-war accumulation strategy had to 
be redesigned not only in terms of its economic dimensions but also in respect of its 
social and political foundations. Ultimately, it had been envisaged that economic and 
200 See Anthony Black, "The Role of the State in Promoting Industrialisation - Selective Intervention, Trade Orientation and Concessionary Industrial Finance, " in Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins (eds. ) 
State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Afi-ica (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 203-234. 201 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 41. 
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social reforms would engender a degree of legitimacy for the social order by creating 
a new basis for national consent. The first package of reforms focused on the trade 
and industrial policy aspects of the growth model. The second set of reform measures 
sought to restructure crucial aspects of the social relations undergirding the 
accumulation strategy - the labour regime and urbanisation policies. The third pillar 
of the reform policy concerned the economy's links with a changed international 
financial system and its consequences for South Africa's financial regime. Fourth, the 
reform plan entailed the elaboration of a regional policy geared to decentralising 
South Africa's political and economic problems. As pointed out earlier only the 
second, third and fourth sets of reforms are discussed in this chapter; the first raft of 
reforms is analysed at length in Chapter 3. 
6. Labour and Social Policies 
The late 1970s saw the apartheid state initiating what Morris and Padayachec 
described as a "selective Fordist" response to South Africa's multi-dimensional 
crisis. 202 Two commissions - namely the Rickert and the Wichahn Commissions 
were specifically charged with the responsibility to reform the social relations upon 
which the accumulation strategy rested, while the Dc Kock Commission was tasked 
with reviewing monetary policy. (The Reynders and Kleu Commissions, which were 
set up to review export trade and industrial policy respectively, arc discussed in the 
next chapter). In addition, the NP government introduced a regional policy calculated 
to `decentralise' South Africa's economic and political ills. 
202 Cited in Patrick Bond, Commanding Heights und C'(»mmunili, control - Ncw F, conoil, ics for a New South Africa (Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 1991), p. 40. 
The Riekert Report set out "to underpin, on a new basis, territorial segregation by 
legislatively strengthening the division between urban and rural Africans. "203 To this 
end it recommended that Africans be broken up into two groups, namely those 
deemed eligible for urban citizens and those disqualified from such social status - the 
latter would be restricted to the Bantustans. In essence, the report sought to 
restructure societal divisions along class instead of racial lines: it was believed that 
the new rights and concessions extended to urbanised Africans would gradually 
distinguish them from their rural-based counterparts. This observation is echoed by 
Morris and Padayachee, who concluded that "it (the Riekert strategy) proposes to use 
urbanisation to increase competition between workers, not only to hold wage levels 
down, but principally to act as a process of class differentiation. Those black workers 
who are unable to secure steady employment, secure housing and services are hence 
forced out of the more stable urban townships. 204 
The shift in policy was partly in response to "a growing realisation among sonic 
influential employers and government officials that the accommodation of African 
workers within the official labour relations system could not be indefinitely 
postponed. "205 Escalating labour militancy, coupled with the exponential growth of 
an independent, preponderantly African, trade union movement could no longer be 
ignored by managers of the apartheid state. But policy changes also "stell med from 
industries' need for a more settled and sophisticated semi-skilled African labour force, 
and the political hope that a layer of comparatively privileged urban Africans would 
emerge to douse the ardour of the masses. "20 
203 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 42. 
204 Cited in Bond, Commanding Heights ttnrl Community Control, p. 41. 205 Louwrens Pretorius, "The Head of Government, " p. 227. 206 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 43. 
The Wiehahn Commission set out to achieve two specific aims, namely to review the 
regulation of black workers in the labour market as well as to fashion measures 
calculated to raise the productivity and purchasing power of an expanding, skilled 
African labour force. 207 It emphasised the importance of containing growing black 
trade union militancy but cautioned against the use complete repression, which it 
feared "would undoubtedly have the effect of driving black trade unionism 
underground and uniting black workers - against the system of free enterprise. "20" As 
such the commission recommended the implementation of a wide array of policy 
measures designed to incorporate black trade unions into the mainstream of the labour 
relations regime. Morris and Padayachee conclude that: 
The purpose of this new `reform policy' was to ensure maximum 
division and differentiation of the popular classes: divide the black 
petty bourgeoisie from the working class by satisfying some of the 
former's socio-economic aspirations; pacify the working class by 
granting trade union reform; divide the general black population by 
driving a wedge between `insiders' (with access to urban residential 
rights) and `outsiders' (with no urban residential rights). 201) 
It is worth stressing that the reforms were introduced when the world economy was 
beset by a recession triggered by the 1979 oil crisis. In line with neo-liberal economic 
policies adopted by governments of advanced capitalist nations to stem the global 
recession, the South African authorities made a number of adjustments to the 
country's economic policy, primarily the abolition of capital controls for non- 
residents and the strengthening of monetary policy. However "the liberalisation of 
South Africa's economic links allowed for the easy transmission of the worsening 
international economic situation into [the] South African economy. , 210 This 
207 Ibid. 
209 Ibid., p. 44. 
209 Cited in Marais, South Africa Limits to Change, p. 44. 210 Ibid., p. 45. 
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translated into growing inflation and escalating unemployment, undermining the 
envisaged labour market changes and sparking off political resistance to the reforms 
among the black working class. Nor were the measures recommended by the Rickert 
Commission a success. At the heart of its report was a quest to foist segregation 
between the urban and the rural sections of the African population. Yet thanks to 
structural changes in the South African political economy, the wall separating 
Africans banished to the Bantustans and those allowed to reside in the urban areas 
was not as permeable as apartheid architects calculated. A combination of factors - 
notably the migrant labour system - had ensured the blurring of spatial divisions. In 
reality, rather than entrench the state's stranglehold over urban dwellers, "the reforms 
became the basis for renewed and reinvigorated protests as the beneficiaries pushed 
the reforms beyond the limits imposed by the state. "21 Despite their shortcomings, 
the recommendations of the Wiehahn, Rickert and De Kock Commissions represented 
a seismic ideological shift in terms of state economic policy for two reasons. First, 
the reports stressed the need to reduce the role of the state in shaping the economy and 
to strengthen the role of the private sector in economic policymaking. Second, they 
rejected the notion of race as a guide to government' economic policy on the grounds 
that this threatened the free enterprise system. This sentiment was stridently voiced in 
the Wichahn Commission report which pointed out that: 
The Commission accepted the premise that full involvement, 
participation and sharing in the system of free enterprise by all 
population groups with as little as Government intervention as possible 
would not only give all groups a stake in the system, but would also 
ensure a common loyalty to both the system and the country. 212 
211 Ibid. 
212 Cited in Jill Nattrass, The South African ! Economy - Its Growth a, ul C'hanýe (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 28. 
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7. Monetary Policy 
The neo-liberal, monetarist economics adopted by advanced industrial countries in the 
1980s was enthusiastically embraced by the De Kock Commission, the centrepiece of 
whose recommendations was liberalisation of South Africa's financial markets in 
accordance with prevailing international orthodoxy. The ascendancy of monetarism 
in economic management can be attributed to fears for the world economy sparked off 
by the exponential global increase in the cost of money, exemplified by high interest 
rates, in the 1980s. Monetarism sought to deploy interest and exchange rates as tools 
of economic policy in order to decrease the amount of money in circulation, thereby 
stabilise prices and the external balance. 
213 
The liberalisation of South African financial markets represented a boon for domestic 
financial interests. Indeed, as Bond noted, "local finance capital appeared to have a 
lot to do with shaping the local monetarist initiative, including the removal of interest 
rate ceilings and foreign exchange control S.,, 214 The shift to international monetarism 
dovetailed neatly with the worldview of domestic finance houses, which was 
premised on the notion that the growing value of mineral exports would lay the 
foundation for continued industrial development along the previous track, whereas 
enhanced integration into the international financial system would discard `anomalies' 
such as negative real interest rates and `overvalued' exchange rates. 215 The new 
international economic milieu delivered significant gains for South African business. 
South African companies took advantage of cheaper foreign money to borrow heavily 
from overseas banks. Buoyed by the ensuing domestic and international policy 
2 13 Bond, Commanding Heights and Comnnunity Control, p. 46. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Gelb, "South Africa's Economic Crisis, " p. 25. 
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environments, both the private and state corporations invested heavily in new 
projects. In addition the liberalisation of the internal economy, notably the 
privatisation of state parastatals, bestowed a windfall on corporate investors mainly in 
the shape of hefty tax incentives. 216 
Significantly, this liberalisation episode witnessed the introduction of the dual 
exchange rate system recommended by the De Kock Commission in 1978. This was 
in response to pressures for the easing of exchange controls imposed at the height of 
the instability that afflicted international currency markets in the 1970s. The dual 
exchange rate system was aimed at freeing the rand (the South African currency) by 
making it easy for people to move their capital out of the country while 
simultaneously encouraging foreign investment in the South African economy. 217 
Nevertheless, even though the liberalisation of South Africa's financial market regime 
was greeted with high acclaim by various fractions of capital it encountered a political 
backlash from key sections of the South African populace -- primarily the black 
working class which could no longer bear the brunt of the government's conservative, 
monetarist economic policy. The potential benefits promised by the reform measures 
subsequently fell prey to the social upheaval and political instability which engulfed 
South Africa during the latter part of the 1980s. 
26 Bond, Commanding Heights and Community Control, p. 42. 217 Nattrass, The South African Economy, p. 266. 
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8. Decentralisation Policy 
The regional policy pursued by the NP government in the 1980s essentially 
represented a continuation of the Verwoerdian dream of black ethnic balkanisation. It 
espoused the establishment of selected economic growth points bordering the black 
homeland territories, which would enable the apartheid regime "to combine its 
political goals with a manufacturing export strategy based on the familiar themes of 
cheap labour plus subsidies. "21 To this end, massive state subsidies and incentives 
were awarded to companies willing to relocate to the Bantustans; subsidies rose from 
R90 million in 1970 to RI. 4 billion in 1980, increasing further to R4.7 billion in 1985. 
In the early 1990s, around 4700 companies were beneficiaries of the state subsidy 
scheme. 219 
Apart from economic considerations, the decentralisation strategy was geared to 
fulfilling numerous political goals. First, it was viewed as a mechanism to raise 
employment opportunities in the homelands "so as to retain a greater proportion of 
blacks within these areas while simultaneously ensuring that migration is geared more 
efficiently to the demands of the urban labour markets. "220 Second, it was an attempt 
to blunt popular struggles in the urban areas by relocating massive numbers of urban 
black dwellers to the homelands. Third, it was a device for Ionlenting class 
inequalities among black people by co-opting into the political system the nascent 
black technocratic stratum. Lastly, the decentralisation plan constituted an effort to 
make the government's homeland policy acceptable to the international 
`'s Bond, Commanding Heights and Con,,?,,,,, ity Control, p. 42. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Paul Wellings and Anthony Black, "Industrial Decentralisation under Apartheid: The Relocation of 
Industry to the South African Periphery, " World Development vol. 14, no. 1, p. 10. 
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community. 221 Notwithstanding claims by government policymakers about its 
success, the strategy was derided by critics as "entirely political, economically 
irrational and in contradiction to economic trends. "222 In sum, the barrage of 
reforms initiated by the NP regime in the late 1970s was woefully inadequate: not 
only did the reforms tinker with the system but they also failed to address the 
fundamental ideological and social foundations of the structural economic crisis. As 
Gelb concurred: 
In general, the state's approach was adaptive and partial -- `groping' for 
solutions - in the sense that policy initiatives undertaken to reorganize 
specific aspects of the mode of regulation were carried out 
independently of each other. Moreover, the overall context remained 
the racial Fordist model, even while it was acknowledged that the 
problems faced were structural. 223 
The inability of the apartheid state to deal effectively with South Africa's enduring 
structural economic crisis prevented the country from exploiting advantages induced 
by the structural changes that reconfigured the world economy in the 1970s. And it 
explains why although five decades ago South Africa appeared destined to attain the 
status of a semi-industrialised state endowed with a relatively diversified export base, 
its position in the contemporary global political economy is still fragile and 
precarious. It is to the analysis of South Africa's location in the new international 
division of labour this chapter now turns. 
221 Ibid., p. 1 1. 
222 Ibid., p. 9. 
223 Gelb, "South Africa's Economic Crisis, " p. 25. 
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9. South Africa in the New International Division of Labour 
Notwithstanding the impressive industrialisation efforts of the past decades, South 
Africa's terms of incorporation into the world economy at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century have remained largely static: the country continues to be an 
exporter of traditional commodities (predominantly gold) and a capital goods and 
technology importer. The characteristic feature of South Africa's economy has been 
the overwhelming dominance of its exports by gold. During the mid-1980s, South 
African gold accounted virtually for two-thirds of world output and between forty and 
fifty percent of the country's exports, maintaining production levels that had prevailed 
throughout a large part of the twentieth century. 224 In 1986 the gold mines, buoyed 
by exponential increase in the gold price at the start of the 1970s, employed 534 000 
people. 225 
Nonetheless, a coalescence of plummeting prices and skyrocketing costs in recent 
years has precipitated a decline in the gold mining industry, with adverse 
consequences for the South African economy. First, the weakening in gold mining 
has led to a massive decline in state revenue. Whereas gold tax from 1981 to 1983 
accounted for 16.7 percent of total government income, it decreased to 1.0 percent by 
1994, dropping further to 0.7 per cent between 1994 and 1998.2-0 Tied to the loss of 
government income was the shedding of jobs. In 1991, overall employment in the 
gold mines dropped 21 percent from 534,000 to 424,000 people, with the number of 
migrant workers declining precipitously from 478 000 to 354 000, it 26 percent 
decrease. In the late 1990s, employment in the mining sector decreased by an 
224 Wilson, "Minerals and Migrants, " p. 102. 
225 Ibid. 
'`'`' Ibid., pp. 113-115. 
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additional 40 percent, with 222 000 lost in the gold mining industry. 
22' From the 
1980s to the mid-1990s, the spectacular decline in South Africa's gold exports was 
balanced by a growing share of manufactured exports. Nevertheless, the continued 
dominance of primary and semi-processed goods still confirmed South Africa's status 
as a weak exporter of manufactured products. Thanks to South Africa's over- 
prolonged import substitution policies, during this period manufactured exports per 
capita were lower in South Africa than in other upper-middle income countries save 
for Brazil. 229 
Although South Africa has been historically classified by the World Bank as a 
developed country, this categorisation is misleading. 229 While, for example, in 1994 
the country had a GNP per capita of US$ 3,040 -- which placed it ahead of ninety-two 
of the one-hundred and thirty-three countries assessed by the World Bank - the 
distribution of income across its population has been marked by severe racial 
disparities. 230 However, the applicability of this pattern of income distribution to 
post-1994 South Africa has been contested by Nattrass and Scekings who argue that: 
In South Africa, black and white are no longer synonymous with rich 
and poor. Moreover, South African society cannot simply be divided 
into rich and poor, as if the distribution of incomes were bipolar. In 
the final decades of apartheid the deracialisation of formerly 
discriminatory policies, upward occupational mobility among black 
workers, and rising unemployment resulted in declining interracial 
inequality but rising intra-racial inequality, especially among the black 
population. In post-apartheid South Africa, inequality is driven by two 
`27 Ibid. 
228 Cited in Patrick J. McGowan, "The 'New' South Africa: Ascent or Descent in the World System?, " 
in C. Roe Goddard, John T. Passe-Smith and John G. Conklin, International Political Economy- Stute- 
Marrket Relations in the Changing Global Orr/er (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 207. 
229 'I, he country is classified as developed because it conforms to the World Bank criterion that regards 
developed countries as those that have a per capita income of tore than US$ 2900 per annum. In the 
South African context this classification has been misleading because it historically was based on the 
living standards of the white minority population. 
230 See World Bank (1996), World Dei'elopmenrt Report /996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
pp. 188-I 89. 
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income gaps: between an increasingly multiracial upper class and 
everyone else; and between a middle class of mostly urban, industrial, 
or white-collar workers and a marginalised class of black unemployed 
and rural poor. 231 
Whatever the merits or demerits of these arguments, what is indisputable is that South 
African society continues to be characterised by vast racial, social and economic 
inequalities. In many ways South Africa fits neatly the Wallersteinian definition of a 
semi-peripheral state. 232 Partially industrialised, the country exhibits features of both 
developed and underdeveloped societies. Yet in spite of its semi-peripheral status 
South Africa has lagged far behind other semi-peripheral societies that benefited from 
the structural changes associated with the NIDL. The strategy of import-substitution 
industrialisation -- while necessary in the early phases of industrial development -- was 
over-prolonged, denying the country the opportunity to deploy trade as a tool of 
growth; in the same way as the East Asian and Latin American NICs did (see Chapter 
3). In addition, trade sanctions imposed against successive South African apartheid 
regimes over past decades exerted considerable constraints on the country's 
international trading position. 233 Not only did they cut off South African industry 
from large potential markets in the developing world, they also undermined its 
established trade relations with developed capitalist countries of the world. To its 
credit, the apartheid state, unlike most Latin American countries, did not try to spend 
its way out of trouble when its growth strategy ran into difficulties. ß t4 y 
23 ' Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings, "Two Nationti'? Race and Economic Inequality in South 
Africa Today, " Daeclelus, vol. 130 no. I(Winter 2001), p. 47. 
232 For a detailed discussion of the concept of the semi-periphery, see Immanuel Wallerstcin, "Semi- 
Peripheral Countries in the Contemporary World Crisis, " Theory and Society no. 3 (1976), pp. 461- 
483. 
231 Richard Moorsom, "Foreign Trade and Sanctions, " in Mark Orkin, Sanrctiorrs ý1 yuiust Apartheid (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), p. 264. 
214 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 120. 
Still, this cannot disguise the abysmal performance of the South African economy 
since the mid-1970s. The economy still relies on traditional commodity exports that 
are vulnerable to volatile price fluctuations on the global markets. Also, its mammoth 
dependence on secondary and tertiary goods has had an unfavorable impact on its 
balance of payments position. Moreover, South Africa entered the twenty first 
century beset by daunting economic problems: a low GDP growth rate, which 
declined from its 6 percent average during the 1960s to 1.8 percent in the 1980s, 
ultimately plummeting to -1.1 percent in the early 1990s; unsustainable levels of 
public debt; declining rates of gross fixed investment and high rates of capital flight; 
poor levels of private investment and declining competitiveness; high unemployment 
and shortage of skilled labour; low investment in research and development; a heavy 
bias against small and medium enterprises; and balance of payments constraints . 
235 In 
essence, the position of South Africa in the contemporary global political economy is 
insecure and vulnerable. In this respect South Africa's location in the NIDL is not 
dissimilar to those of many underdeveloped countries. 
10. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to clarify why a trading nation that once enjoyed 
consistently remarkable economic growth rates in the 1960s ended up as an 
insignificant player on the fringes of the global economy. South Africa's current 
economic problems are partly a legacy of the accumulation strategy, based on import- 
substitution industrialisation and dependency on cheap labour, implemented by 
consecutive apartheid governments in the post-war period. Although it was 
2 , 15 Ibid., p. 100. 
originally presented as a strategy to reduce South Africa's economic reliance on 
Britain and promote international competitiveness, in reality the post-war growth 
model was aimed at protecting the economic interests of the white minority 
population. South Africa's industrial transformation mimicked the growth models of 
advanced countries in that it was based on the Fordist logic of linking the extension of 
mass production with the extension of mass consumption. Even so, accumulation in 
South Africa differed in one crucial respect: both production and consumption were 
racially ordered. 
The adoption of the post-war growth model was influenced by two considerations: 
domestic politics (the political imperative to respond to the economic needs of the 
minority white population) as well as the incorporation of South Africa into the global 
economy as an exporter of primary products and an importer of capital goods. This 
pattern of global economic incorporation has made South Africa vulnerable to the 
whims of the global economy; through its dependence on foreign investment to drive 
economic growth, its reliance on gold and other mineral products, and its reliance on 
imports of capital goods and technology. South Africa's situation in the NIDL, 
therefore, cannot be understood completely without taking into account the country's 
historical economic vulnerabilities. 
South Africa's international ostracism during the apartheid period catapulted sell'- 
sufficiency to the top of government policy priorities. In keeping with this objective, 
the apartheid state forcefully implemented an extremely protectionist trade strategy 
designed to consolidate coalitions with sections of the capitalist class and to provide 
employment and economic opportunities for the white minority. Yet despite 
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recording laudable levels of industrialisation and high economic growth rates in the 
1960s, the post-war accumulation strategy was inimical to South Africa's long-term 
economic development. Apart from saddling South Africa with a structural 
economic crisis, it imperilled its prospects in the globalising world economy and 
entrenched the country's precarious position in the NIDL. This chapter has sketched 
a broad historical sweep of the nature and trajectory of economic development in 
South Africa over the past decades. This was intended to set the scene for the 
following chapter which focuses special attention on how trade policy -- the 
immediate concern of this thesis - evolved in the apartheid era and how this fitted into 
the wider international political economy. 
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Chapter 3 
Striving for National Self-reliance: Trade Policy in Apartheid South Africa 
Post-apartheid South Africa's trade policy, which is discussed in Chapter 4, represents 
the latest chapter in a long history of trade policy initiatives undertaken by successive 
South African governments. This chapter analyses trade policy in South Africa 
during the apartheid era. It argues that South Africa's trade policy in the apartheid 
period evolved in response to the imperatives of the domestic economy. Trade 
reforms were implemented fitfully and haphazardly to address specific problems, not 
as part of a coherent economic strategy. The pre-eminent policy objective was the 
survival of apartheid in an unstable domestic situation and increasingly hostile 
international environment. Although the theoretical basis of free trade was eventually 
accepted, it was never the government's policy to undertake full-scale trade 
liberalisation; the promotion of exports was never matched by the liberalisation of the 
import regime. On the contrary, trade liberalisation was viewed as a tactical 
mechanism to ease economic difficulties, notably balance of payments problems, 
induced by the post-war growth model. However, various foreign exchange shocks in 
the 1980s (especially the debt crisis of 1985), and the ensuing economic crisis, forced 
South Africa to shift abruptly to an outward-oriented tradc regime. 
1. Import Substitution 
Extensive policy intervention became a defining feature of economic management in 
numerous developing countries in the early part of the twentieth century. South 
Africa was no exception to this trend. It pursued a policy of import-substituting 
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industrialisation (ISI) since 1925, making it one of the first countries to explicitly 
embrace inward-oriented development strategies that were to be championed by 
structuralist economic thinkers such as Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer in subsequent 
decades. 236 The theoretical arguments for ISI have been elaborated in detail in the 
first chapter but will be reiterated very briefly here. Based on the infant industry 
argument, ISI policies advocate protection for domestic industries with potential 
comparative advantage and seek to encourage competition for these industries by 
increasing the domestic price of imported goods. Consequently the ISI strategy 
prescribes the imposition of constraints on negative external influences (such as 
foreign manufactured goods) so as to promote self-sufficiency and internal 
development. Instead of importing manufactured goods, local manufacturing is 
actively encouraged. Promoting domestic enterprises requires strict controls on 
imported goods to reduce foreign competition. The state plays a pivotal role in 
regulating strategic industries, which are central to providing the necessary resource 
base for a manufacturing economy. 237 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the case of South Africa ISI was expected to assist with 
developing greater economic independence from Britain and with creating 
employment for whites in manufacturing. As such in South Africa, like in most 
countries that pursued the IS[ growth path, the issue of national sovereignty was at the 
heart of intervention. To eschew its colonial dependence, it was necessary for the 
country to overcome its status of an exporter of primary products and become a 
manufacturing economy capable of competing in the global markets. Five policy 
instruments propelled South Africa's early industrialisation. The first was trade 
23(, Colin McCarthy, "South African Trade and Industrial Policy, " in Lennart Peteisson (ed. ) Post 
Apartheid Southern Africa (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 66. 
237 Ibid., p. 67. 
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management underpinned by import restrictions and import tariffs, and subsequently 
combined with export promotion. Second, far-reaching government intervention in 
the industrialisation process resulted in the establishment of state-owned public 
corporations. Third, labour market policies designed to assist in the shaping of 
domestic industry were introduced. Fourth, a policy of industrial decentralisation was 
employed to foster `separate development'. Finally, exchange controls were imposed 
to cope with balance of payments difficulties arising from the industrialisation 
239 During the apartheid era, trade policy evolved cautiously in reaction to 
specific economic needs and problems identified by policymakers. The paramount 
policy objective was the survival of apartheid, to which all other aspects of policy 
were subordinate. Trade and industrial strategies continued to place a premium on 
reducing reliance on Britain and generating productive employment for whites, but 
increasingly shifted "to search for a stimulus to economic growth after the easy stages 
of import-substitution industrialisation were completed, and to respond to the 
overriding necessity to ease pressures on the balance of payments. '1V 
Yet industrial protection in South Africa did not go unchallenged. In the light of 
criticisms levelled at industrial protection by the Customs Tan f(T Commission in 1934 
- which concluded that "protection was having a weakening effect on initiative, risk- 
taking and competitiveness' 240 - the Nationalist government appointed in 1958 
another commission (the Viljoen Commission) to review trade protection in South 
Africa. Deploying structuralist development arguments to justify its 
recommendations, the commission endorsed a continuation of ISI, albeit through the 
238 Davis, South African Managed Trade, p. 13. 
239 Michael Bleaney, Alan Hirsch, Merle Holden and Carolyn Jenkins, "South Africa, " in Ademola 
Oyejide, Benno Ndulu and Jan Willem Gunning (eds. ) Regional /nlc, graliun and Trat/, Liherahaolion 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999), p. 408. 
24() Bleaney, Hirsch, Holden and Jenkins, "South Africa, " p. 397. 
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use of tariffs instead of quantitative restrictions and subsidies. The retention of the 
protection policy for domestic industry resulted in its considerable diversification, 
even though the overall import intensity of the manufacturing sector did not change 
significant ly. 24 
The adoption of a deliberate siege economic development strategy by the apartheid 
regime was influenced by a number of factors. First, owing to reasons of limited 
scale of domestic production, distance from key world markets, as well as growing 
industrialised country trade protectionism, South Africa had to overcome these 
formidable obstacles if it was to expand manufactured exports. Second, given its 
heavy reliance on primary product exports South Africa was highly susceptible to 
price fluctuations on the global markets. Third, in its quest to foster a replacement of 
imported goods by domestically produced substitutes South Africa had to use 
imported technologies that, ironically, increased reliance on intermediate and capital 
imports. Fourth, South Africa was uniquely faced with the additional pressure of 
dealing with international opposition to apartheid policies. 
It is this international backdrop that informed South Africa's shift in the 1960s to 
strategic industry arguments as justification for protection. The development of an 
armaments industry, with strong spin-off effects in capital-intensive chemicals, metals 
and engineering industries, came to be regarded as important in an economy `acing 
international isolation. Public investment went into creating or expanding strategic 
industries - such as the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) and the Mossgas off-shore gas and refinery project 
241 See Merle Holden, "The Choice of Trade Strategy: Past Reflections and Future Prospects, " in Nicoli 
Nattrass and Elisabeth Ardington (eds. ) The Political Economy ol'Soiul, Arica (('ape "town: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), pp. 262-265. 
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deemed necessary to maintain the country's independence from the rest of the 
world. 242 The quest for national self-sufficiency was particularly pronounced during 
the governments of Prime Minister John Vorster (1966-78), which embarked upon a 
further drive to reduce dependence on strategic imports. Large subsidies were made 
available to import-competing industries. At the same time the government, in an 
attempt to stop the urbanisation of the Black population, provided subsidies if they 
would relocate to specified rural areas that lacked the infrastructure or resources for 
sustainable industrial growth. 
243 Even so, import substitution still did increase South 
Africa's dependence on foreign trade because of the need of the manufacturing sector 
to import capital and intermediate goods, necessitating export revenues to finance 
this. Between 1950 and 1970 the composition of imports changed, with capital goods 
as a proportion of imports rising from about 32 percent to 41.5 percent; a Further 10 
percent of imports was made up of industrial raw materials. 44 
The effects of the ISI strategy in South Africa were substantial. According to 
Nattrass, "the success of the industrialisation process allowed South Africa to escape 
the ill effects of economic imperialism that were concomitant of colonialism in so 
many instances on the African continent. -141 To he sure, the proportion of 
manufacturing in South Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) increased lrom 7 
percent in 1920 to 23 percent in 1970 (sec Appendix B for the change in composition 
of manufacturing output). Much of this manufacturing activity can undoubtedly be 
242 McCarthy, "South African Trade and Industrial Policy, " p. 68. 
243 See Sampie Terreblanche and Nicoli Nattrass, "A Periodisation of the Political Economy from 
1910, " in Nicoli Nattrass and Elisabeth Ardington (eds. ), The Political Lcmu»nv of South Africa (Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 16-17. 
'°" Charles Meth, "Capital Goods, "Dependence" and Appropriated 'l cchnology, " in Sample 
rerreblanche and Nicoli Nattrass (eds. ), The Political Economy of South Africa (('ape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), p. 45. 
245 Nattrass, The South African Econonnt', pp. 162-163. 
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attributed to the industrialisation policy, which appeared to be particularly successful 
in the 1960s, during which South Africa's economic growth rate compared favourably 
with other developing countries. 
But the negative effects of ISI in South Africa cannot be overlooked. Not only did it 
induce an increased anti-export bias in manufacturing, it promoted industrial 
expansion that was increasingly dependent on the continuing ability to import capital. 
Furthermore, the long-term benefit of industrialisation to the South African 
population (especially black people) was questionable. Real economic growth was 
high in the early phases of industrialisation, but its nature was not sustainable: 
originally easy, import substitution grew more difficult as opportunities became 
exhausted. Economic growth decreased from 5.5 percent in the 1960-74 period to 1.9 
percent per year in the 1974-85 period. With a population growing in excess of 2 
percent per year, per capita incomes dropped in the latter period of ISI the number 
of jobs created annually in the formal sector declined from 157 000 to 64 000 over the 
same periods. 246 In addition, industrialisation was capital intensive, and the import of 
capital-intensive intermediate goods created periodic balance of payments crises. The 
obsession with capital investment meant that investment in human resources a 
crucial ingredient of policies of all newly industrialised countries that have pursued 
successful industrialisation programmes was ignored. 
246 Ibid., p. 176. 
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2. South Africa and the GATT 
South Africa was one of the 23 original signatories to the GATT in 1948. Having 
been an active participant in the shaping of the post-war international order -- through 
participation in World War 2 on the side of the Western Allied forces and in the 
reconstruction efforts that saw the emergence of the Bretton Woods institutions 
South Africa came to be treated (and to see itself) as a `developed country' and part of 
the `Western bloc' in the post-war geo-political and economic real1gnments. '4' South 
Africa has historically pursued a policy of multilateral trade through the institutional 
mechanism of the GATT. Even so, the paramount question that exercised the minds 
of South African policymakers over successive decades was whether the country's 
economic interests were adequately served by the GATT or not. This ambivalent 
attitude towards the GATT regime was starkly highlighted in submissions made by 
domestic commerce and industry to the Reynders Commission of Inquiry into South 
Africa's export trade. 
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While South Africa saw the GATT as a crucial tool of post-war policy to achieve 
international trade liberalisation, it was concerned that the concessions it was making 
in the international trade system were not matched by the benefits it was deriving. 
There were doubts over whether the GATT did take sufficient account of South 
Africa's development needs and whether it was desirable, given these development 
imperatives, for South Africa to fulfill its GATT obligations to the same extent as 
industrialised countries. South Africa was also apprehensive about what it viewed as 
2" See Sam C. Nolutshungu, "South Africa's Position in World Politics, " in Vincent Maphai (c(i. ) 
South Africa -- The Challenge of Change (IIarare: Sapes Books, 1994), pp. 129-136. 249 The Reynders Commission, Report of the Cono"i. tision of l, zqirv into the Export Trude of the 
Republic ofSouth Africa 1972, Report no. 69/72 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1972). 
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double standards in the GATT system: the country was expected to maintain liberal 
conditions of entry to its markets for manufactured goods from industrialised 
countries, particularly its Western European trading partners, while these countries 
were allowed to impose an assortment of restrictions on South African agricultural 
exports. Although South Africa accepted that the kind of trade discrimination 
practised by the then European Economic Community (EEC) encompassed a 
recognised exception to the general principle of non-discrimination of GATT, it 
questioned whether this could in fact be reconciled with this principle. For South 
Africa the discriminatory provisions of the EEC, especially the mercantilist aims of its 
agricultural policies, spelled numerous disadvantages for its external trade against 
which the GATT provided no protection. 
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Moreover, South Africa was concerned about the adverse effects Britain's accession 
to the EEC in 1974 would have on its agricultural exports, especially its sensitive 
products such as wine, fresh dried and canned fruit, fruit juices, jam and marmalades, 
maize and maize products, groundnuts, and wattle bark and extract. 250 In terms of the: 
Ottawa Trade Agreements of 1932, South African exports had enjoyed either duty- 
free entry or entry at a margin of preference to the British market. But these trade 
preferences were facing extinction as a result of Britain becoming a member of the 
EEC: South Africa would in future have to contend with the massive costs involved 
in adjusting to the EEC's common external tariff as well as its protectionist 
agricultural policies. Given that Britain was then South Africa's largest trade partner 
249 Ibid., pp. 74-75. 
250 Ibid., p. 80. 
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and export market, a termination of the trade preferential agreement was bound to 
have undesirable consequences for South Africa's foreign trade. 
25' 
In some ways South Africa's anxieties about the GATT reflected the country's deeply 
ingrained suspicion of international institutions at the height of the apartheid era. 
Yet, more fundamentally, they also encapsulated South Africa's perception that 
GATT disciplines were unduly constraining its domestic economic objectives, 
particularly its quest for national self-sufficiency. In the late 1960s and early 1970s 
South Africa's economic profile resembled those of other so-called `middle-zone' 
countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Neither a completely 
industrialised nor a fully-fledged developing country, South Africa depended 
extensively on exports of traditional commodities as well as intermediate and capital 
goods imports to foster industrial development. Not only was the country reliant for 
foreign exchange earnings on a limited range of primary goods predominantly 
agricultural and mineral products - which were subject to rapid price fluctuations, its 
debtor nation status induced an enormous dependence on steady flows of' foreign 
capital to fuel economic expansion. The resultant continuous pressure on foreign 
exchange reserves, in turn, exposed South Africa to chronic balance of payments 
difficulties, necessitating a frequent review of trade strategy to contain ensuing 
economic problems. It is these considerations that propelled South Africa to question 
the utility of the GATT to its economic interests. Notwithstanding South Africa's 
reservations about the GATT, the Reynders Commission strongly cautioned against 
the country withdrawing from this institutional arrangement: As the Commission's 
report stated: 
251 Ibid., p. 84. 
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There is little doubt that the GATT has played a most important role in 
the destiny of South Africa's industrial development as well as its 
export trade and policies. For various reasons the country has a 
material interest in the expansion of world trade and it can, therefore, 
identify itself with the general objectives of the GATT to free and 
enlarge world trade. It should be recognised that for this purpose the 
nations of the world should accept and respect the formulation and 
application of a realistic code of behaviour in foreign trade. At the 
same time, many countries feel that the existing rules of behaviour of 
the GATT are deficient in a number of respects and do not, 111 fact, 
conform to the requirements of the modern world. Although this may 
be true, the Commission is of the opinion that it would serve no 
purpose for South Africa to dissociate itself from the GATT (thereby 
also giving more power to the attempts to isolate the country) but that 
it should rather endeavour to bring about a change in these rules and in 
252 their actual application. 
By taking heed of the Reynders Commission's counsel, the South African state 
committed itself to continuing its participation in the GATT as a developed country. 
But decades of international ostracism induced by its apartheid policies meant that it 
was able to operate beyond the reaches of GATT rules: the country remained largely 
outside the substantial liberalisation achieved in the successive pre-Uruguay Round 
negotiating rounds. As such, South Africa could maintain relatively high tariffs and 
several quantitative restrictions on its imports to sustain its import-substituting 
industrial policies. Moreover, the imposition of trade and other sanctions against 
South Africa by its major partners allowed South Africa to conduct its trade policy 
with little regard to its obligations under the GATT. South Africa's isolation from 
GATT processes over the decades, however, robbed the country of the bene['its 
associated with structural changes in the global economy, typified by trends towards 
globalisation of production, investment, technology and trade flows. And this 
explains why the South African economy has lagged behind those its peers such as 
252 Ibid., p. 78. 
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Australia and New Zealand, despite the fact that they were all more or less on the 
same level of development a few decades ago. 
3. Unilateral Trade Liberalisation 
South Africa's estrangement from GATT developments did not prevent consecutive 
apartheid governments from embarking on domestically inspired, unilateral trade 
reforms as a way of easing recurrent economic difficulties. Two episodes of trade 
liberalisation took place in South Africa during the apartheid pcriod, 2 The first 
began in 1972 following the publication of the report of the Reynders Commission. 
The second episode followed the publication in 1983 of the Kleu Report on industrial 
strategy, which recommended the replacement of quantitative restrictions with tariffs 
as trade protection policy. The current trade liberalisation process, the subject of the 
next chapter, could be thus said to represent a third liberalisation episode in South 
Africa. 
A salient clement of South Africa's trade liberalisation is that it (lid not entail any 
import liberalisation until 1995. Erstwhile liberalisation efforts concentrated on 
reducing the anti-export bias, combined with the substitution of quantitative 
restrictions with equivalent tariffs and duties on the import side. Significantly, the 
fact that trade reform was dictated entirely by domestic considerations meant that 
South Africa, unlike most African countries, was never pressured into making 
changes as part of structural adjustment programmes sponsored by multilateral 
253 See Bleaney, Hirsch, Holden and Jenkins, "South Africa, " p. 396. 
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financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank. 24 
4. Export Promotion 
By 1970 South Africa was moving towards autarky and the failure of the 
manufacturing sector to develop a substantial export capacity, together with the 
recognition that ISI was no longer driving growth, had become a matter of serious 
concern. There was also a concern that South Africa was dependent on a single 
commodity: gold. Further, there was recognition that the export pessimism of the 
1950s had given way to export optimism in light of the achievements of the newly 
industrialised countries of South East Asia, which had achieved rapid economic 
growth through outward-oriented economic strategies. 
All these considerations prompted the establishment in 1971 of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Export Trade of the Republic of South Africa into the Export Trade of 
the Republic of South Africa (known as the Rcynders Commission after its chairman 
Hans Reynders) to: 
enquire into and to report upon all matters and factors which 
discourage South African producers and manufacturers from 
participating on a continuing basis in the export trade, and from 
planning therefore; and to submit recommendations as to the steps 
which the government and private enterprise should take in order to 
contain these factors so as to promote a sustained increase of the 
255 Republic's export trade. 
251 
Ibid. 
? SS Cited in A. L. Ratcliffe, "Export Policy in Perspective, " . S'urrlh A -iccrn Jurrrvra! of Economics vol. 43, 
no. 1, (1975), pp. 74-91. 
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The Reynders Report, which represented South Africa's `first liberalisation episode, 
reached several conclusions on the basis of which it made a number of specific 
recommendations. First, it concluded that South Africa's export performance had to 
be improved if a total balance of payments crisis was to be averted. Second, it 
argued that South Africa's geographical distance from the key markets, its lack of 
access to trade preferences, and the subsidisation of exports required from South 
Africa "need a rethink on the questions of export awareness (by Government and a 
private sector), improved infrastructure, and the aggressive exploitation or export 
areas in which the Republic has a comparative advantage. "25 
The Reynders Report advocated the promotion of exports, particularly of the 
manufacturing sector, as the long-term panacea for future foreign exchange 
requirements. Strikingly, it argued for a shift towards a greater emphasis on the 
expansion of manufactured exports yet left intact the protective import regime. 
Although the report pointed out that import protection had hampered the 
competitiveness of domestic manufactures in global markets, it did not endorse the 
elimination of existing protection. In addition, it refrained from recommending 
exchange rate devaluation as a means of holstering exports. X57 In essence, the 
Reynders Report called for the expansion of exports without endorsing a füll-scale 
strategy of export promotion. As such, protection of the domestic market continual, 
with import substitution proceeding in the production of intermediate goods. This 
trade strategy, although contradictory, was in fact consistent with the broad thrust of 
the govennment's strategic objective of survival. Given the international isolation of 
South Africa, the government was concerned about dependence on imports, and one 
25 EI. JJ. Reynders, "Export Status and Strategy, " South Afi icmt Jotn"nn/ of Econom ics, vol. 43,1975. 
127. 
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of the most appealing policy instruments available for influencing import dependence 
was its highly protective and differentiated tariff regime. Also, since the government 
was unwilling to allow purely economic factors to influence the structure of imports, 
action on the export side was viewed as a more attractive 258 
Despite its comprehensiveness, the Reynders Report was not well received by 
economists and was "criticised for being incomplete in its analysis, inconsistent and 
poorly written. "259 A concern was also raised that the commission had failed to 
systematically investigate export problem, its primary mandate. There was also a 
suspicion that the move to embrace export promotion was "nothing more than a 
balance of payments fix and had no relation to export-led models of growth . 
"'`'0 
Notwithstanding these misgivings it nonetheless had been accepted that the report had 
initiated, albeit haltingly and in a qualified manner, a more outward-oriented trade 
strategy on the part of the government. 
In line with government's policy, South Africa's import regime remained 
protectionist. Nonetheless, support for a more outward-oriented strategy was 
reiterated by the publication in 1983 of the Klcu Report on industrial strategy, which 
"attempted to find a more effective system of export incentives to (ävour higher 
value-added manufactured exports. "``'' Representing the second `liberalisation 
episode' in South Africa, the report "recommended a move away from import 
replacement and criticised existing export incentives for neither favouring domestic 
258 Ibid., p. 18. 
259 Ibid., p. 19. 
2(, l) Ibid. 
261 Bleaney, Hirsch, Holden and Jenkins, "South Africa, " p. 402. 
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intermediate inputs nor creating incentives for technological innovation .,, 
202 The 
government's response to the report was lukewarm and the implementation of its 
recommendations unenthusiastic; it was clearly not supportive of entirely free trade. 
As its White Paper issued in 1985 declared: 
The government wishes to make it very clear that it has never espoused 
any so-called `free trade' policy. On the contrary, like all previous 
South African governments since 1924, and indeed earlier, it has 
decisively implemented a policy of protection for industry. Like 
previous governments, it has accorded protective customs duties, where 
justified, against competition from normally priced imports. This has 
continued to be done on a moderate and selective basis, in order to 
avoid the undue raising of costs and to ensure the optimal use of 
263 resources. 
Opposition to the Kleu Report reflected, in some ways, differences of opinion within 
the government on the importance, and means, of promoting exports. This 
demonstrated "a lack of clear decision-making authority in the economic 
bureaucracies as well as powerful vested interests which would resist a reduction in 
tariff protection. "2M Moreover, the imposition of sanctions also "militated against a 
serious export strategy and meant that the main thrust of policy interventions 
remained in support of strategic self-sufficiency. "2(S However, the importance of 
manufactured exports as a policy objective was becoming firmly established by the 
mid-1980s. It was accepted that the exchange rate had historically been overvalued 
and that the gold price could no longer he the main determinant of the exchange rate 
level; exchange rate policy came increasingly to reflect the needs of'manufacturing, 
particularly exports. There was also a growing consensus in government about the 
need for structural adjustment in order to reorientate industry towards foreign 
2(2 Ibid. 
2(3 RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1985), White hip (, t- on Indust ial L)e eluýnnent So-ategv (Pretoria: 
Government Printer), p. 402. 
204 Black, "The Role of the State, " p. 17. 
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markets. Even so, there were still huge differences of opinion regarding the means by 
which this was to be achieved. 
5. Structural Adjustment 
In 1988 the Board of Trade and Industry (BTI), a quasi-independent government 
agency responsible for formulating and administering South Africa's tariff regime, 
published a key policy document titled A Policy (111(1 Strategy for the Development 
and Structural Adjustment of Industry. The document espoused the idea of 
providing enhanced support on selective grounds to promote the structural adjustment 
of designated industries with the aim of encouraging exports. Drawing heavily on the 
East Asian experience, the document introduced concepts such as selectivity, dynamic 
comparative advantage, support measures on the supply side, and performance criteria 
for granting incentives. Although it acknowledged that South Africa could not 
emulate the Japanese experience, the document alluded to it positively: 
The general pattern of the strategy is as follows: The home market is 
closed as part of a conscious strategy to establish an industry. 
Together, government and selected firms choose a few high-volume 
product lines for specialisation. With the help of government grants 
and loans, and the co-operation of the banking system, large new 
investments are made in advanced new production equipment. If the 
product is one requiring technological breakthroughs, research and 
development is funded by the government. Anti-monopoly laws are 
waived to smooth the way towards agreed objectives. An `entering' 
wedge export drive, characterised by extremely aggressive pricing, is 
launched with the objective of obtaining market dominance. Then, 
once a beachhead is established in a broad commodity product area, 
the product ladder is scaled to obtain a commanding position in the 
market. Reluctantly, protection of the home market can be relaxed, as 
the major objectives have been achieved. This is sound strategy. It 
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worked in the competition between Japan and the United States to 
produce computer memory chips. Japan has won -- so far. 
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A key feature of the BTI report was its acceptance that "comparative advantage is not 
a static concept that can be created by countries and governments. -207 Referring to 
the case of the Japanese steel and engineering industries -- which were lavished with 
government support in spite of the fact that they did not possess comparative 
advantage in natural resources such as iron ore, coal and cheap energy - it contended 
that "government policy should act in support of industries with actual or potential 
comparative advantage .,, 
26" Given the dominance of basic commodities in South 
Africa's manufactured exports, the document emphasised that there was a case "for 
moving away from an area of comparative advantage (for example export of ores) to 
an area where a future comparative advantage can be cicvelopecl. "2"" 
In response to the BTI report, the South African government devised a series of 
sectoral structural adjustment programmes, notably within the automobile as weil the 
clothing and textiles sectors. Domestic producers in these industries were allowed to 
import duty-free inputs or finished goods if they exported a sufficient part of their 
output. However, this approach to redressing the anti-export bias was not universally 
popular within government. On the surface the reason for this seemed to he 
attributable to an institutional clash between the BTl and the Department of Industry 
(DTI), which in its Annual Report of 1989 launched an unusually caustic attack on the 
"complicated programmes that are not manageable as well as affordahle"27" and 
266 Cited in Black, "The Role of the State, " p. 210 
20 Ibid., p. 211. 
2"x Ibid. 
``') Ibid. 
2711 Department of Trade and Industry (1989), Annual Report (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1989), p. 2 
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claimed that they provided incentives for fraud in the form of fictitious exports. But 
in reality these concerns seemed to be rooted in the fact that the introduction of 
sectoral adjustment programmes coincided with a fundamental ideological and policy 
shift on the part of the government towards a more market-oriented direction and 
less state economic intervention (see discussion below). 
6. Export Performance 
As indicated earlier the fundamental cause of the economic difficulties of the mid- 
1980s was a drastic decline in the foreign currency value of South Africa's exports in 
1980-85. Table I shows that South Africa's total exports, measured in US dollars, 
rose at an average annual rate of 22.2 percent in the 1970s, but fell dramatically by 
8.8 percent in 1980-85. The exports of all four major sectors of the economy 
(agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services) recorded huge decreases during 
1980-85. OF particular significance, however, was the deterioration in the export 
performance of the mining industry -- which accounted for 54.1 percent of South 
Africa's total exports in 1980 as opposed to 42.4 percent in 1990. This dramatic 
decline was due mainly to the sharp drop in the price of gold. 
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Table I- Exports of South Africa by Major Economic Sectors in Current US Dollars 
1970-1990 
Share of Sector in Total Exports 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Agriculture 6.1 6.3 4.1 1.5 2.4 
Mining 44.6 46.6 54.1 53.2 42.4 
Manufacturing 43.5 40.3 37.5 39.4 47.8 
Services 5.7 6.8 4.3 5.9 7.5 
--- 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Average Annual Rates of Growth ('%) 
1970-75 1975-80 1970-80 1980-85 1985-0 
Agriculture 21.9 13.1 17.5 -25.4 18.3 
Mining 22.5 26.7 24.6 -9.1 3.6 
Manufacturing 19.5 21.2 20.4 -7.9 12.7 
Services 25.6 12.2 18.7 -2.8 13.8 
TOTAL 21.4 23.0 22.2 -8.8 8.4 
Source: Central and Economic Advisory Service (CEAS) 
This decline in exports greatly reduced the country's ability to pay for imports. The 
decrease in import capacity was further worsened by the significant decline in lorcign 
capital inflows from 1983. The South African economy is heavily dependent on 
imports, especially intermediate and capital imports. As Table 2 shows, during 1971- 
88 between about 76 and 82 percent of imports consisted of' intermediate goods and 
capital goods. The reduced import capacity forced a reduction in imports. 
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Table 2- Percentage Shares of Intermediate, Capital and Consumption Goods in 
South Africa's Total Imports 1971-1988 
1971 1975 1978 1981 1984 1985 1988 
Intermediate goods 60.0 57.2 62.4 57.0 57.7 60.7 62.1 
Capital goods 15.8 18.9 19.1 
18.7 18.6 17.4 14.4 
Intermediate and capital goods 
75.8 76.1 81.5 75.7 76.3 78.1 76.4 
21 5 17.4 16.9 14.9 19.2 19.5 21.9 
Consumption goods . 2.7 6.5 1.6 9.4 4.6 2.4 1.6 
Residual 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
TOTAL 
Source: Central and Economic Aclvisorv Service (CEAS) 
The 1980-90 decade saw South African external trade revert to the pattern of the 
1960s and 1970s, when the growth of trade was slower than the growth of GDP. 
271 In 
the 1980s external trade grew by 206.4 percent and the GDP by 326.7 percent this 
implies that South Africa did not experience export-lcd growth during these years. In 
terms of the ratio of external trade to GDP, foreign trade had amounted to 59,3 
percent of GDP in 1980 and it had fallen to 42.6 percent in 1990 (sec Table 3). This 
decline in the relative importance of foreign trade is confirmed by the export and 
import prices. The price of exports rose from R19 957,8 million to R22 194,7 
million, whereas imports declined fron R14 418,8 million to R12 862,4 million: 
imports had declined by 10 percent. Partly, this was due to the collapse of the rand 
(the South African currency). In 1980, on average, a US dollar was worth 76 South 
African cents. By 1990 this had risen to R2,59 the rand's value had dropped by 
244 percent , 
272 
271 Stuart Jones, "South Africa's External Trade in the 19SOs, " Ac South 41ricun dotn"nul of Economic 
History - Special Issue vol. 9, no. 2, (September 1994), p. 110. 
272 Ibid., p .111. 
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Table 3- External trade as a percentage of GDP 1980-90 
1980 
(%) 
1990 
(0/p) 
'%º Decrease 
(O1-) 
Exports 34.4 24.7 28.0 
Imports 249 17.9 28.1 
Total 59.3 42.6 28.1 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletins 
Trade sanctions also emerged as a crucial factor in South Africa's foreign trade in the 
1980s. Although trade sanctions against South Africa had a long history India 
imposed a total trade embargo in 1946 - the scope of these sanctions broadened in the 
period since 1985.273 For the first time, nearly all South Africa's Western trading 
partners imposed restrictions -- albeit in most cases very limited ones to show their 
displeasure at the apartheid regime's policies. It is debatable, however, whether trade 
sanctions had adverse effects on South Africa's economic performance in the 1980s; 
not only did exporters found other markets but they also employed intermediaries who 
helped them sell their goods through surreptitious channels. 274 Though South Africa's 
dependence on foreign trade and on `external linkages' rendered the county's 
economy vulnerable to trade sanctions, it was in fact international 
Financial sanctions 
that imposed massive costs on the economy. It is worth stressing that even at the 
height of the international sanctions campaign against South Africa, the country's 
paramount economic problems did not concern export markets but were internal the 
relatively small size and high costs of the protected manufacturing sector, the 
overwhelming concentration of subsidies and export incentives on capital-intensive 
industries, as well as the high levels of unemployment 
27 'Richard Moorsorn, "Foreign Trade and Sanctions, " in Mark Orkin (ed. ), Sanctions 1 g, jinsl 
Apartheid (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), p. 261. 
'i4 Holden, "The Choice of Trade Strategy, " pp. 270-271. 
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In sum, the slower growth of external trade in the 1980s reflected a variety of 
problems, including the fall in the gold price, the domestic recession, the increasing 
pressure of the economic sanctions - financial sanctions - being employed against 
South Africa and the uncertain state of the international economy. The combination 
of these foreign exchange shocks had serious consequences for the South African 
economy, and probably triggered the most traumatic external shock oC the period -- the 
debt crisis of August 1985. 
7. The Debt Crisis 
In 1985 South Africa plunged into a serious debt crisis, which necessitated a lürther 
shift in trade policy. When political instability reached crisis proportions in the 
1980s, it triggered net outflows of portfolio investment and direct investment. During 
1982-88, capital flows reached more than US$6 billion dollars, following the decision 
of about 40 percent of transnational firms to disinvest. To stem the tide of capital 
outflows, the South African monetary authorities responded by tightcning exchange 
controls and imposing, in 1985, a unilateral moratorium on the country's short-term 
international debt. This move precipitated a dramatic collapse of international 
investor confidence in the South African economy, Culminating in massive capital 
flight and a record 20 percent depreciation of the national currency. 27 
Outflows of long-term and short-term capital from 1985, together with the virtual 
cessation of inflows of both direct investment and loans, created a large and sustained 
275 Alan Hirsch, "Sanctions, Loans and the South African Lconomy, " in Mark Orkin (ed. ), Sanctions 
Against Apartheid (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), p. 273. 
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deficit on the capital account of the balance of payments. This required action by the 
monetary authorities to turn the current-account deficit into a substantial surplus so as 
to enable the servicing of the foreign debt. To this end, the South African Reserve 
Bank reintroduced the dual exchange rate system it had abolished in 1983 as part of 
the government's policy to move towards a more market-oriented economy. Also, the 
value of the rand was allowed to fall against the currencies of all historically 
important trading partners, and deflationary policies to reduce domestic expenditure 
were implemented. 
The sudden, massive flight of capital induced by the debt crisis "necessitated an 
equally large and abrupt increase in the surplus on the balance of trade. "270 For South 
Africa, like for many other countries which had been subjected to debt shocks in the 
in the 1980s, the only way in which this could he achieved was through it drastic 
reduction in imports. To this end, the most pressing requirement for economic 
recovery was a massive increase in foreign exchange to pay for essential intermediate 
and capital goods. Given the absence of new capital inflows, this necessitated a 
dramatic increase in the growth rate of exports, especially exports of' manufactured 
goods. Whatever objections there may have been to export-led growth in the past, 
various foreign exchange shocks in the 1980s (especially the debt crisis of 1985), and 
the ensuing economic crisis, forced South Africa to shift abruptly to an outward- 
oriented trade regime. The vigorous promotion of exports, to case foreign exchange 
constraints, became the overriding aim of trade policy. 
276 Bell, "Should South Africa Further Liberalise its Trade?, " p. 93. 
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8. Ideological Shift 
The foreign exchange shocks of the 1980s coincided with a fundamental ideological 
shift on the part of apartheid regime, which again triggered a rethink of trade policy. 
This followed an acceptance by the Nationalist government of advice from three 
separate government-appointed commissions that the State should play a less 
important role in shaping the economy, and that the market should be left to operate 
as freely as possible . 
277 Partly, this ideological rethink was informed by changes in 
the intellectual climate in the late 1970s and early 1980s regarding the role of the state 
sparked off by the rise of the ideology of neo-liberalism. The ascendancy of neo- 
liberal economic ideology in the 1970s and 1980s represented an assault on the idea 
of `embedded liberalism, ' the normative foundation upon which the interventionist 
economic practices of the post-war period were constructed. 
`7 
Proponents of neo-liberalism, inspired by the ideas of economic thinkers such as 
Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek, were critical of the Keynesian welfare 
state and blamed it for most of the problems afflicting the global economy. They 
sought to create an international economic order that would "promote freer markets 
and more orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. "279 In the domain of international 
financial markets, not only did they oppose the imposition of capital controls on 
financial movements, they also admired the way international financial markets 
disciplined government policy and compelled states to adopt conservative 
macroeconomic policies. Moreover, they argued that a liberal international order 
2" This refers to the De Kock, Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions discussed in the second chapter. 
`" Eric Helleiner, "Freeing money" p. 301. 
279 Ibid. 
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would "promote a more efficient allocation of capital by allowing capital to move 
across borders where it could be most productively employed ., 
280 
In the trade domain, the notion of growth through trade assumed a status of orthodoxy 
in development circles during the 1980s. Based on neo-classical trade theory, 
particularly the Ricardian model of dynamic comparative advantage, growth through 
trade prescribed outward oriented or export-led development strategies for developing 
countries. It was touted by the World Bank as central to the successes of the NICs, 
primarily because "an outward orientation increases efficiency in the allocation of 
resources, competitiveness of goods produced, and flexibility to adapt to the ever- 
changing opportunities and constraints thrown up by the international economy 
including rapid adjustment to the severe external shocks of the 1970s. "`ýý The rise of 
EOI strategies represented a fundamental departure from the ISI development model 
pursued vigorously by most developing countries in the post war period. 
These ideas had a huge impact not only on Western conservatives such as Reagan and 
Thatcher, but also on the policies and practices of the Bretton Woods institutions 
which were disenchanted with the outcomes of statist economic policies in the 
developing world. This accounts for the decisions of the IFIs in the 1980s to use 
their stranglehold over deeply indebted African and Latin American countries to push 
for internal policy reforms in line with neo-liberal prescriptions, including the 
reorganization of the state. "' The new economic thinking propagated by the IFIs in 
the 1980s was not lost on the South African government. The NP presented the shift 
towards free market ideology as part of a process that required the `rolling back' of 
280 Ibid., p. 310. 
2"' Ruggie, "International Interdependence, " p. 10. 
22 Lipton and Simkins, State and Market, pp. 18-20. 
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the state. There was, however, another dynamic at play regarding why the apartheid 
regime set out to `roll back' the state in the mid-1980s. The conversion of the NP 
whose record for state interventionism was formidable - came as a surprise to 
observers, and raised the suspicions of the ANC, its potential successor in 
government. Coming on the eve of democratic change in South Africa, the ANC 
suspected that the NP's shift represented an attempt to restructure the post-apartheid 
state in ways that would benefit itself and its constituency, and which would curtail 
the ability of the future ANC government to pursue its agenda of social and economic 
transformation. 293 Whatever the underlying motives of the NP, what is clear is that 
the emergence of a more market-oriented ideological direction was poised to have 
significant consequences for future South African trade policy. 
9. The Beginnings of Export-Oriented Industrialisation 
In the domain of trade policy, the NP's intellectual metamorphosis was underscored 
by the 1989 Department of Trade Industry's (DTI) annual report which declared that: 
Economic growth, particularly export-led industrial growth, is of the 
utmost importance to the country with its rapidly increasing 
population. It has to be achieved in an international environment 
changing at a breathtaking pace, and with results which cannot 
everywhere be predicted with certainty. In this world of crumbling 
ideologies and shifting economic power centres, South Africa will 
have to design its strategy in a way that ensures meaningful access to 
capital markets and technology in the coming years. Our economic 
future can in no way be isolated from the larger scenario. The real 
economic growth declined during the seventies and evidenced a 
strongly downward trend during the eighties. It is generally realised 
that economic restructuring has become a necessity. `K4 
"" Ibid. p. 15. 
284 Department of Trade and Industry (1989), Annual Report, p. l. 
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Moreover, the subsequent appointment as trade and industry minister of Kent Durr, an 
avid economic liberal plucked from the private sector, demonstrated the government's 
determination to close the door on the selective intervention advocated by the BTI. 
Durr presided over the introduction in 1990 of the General Export Incentive Scheme 
(GEIS) which "was aimed at countering the higher costs of protected inputs, which in 
turn raised the costs to exporters. -295 The GEIS provided export incentives, related to 
value added and local content, as well as some protection against exchange rate 
fluctuations . 
286 The scheme was particularly designed to encourage the production 
and export of processed raw materials, although it was criticised for excluding 
producers of indirect exports and for overlooking the need to remove constraints on 
more labour-intensive exports. 
27 
The introduction of GEIS was followed in June 1990 by the publication of a study 
undertaken by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Modification of the' 
Application of Protection Policy. Commissioned by Durr's predecessor, Wim Dc 
Villiers, the report arose out of the long held view that there was limited scope for 
import substitution and that a more export-orientated policy was necessary. It 
contrast to BTI structural adjustment, the report advocated a much more uniform and 
lower tariff structure, arguing that "the prevailing system was defective owing the 
cost-raising implications of a relatively high protective structure, as well as the 
misallocation arising from sectoral variations in protection ICVCIS.,, 299 
25 Black, "The Role of the State, " p. 213. 2"' Department of Trade and Industry (1990) Annual Report (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1990), p. 15. 
`'"' Bleaney, Hirsch, Holden and Jenkins, South Africa, p. 404. 
299 Cited in Black, "The Role of the State, " p. 213. 
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Influenced heavily the World Bank's World Development Report of 1987, the IDC 
report also endorsed a "process of structural adjustment towards export orientation, 
which must be pursued with perseverance in order to achieve eventual success.,, 
2S') 
The main instrument for achieving greater export orientation would be the lowering of 
protection. The report stressed, however, that reducing protection should he 
conditional on the implementation of a "package of measures designed to achieve 
macroeconomic stability, higher levels of domestic savings and a more appropriate 
tax structure. "2 90 This implied that the expansion of exports would be encouraged 
through a package of supply-side measures including lower company tax, higher 
domestic savings, an appropriate exchange rate policy, and an improvement in the 
supply of skilled labour. It was anticipated that the reduction of tariffs would 
lead to 
lower subsidies under the GEIS and the phasing out of other export subsidies as well 
111 
as tax concessions designed to favour exports. ` 
10. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored trade policy in South Africa during the apartheid era. It has 
contended that South Africa's trade policy in the apartheid period evolved in response 
to the imperatives of the domestic economy. Trade reforms were Implemented 
sporadically and randomly to tackle specific concerns, not as part of a coherent 
economic strategy. The overriding policy objective was the survival of apartheid in 
an unstable domestic situation and increasingly harsh international milieu. Like other 
developing countries, South Africa pursued a policy of import-substituting 
industrialisation (ISI) since 1925. Not only was ISI expected to assist with 
Ibid., p. 214. 
2Ibid. 
291 Ibid., p. 216. 
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developing greater economic independence from Britain, it was also anticipated that it 
would generate employment for whites in manufacturing. Domestic industry was 
protected by high tariff barriers, high exchange rate subsidisation and other demand- 
side assistance to industries that were generally uncompetitive. Through parastatals 
like the IDC and ISCOR, the government invested heavily in what was considered to 
be strategic intensive mega-projects, stimulating downstream industries. In turn, the 
high protection enjoyed by these parastatals resulted in high costs for downstream 
industries. Reinforced by an oppressive industrial relations system, this approach did 
not create a competitive manufacturing sector nor did it support desired job growth. 
The effects of the ISI strategy in South Africa were substantial. It fostered a 
considerable diversification of the domestic industry, even though the overall import 
intensity of the manufacturing sector did not change significantly. Furthermore, it 
enabled the apartheid regime to pursue its goal of achieving national self-sufficiency 
and reducing dependence on strategic imports. However, worsening international 
economic conditions in the early 1970s - exemplified by the oil crisis, floating world 
currencies, as well as international monetary uncertainties necessitated a review of 
South Africa's external trade policy. 
Yet although the theoretical basis of free trade was eventually accepted, it was never 
the government's policy to implement full-blown trade liberalisation; the promotion 
of exports was never matched by the liberalisation of the import regime. Trade 
liberalisation was viewed as a tactical device to case economic difficulties, notably 
balance of payments problems, induced by the post-war growth model. It was only in 
the 1980s that a combination of foreign exchange shocks in the 1980s, particularly the 
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debt crisis of 1985, and the ensuing economic crisis, that the South African 
government was compelled to move abruptly to an outward-oriented trade regime. 
The shift towards an export-oriented trade policy in South Africa coincided with the 
beginning of the Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral trade negotiations in 1986 in 
which South Africa participated. What was the UR all about? Which countries were 
the key actors in it? What role did South Africa play in the UR? What was the 
outcome of the round? And what were the consequences of the UR outcome for 
South Africa. These crucial questions are explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Thrown in at a Deep End: South Africa and the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Negotiations 
The re-integration of South Africa into the multilateral trade system in the early 1990s 
marked the end of decades of international isolation induced by the country's 
apartheid policies. This chapter explores South Africa's role in the global trade 
regime within the context of the UR of multilateral trade negotiations. It argues that 
by signing the Marrakesh Agreement of the GATT in 1994, South Africa signalled its 
commitment not only to liberalise its trade policies in accordance with the rules-based 
international trade system, but also to formalise its credentials as a fully-fledged 
trading nation following many years of operating beyond the GATT disciplines. 
However, the restoration of South Africa's trade rights also imposed responsibilities. 
By embracing the strictures of the WTO, embodied in the negotiating outcome of the 
UR, South Africa committed itself to far-reaching changes to its economic policy and 
undertook to implement as a single undertaking all the agreements of' he UR. The 
paramount challenge confronting South African policy»akers is to reconcile the 
constraints entailed by the country's WTO membership with those arising from its 
domestic social and economic pressures. 
The chapter is in two parts. First, it contextualises the UR of multilateral trade 
negotiations within a global historical setting to set the tone for the discussion of 
South Africa's role in it later. Second, it undertakes a comprehensive examination of 
South Africa's participation in the UR and its implications for the country. 
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1. The Uruguay Round in Global Context 
The UR of trade negotiations came about as a result of a growing realisation across 
the world in the 1980s that the global economy was undergoing structural changes 
that necessitated a fundamental review of the manner in which the traditional GATT 
structure was operating. 292 It is this recognition that inspired the US to take the lead 
in calling for a new round of trade negotiations. The US initiative was supported by a 
wide cross-section of developed and developing countries. Although these countries 
were driven by diverse concerns, they shared a common objective to maintain the 
multilateral trading system and to make it more responsive to the economic problems 
they faced in their domestic economies. 293 Given the wide scope of its agenda, the 
UR was expected, and proved to he, the most complex and ambitious GATT 
negotiation round ever undertaken. 24 
Developing countries played a central role in building momentum towards a new 
trade negotiation. This is largely because some countries previously classified as 
developing nations -- notably the newly industrialising nations such Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea were assuming it greater role in the 
international trade system in the 1980s. Domestic considerations also made it 
imperative for most developing countries to seek a new negotiation round. Faced 
with a devastating recession and debt crisis, which precipitated a sharp increase in 
debt repayments and a consequent decline in imports, many developing country 
`"" Gilbert R. Winham, "The Uruguay Round and the World Economy, " in Richard Stuhhs and 
Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds. ), Political Economy and the ('hanging Global Order (Ontario: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 163. 
"" Ibid. 
294 For a detailed evaluation of the trade negotiating agenda dealt with during the Uruguay Round sec 
Jeffrey J. Schott, The Urugucrv Room/: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1994). 
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governments recognised that they had a stake in expanded exports and in an open 
295 
trade system. 
The significance of the UR rested with its aim to subject trade in agriculture and 
textiles to GATT rules and disciplines. It was also notable for its introduction of new 
issues into GATT negotiations -- namely trade in services, investment, and intellectual 
property rights. It was largely around these issues that divisions between the 
developed and developing countries revolved during the pre-negotiation phase of the 
UR. Most developing nations were opposed to the inclusion of these new issues, 
fearing that "the GATT rules developed for the new issues could be used by the 
industrialised countries to overwhelm their fledgling industries and to undermine 
domestic policies that the developing countries considered critical to their national 
economic development"29b They wanted to ensure that if they were forced to make 
concessions in these areas, the developed countries would reciprocate by making real 
concessions on issues of importance to them such as textiles, clothing and agriculture. 
Ironically, the sectors on which developing countries sought concessions were 
precisely those that were considered `sensitive' in the developed countries' markets in 
terms of the GATT regulatory regime. 
The GATT provided for an agreement the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) that 
"allowed the developed countries to restrain imports either through the negotiation of 
bilateral quotas or through the application of flexible safeguard measures . 
"2 7 lt is 
worth emphasising that the MFA prohibited developed countries from imposing 
295 Winham, "The Uruguay Round, " p. 169. 
Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of lºrternational Economic Relations (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1997), p. 84. 
297 McDonald, The World Trading System, p. 136. 
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quotas on imports from other developed countries only the exports of developing 
countries were affected. 
The issue of agriculture generated the most acrimonious disagreements among the 
negotiating parties during the UR. At the heart of the disputes were differences of 
opinion regarding the pace and amount of structural adjustment needed to reform 
agricultural policies, and regarding what required to be regulated . 
2118 According to 
Moon, the difficulties experienced in agriculture highlighted not only the uniqueness 
of the agricultural sector in world trade but also the complex trade dilemmas which 
agriculture spawns. As he avers: 
Agriculture presented a unique challenge because its special role in 
most political economies ensures that any liberalisation in this sector 
will induce extensive distributional consequences and uncomfortable 
trade-offs with other values. Nearly all nations are committed to 
sustaining a healthy agricultural sector, because a relatively large, 
geographically concentrated, and occupationally inflexible population 
is dependent upon it. 2 9 
To appreciate the nature of the agricultural conundrum it is important to examine It in 
its historical context. Since the founding of the GATT system, there has been a 
tendency on the part of industrialised countries not to accord serious attention to the 
liberalisation of trade in non-manufactured commodities, especially agricultural trade. 
Indeed, as Higgott noted, "since the mid-1960s especially, following the inception of 
the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the benefits 
agricultural exporting countries might expect to gain under GATT have been 
seriously curtailed by a variety of note-tariff devices and outright protectionist 
24 ]bid., p. 206. 
2)) Moon, Dilemmas, p. 105. 
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policies. "300 When the GATT system was instituted in the immediate post-war 
period it was agreed by the major economic powers, principally the US and the EU, 
that its rules would not apply to the agricultural sector: the ban imposed by the GATT 
agreement on import quotas and export subsidies was waived in recognition of the 
`specificity of the agricultural sector. '301 However, in subsequent years the US 
changed its position and tried unsuccessfully during the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds 
to have agriculture brought under the full disciplines of the GATT. This meant that 
serious bargaining on agriculture would be thus left to the UR. 
The UR agriculture negotiations were influenced by a number of crucial factors 
including a crisis in the global agricultural system -- exemplified by burgeoning trade 
disputes between the US and the EU -- a recognition within the EU that its 
interventionist agricultural policy needed to be refornmed to control an increasingly 
unsustainable agricultural budget, and a realisation that the success of the UR 
depended partly on the EU making agricultural concessions in order to accommodate 
the needs of its trade partners. -'(''` The key aim of the EU was to cut domestic 
subsidies to the level where supply and demand on the global market would be in 
equilibrium. Although the EU wanted to reduce the general level of domestic 
support, it nevertheless sought to maintain flexibility in the implementation of this 
provision, thereby allowing for domestic subsidies, border measures and export 
subsidies to be altered accordingly. The EU believed that cutting domestic support 
would lead inexorably to a reduction in border restrictions or export subsidies. For its 
part the US disagreed with the EU's view that decreasing domestic subsidies would 
30° Richard Higgott, The World Economic Order: '17w Trude ('risis and Its Implications fier Aic. siralia 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1987), p. 30 301 McDonald, The World Trading System, p. 206. 
302 Ibid. 
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automatically lead to a lessening of border controls or export subsidies and argued, 
instead, for an application of reduction measures to all the policy eomponents. 313 The 
US position enjoyed the support of the Cairns Group of low-cost agricultural 
exporters, a very influential coalition of developed and developing countries which 
pushed very hard for an end to agricultural protectionism in developed countries. 3"a 
The relative clout wielded by the Cairns Group in the UR agriculture negotiations is 
summed up aptly by Capling: 
The Cairns Group was the most unusual, cohesive and effective 
coalition of countries ever seen in multilateral trade negotiations. 
Throughout the Uruguay Round it acted as a `conscience' for the 
agriculture negotiations and fought to prevent the United States from 
giving in to the Europeans as it had done in the Tokyo and Kennedy 
Rounds, putting off agriculture trade reform in exchange for 
concessions on industrial products. 305 
Even so, the final UR Agreement on Agriculture represented a compromise between 
US and EU positions and did not go far enough to address the concerns of developing 
countries in respect of export subsidy reductions, trade-distorting forms of domestic 
support, as well as improved market access. 300 Of all the issues considered in the UR 
of trade negotiations, agricultural reform was the most pressing for most developing 
countries. The key concern of developing countries was the high agricultural subsidy 
support provided by industrialised country governments to their farmers, which 
restricted access to developed country markets for products in which developing 
"° Ibid. 
3°4 The Cairns Group is made up of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, 
Indonesia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. 305 Ann Capling, Australia and the Global Trude . S%'strm (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 118; For an extensive analysis of the historical development of the Cairns Group see Ihr 
example Diane Tussie, "Holding the Balance: The Cairns Group, ' in Tussie and David Glover (eds. ) 
The Developing Countries in World Trade: Policies am! Bargaining Strategies (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1993), pp. 181-203. 
3111' Ibid., p. I45. 
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countries had a comparative advantage. For most developing countries, the UR 
represented a major setback: they gained little or nothing from it, despite assurances 
made by developed countries to provide them with larger market access for their 
agricultural products and clothing and textile exports, as well as with the necessary 
technical assistance to implement their WTO obligations. This prompted Raghavan 
to surmise that the UR ushered in a new international division of labour that amounted 
to the recolonisation of the developing world, while at the same time reorganising the 
global economy in ways that entrenched the position of the US as a global 
superpower. -107 Although it is debatable whether the UR occasioned the 
recolonisation of Africa, what is abundantly clear is that it sharply brought into focus 
the serious marginalisation of African countries in the global trade regime. Not only 
did the UR fall short of delivering meaningful results on issues of interest to poor 
countries such as providing greater market access for its agricultural exports as well 
as textiles and clothing products, it also failed to deal satisfactorily with systemic 
issues such as the GATT articles, safeguards, subsidies, multilateral trade negotiation 
agreements, special and differential treatment, and enforcement of rights and 
obligations. 
109 
The least developed countries (LDCs), in particular, had to contend with new trade 
issues -- trade in services, intellectual property rights, and investment they did not 
understand and for which they were not adequately prepared to negotiate. In sum, 
the UR yielded a few winners, predominantly from the economically advanced 
nations, and many losers, mainly from the developing countries. The commitments 
'07 See Chakravathi Raghavan, Recolonrsation: GAIT, the Uruguay Roautd und the 77111c1 World 
(London: Zed Books, 1990). 
"" Bade Onimode, Africa in the World of the 21 " CcWtrf (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 2000), 
pp. 185-187. 
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made by industrialised nations to provide greater market access to developing country 
exports remain unfulfilled. Furthermore, developing countries are still saddled with 
the onerous burden of implementing new WTO obligations. Resentment has been 
strongest among the least developed WTO members, whose share of world trade has 
deteriorated in spite of the UR's provisions on special and differential treatment as 
well as the GSP. If these countries are to undertake further trade liberalisation, they 
will need to be assured that this will not happen at a disproportionately high cost to 
them. It is this fault line between advanced industrial countries and developing 
nations that made it difficult for the WTO to agree on an agenda for its Seattle trade 
ministerial meeting in 1999 (see Chapter 5). At the conclusion of the UR, developing 
countries made market opening concessions that went further than the unilateral 
liberalising measures they were already undertaking, in exchange for the removal of 
developed country barriers to their exports and the legal enforceability and security of 
the resulting market access. In turn, the final UR agreement provided for the phase- 
out of the MFA and a removal of all quotas over ten years. 
It also enunciated measures that would greatly liberalise trade in agricultural 
commodities in order to benefit developing countries that are net agricultural 
exporters. It committed all countries, with the exception ofthe LDCs, to eliminate all 
quantitative restrictions on industrial goods and agricultural imports. It enjoined 
developing countries to adopt appropriate protection for intellectual property rights, 
while ruling that trade in services be subjected to multilateral trade disciplines in the 
WTO. 3O`ý It stipulated new procedures for dispute settlement, and set up the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) in terns of which trade policies and practices of 
309 Stephen Woolcock, "The Multilateral Trading System into the New Millennium, " in Brian I locking 
and Steven McGuire (eds. ) Trade Politics - bitt rrlutioflnl, Domestic am! Re,, ionu! Prers7 ectivices (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 32-34. 
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WTO member states are subjected to regular review within the organisation. 
Moreover, unlike the GATT Tokyo Round that ended in 1979 -- with its additional 
voluntary Codes on subsidies and countervailing measures -- the UR final agreement 
was negotiated as a single undertaking: this made the implementation of all its 
provisions compulsory and abolished erstwhile waivers and exceptions. Lastly it 
inaugurated significant institutional changes by providing for the establishment of the 
WTO, which would assume the functions of the old GATT. In line with the UR 
provisions, the WTO would concern itself not only with trade in goods but also with 
trade in services, trade-related intellectual property (TRIPS) as well as investment 
issues. In addition, the WTO would hold a biennial ministerial conference designed 
to infuse political direction and impetus on major trade policy issues. "" 
2. South Africa and the Uruguay Round 
As a founder member of the GATT South Africa participated in all the rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations. However, decades of international ostracism meant 
that South Africa was able to remain largely outside the substantial liberalisation 
achieved in the successive pre-UR negotiating 311 South Africa's international 
isolation coincided with, and marginalised the country from, newly emergent trends 
towards globalisation of production, investment, technology and trade flows, and the 
corresponding changes in external policy and regulatory environment centred on the 
GATT. Consequently, until the mid-1980s South Africa could maintain relatively 
high tariffs and several quantitative restrictions on its imports to aid its import 
'10 McDonald, The World Trading Svstem, pp. 39-46. 
; 11 Alan Hirsch, "From the GATT to the W'l'O: The Global Trade Regime and Its Implications fier 
South Africa, " in Greg Mills, Alan l3egg and Anthoni van Nieuwkerk (eds. ), South Africa in the Global 
Econonw (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 41. 
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substituting industrial policies. Although the limits to South Africa's import 
substitution industrial strategy had become apparent by the 1970s, increasingly 
adverse external conditions made the policy shift towards manufactured exports 
difficult to implement, and left South Africa trailing behind the NICs in terms of 
competitiveness and export growth. South Africa participated in the UR as a 
developed country and conforms to developed country rules. Two reasons account 
for this classification. 312 The first one concerns South Africa's international role in 
the immediate post-war period. Having been an active player in the construction of 
the post-war settlement, South Africa became an essential part of Western strategic 
and economic coalitions that ensued after 1945. Second, the country is classified as 
developed because it conforms to the World Bank criterion which designates 
developed countries as those which have a per capita income of more than US$2900 
per annum -a figure previously based on the living standards of the minority white 
population. 
The issue of classification of South Africa was debated during the review of the 
country's trade policy in 1993. In its opening statement, the South African delegation 
had mooted the possibility of having the country reclassified as a developing country. 
But this proposal was immediately rebuffed by the US, which reminded the South 
African delegation that as a founding member of the GATT South Africa had never 
been regarded as a developing country. For this reason the US refused to categorise 
South Africa as a developing nation; instead, the country was recognised as it 
transitional economy, which implied a degree of flexibility regarding the pace of trade 
112 Ibid. 
ti, 
policy reform . 
313 The US stance in relation to South Africa accorded with an 
increasingly uncompromising and unaccommodating attitude on the part of developed 
countries towards developing countries: in the course of the UR developed countries 
put enormous pressure on developing nations to reduce tariffs substantially, while the 
EU proclaimed that it would not treat Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea as 
developing countries in its implementation of the commitments of the UR.; '`` 
The designation of South Africa as an industrialised country implied that the country 
had little recourse to `special and differential treatment' in the WTO environment. 
The possibility and desirability of South Africa claiming developing country status in 
the GATT has been a subject of intense domestic debate. For South Africa shares 
numerous attributes of semi-peripheral economies. On the one hand, its economy is 
characterised by a huge reliance on traditional commodity exports and imports of 
capital goods, as well as unequal income distribution and high unemployment levels. 
On the other hand, the economy is typified by highly competitive sectors notably 
the financial sector - as well as world-class public infrastructure. Yet many of South 
Africa's economic sectors were massively protected from international competition in 
the past: policies aimed at achieving import substitution and self sufficiency, 
aggravated by resource problems due to apartheid and sanctions, shielded domestic 
industry from competition and perpetuated a high-cost production structure (see 
Chapter 2). This explains partly why the post-1994 South African governments have 
been reticent to pursue the classification issue further within the WTO; a strong 
Department of Trade and Industry, Annual Report 1993 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1993), p. 2. 
David Hartridge, "Implications of the Uruguay Round and the New (; A'I'"I' for South African "Trade 
Policy, " in Pauline H. Baker, Alex I3oraine and Warren Krafchik (eds. ), South Arica and the World 
Econonn' in the /990. s (Cape Town: David Philip, 1994), pp. 175-176. 
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emphasis has been placed on creating an open, vibrant, competitive outward-oriented 
manufacturing economy (see Chapter 5). 
South Africa supported the UR of multilateral trade negotiations from the outset. 
During the latter part of the 1980s the work of the Department of Trade Industry's 
(DTI) multilateral trade relations division was dominated by the UR negotiations. 315 
However, faced with the bewildering scope and complexity of the UR agenda South 
Africa had little chance of influencing the outcome on many issues. South Africa's 
miniscule trade delegation in Geneva - consisting of three trade officials -- was 
overwhelmed by the daunting negotiating agenda, and struggled to keep up with 
developments in the numerous important areas of parallel negotiations. Severely 
under-prepared, the country could thus not join the various issue-coalitions that were 
part of the negotiations such as the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters - where it 
had a palpable stake. As such South Africa's negotiating posture was very 
'defensive. ' 316 With the exception of organised commerce and industry, very little 
consultation did take place between the government and key domestic non-state actors 
in determining South Africa's initial tariff offer in the UR in 1990. 
Overall, South Africa's participation in the UR proceeded virtually without domestic 
public attention and debate until at least until the final stages of negotiation round. 
This was in part a reflection of the sanctions-inspired secrecy that characterised the 
previous government's conduct of international relations. It was also a demonstration 
of the growing lack of legitimacy of the then government's econoHiic policymaking, 
which was overshadowed by the escalating internal political crisis. The rejection by 
315 See for example Department of "Trade and Industry, Annual Report 1989 (Pretoria: Government 
Printer, 1989), pp. II -12. 
"" Ilirsch, "From the GATT to the W"ITO, " p. 45. 
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the GATT secretariat of South Africa's initial offer in 1990, on the grounds that it 
"did not provide an adequate base for a fundamental rationalisation of the tariff 
structure, " 317 coincided with the beginning of South Africa's transition to democracy 
and attendant calls by the ANC on the NP government to broaden the number of 
participants in the UR negotiations. Whereas only the private sector was consulted in 
putting together South Africa's initial offer, the revised offer was formulated in 
conjunction with the National Economic Forum (NEF), 31 a technical group of the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as well as task groups of the automotive, 
textiles and clothing, and electronics industries. At the 1993 trade policy review, in 
which forty countries participated, South Africa's trade policy was subjected to 
intense scrutiny and questions were raised about "the complexity of the country's 
tariff structure, the high levels of certain import tariffs, export incentives and 
subsidies, local content programmes, import control and the surcharge on imports. """ 
The final, revised offer committed South Africa to: 
" Rationalising some 12 800 industrial tariffs into no more than 1000; 
" Cutting industrial tariffs by an average 33 percent by 1999 - with maximum levels 
for consumer goods set at 30 percent, for capital goods at 15 percent and for raw 
materials at 5 percent; 
0 Cutting agricultural tariffs by an average 36 percent over 10 years; 
0 Scaling down textile tariffs over 12 years to a maximum of' 25-45 percent, 
depending on the products; 
" Phasing out local content measures in the automobile industry; 
" Terminating its General Export Incentive Scheune (GFIS) export subsidies by 
1997.320 
317 Department of Trade and Industry, Annual Report 1993, p. 23. 
Made up of representatives from the state, capital and labour, the NEF was set up in 1992 to prevent 
a unilateral restructuring of the South African economy by the NP government. 319 Department of Trade and Industry, Annual Report 1993, p. 22. 320 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 129. 
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In 1993 South Africa scrapped all surcharges on imports ranging from 4 percent to 15 
percent, while abolishing several quantitative restrictions. Furthermore, in 1994 the 
South African government proclaimed its intention to significantly lower tariffs in the 
clothing, textile and automobile industries beyond what was required under the 
GATT. In respect of telecommunications, the government sought to reduce tariffs to 
zero percent - as opposed to the 20 percent point demanded under the 
GATT and the 
WTO. In essence, South Africa's offer to the WTO in 1994 comprised a five-year 
tariff reduction coupled with the rationalisation of its more than 100 tariff bands to 
just six. This entailed reducing South Africa's average tariff from 11,7 per cent in 
1994 to 4,9 per cent in 2002. 
South Africa's accelerated trade liberalisation programme was initially criticised by 
sections of capital and labour, especially those in sensitive sectors such as clothing, 
textiles and the automotive sector who accused the government of adopting a "holier 
than GATT" posture that posed a serious threat to the long-term viability of their 
industries. 321 The labour unions had feared that massive job losses would result 
from a hasty liberalisation process, and were concerned that the government's 
liberalisation policies had failed to take into account the impact of trade reform on 
employment in South Africa. For its part, the government had retorted that the tariff 
reductions agreed to under the GATT had been it key element of South Africa's 
industrial policy designed to facilitate the emergence of South Africa as a dynamic, 
outward-oriented manufacturing economy move the economy up the value chain 
and beneficiate domestic raw materials. 
321 Ibid. 
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South Africa also made market access commitments in the financial services sector -- 
covering banking, securities and insurance sectors. 322 The WTO agreement on 
financial services encourages countries to open up their insurance, banking and 
securities sectors to foreign competition and enables them to challenge transgressors 
in the WTO dispute settlement system. South Africa's offer to liberalise financial 
services was based on three conditions. First, the protection of South African 
investors from "unscrupulous foreign entities selling financial products from offshore 
locations. "; `3 Second, regulations are needed to level the playing fields between 
domestic and foreign financial institutions that establish (or have already established) 
a commercial presence within South Africa's domestic market. Third, a change of 
regulations to ensure that domestic financial institutions are not hindered by local 
regulations in their attempts to become more internationally competitive; improving 
South Africa's ability to export financial services should be a key consideration when 
analysing the current system of regulations. 24 Substantively, South Africa's ofi'cr on 
trade in services did not contain extensive liberalisation measures and was merely a 
confirmation of the status quo. 
3. The Implications of the Uruguay Round for South Africa 
By accepting the rules of the WTO, embodied in the negotiating outcome of the UR, 
South Africa committed itself to extensive economic policy changes. It agreed to 
implement as a single undertaking all the agreements of the UR. All countries taking 
part in the UR were exhorted to accept all of its agreements including agreements 
322 For more details on South Africa's financial services offer see Samantha Anderson, "Liberalising 
the Trade in Financial Services: A Report to the Portfolio Committee on Finance, " South African 
Parliamentary Research Unit (February 1998), pp. ] -27. '" Ibid., p. 10. 
124 Ibid. 
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on agriculture, rules of origin, pre-shipment inspection, investment measures, 
services, and intellectual property rights - as a package deal. In this respect the UR 
represented a key departure from the erstwhile Tokyo Round, which permitted many 
countries to exempt themselves from some of the Codes negotiated by GATT 
contracting parties; South Africa did not join the Tokyo Round on Subsidies and Anti- 
Dumping Measures. 325 
For South African policymakers, the UR represented an auspicious opportunity to 
discipline the country's trade policy and to signal to the international community that 
South Africa was serious about trade liberalisation. As the experiences of numerous 
countries in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East have shown, trade policy is 
notorious for its reversibility whenever a crisis ensues. 326 Policy consistency is thus 
essential to successful trade reform. Trade reform in South Africa has succeeded to 
open up the country's trade policy by replacing quantitative restrictions (QRs) with 
tariffs; simplifying and rationalising the tariff structure and binding it (making it 
irreversible); phasing out GEIS; and abolishing import surcharges. The positive 
progress made in this respect is reflected in a number of economic variables, 
including increased total factor productivity and exports as well as low inflation327 
Tariff reductions have had a positive effect on domestic prices, notwithstanding South 
Africa's devalued exchange rate policy. And thanks to reduced cost wage goods and 
the cost of inflation, it is estimated that the cost of food in South Africa today is Far 
lower than it was eight years ago. 
325 Hartridge, "Implications of the Uruguay Round, " p. 173. 
326 See Dani Rodrik, "The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries, " Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 1, (Winter 1992), pp. 87-105. 
327 See Gunnar Jonsson and Arvind Subramanian, "Dynamic Gains from Trade: Evidence from South 
Africa, " IMF Working Paper WP/00/45 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2000), pp. I- 
34. 
159 
In an attempt to overcome its poor international competitiveness and export 
performance South Africa implemented a raft of industrial supply-side measures 
including the introduction of tax incentives to encourage investment in competitive 
and labour absorbing projects; the promotion of small, medium and micro enterprises 
as a means of job creation and income generation; implementation of employment and 
training policies designed to enhance the growth potential of industry, and increased 
investment in research and development. 328 While it was generally agreed that these 
policy measures were central to the successful re-integration of the country into the 
world economy, there was general anxiety about the social implications of economic 
liberalisation. 329 This was in part due to a widespread concern that trade liberalisation 
over the past decade had not helped to alleviate South Africa's high unemployment 
rate; a key concern of the policymakers had been that trade reform would exacerbate 
South Africa's already high unemployment levels. In fact, the footwear industry in 
the Pietermaritzburg suffered huge job losses as a consequence of economic 
restructuring undertaken in line with the obligations of the UR . 
330 
But some commentators argue that South Africa's tariff liberalisation offer to the UR 
was not as dramatic as it was sometimes Suggested because it was anchored in the 
1989 base year. As Cassim observed: 
What distinguished post-90s liberalisation in the country from the pre- 
90s was that in the latter case trade liberalisation was characterised 
more by giving firms an incentive to export through export promotion 
measures. This was done largely in the absence of an effective reform 
of South Africa's tariff system. What this means was that the 
liberalisation process had no political costs as it continued to protect 
complacent firms but at the same time marginally changed the price 
32 Department of Finance (1996), Growth, Einploymc'nt and Redistribution Strutcgvv (Pretoria: 
Government Printer). 
32') See `Create more jobs, dammit!, ' Mail and Guardia,, 20th April 2000; 'Losing patience, ' f intinc ial 
mad 19"' May 2000; 'Cosatu rejects privatisation gospel, ' Business Du%' 10'x' June 2000. 
310 Interview with Alan Hirsch, Pretoria, 5 April 2002. 
160 
incentive structure for firms to keen to export. The assumption that 
libreralisation under the WTO is not dramatic means that the tariff 
phasing out schedule, by and large, is gradually giving firms sufficient 
time to adjust but there may be some exceptions. Moreover, South 
Africa's initial tariff phasing out has often coincided with exchange 
rate depreciation which have may cushioned firms from the effects of 
tariff cuts. 33 1 
This raises the question of whether job creation is the function of trade policy. 
Empirical research warns against expecting too much from trade policy by way of 
solving economic problems. 332 While trade policy can have positive distributional 
effects - for example when prices are lowered consumers gain - these are often fairly 
dispersed and intangible. Given that it localises gains and losses, trade reform has 
uneven effects on different industries and on different areas of the country. It is for 
this reason that trade policy should not be seen in isolation from a wider set of 
policies such as educational policy, health policy, labour market policy, exchange rate 
policy, and investment policy. The important challenge confronting South African 
policyrnakers in this respect is to manage the relatively accelerated liberalisation 
process in ways that skillfully balance the opportunities and risks presented by 
globalisation against the imperatives of national reconstruction and development. 331 
This means that policymakers ought to pay greater attention to sequencing trade 
liberalisation with supply-side reforms. 
The UR had a positive political effect on South Africa: the normalisation of the 
country's trade relations and the restoration of its trade rights within the GATT/WTO. 
The installation of a democratic government induced a favourable attitude towards 
331 Interview with Rashad Cassim, Johannesburg, 8 April 2002. 
332 Rodrik, "The Limits of Trade Policy Reform, " pp. 102_ 103. 
; 3' Interview with Tshediso Matona, Pretoria, 7 April 2002. 
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South Africa. Although South Africa made commitments to the WTO as `developed' 
country, there was recognition among its trading partners that this classification did 
not sit well with South Africa's social and economic realities. In terms of social and 
economic indicators - such as per capita income, trade composition, income 
distribution, employment and human resource development - South Africa is closer to 
developing than to developed countries. In recognition of these realities, the country 
was granted limited special concessions such as longer phase-in periods in agriculture, 
textiles and clothing in the UR, even though these preferences were in principle 
effectively excluded by South Africa's traditional classification as a `developed' 
country in the GATT. These preferences are sector-specific, and are considered on a 
customised, case-by-case basis, rather than as a general entitlement. Similarly, the 
extension to South Africa of GSP preferences by the US, the EU, Canada, Japan and 
some Nordic countries, and the inclusion of South Africa in the Lome Convention 
preferences on a qualified basis, represent an implicit recognition of South Africa as a 
developing country: a country that merits special treatment without having to 
formalise its status through reclassification. The extension of these derogations and 
preferences to South Africa represented an important breakthrough fier the country's 
trade negotiators, who had assiduously explained South Africa's unique 
circumstances to its key trade partners. 334 
The conclusion of the UR put considerable pressure on South Africa to holster its 
bureaucratic capacity significantly in order to meet its WTO obligations (sec Chapter 
5). South Africa's previous ostracism from GATT meant that it was not in a position 
to develop the necessary internal institutions for administering GATT multilateral 
134 Interview with Gerrit Bryl, Pretoria, 14 April 2003. 
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obligations and diplomacy. When the country joined the UR it had to contend with 
the reality that the GATT section of its department of trade and industry was 
inadequately staffed, lacked technical expertise, was not sufficiently coordinated with 
other relevant government departments, and had a poor image among the business, 
academic, legal and media communities affected by GATT/WTO matters. 335 As such, 
it was compelled to ask for GATT technical assistance even though in terms of long- 
standing GATT law it was not formally eligible for such assistance on account of its 
`developed' country status. The most important challenge facing South Africa in this 
regard is to strengthen its institutional and regulatory frameworks. 
Notwithstanding South Africa's economic strengths, its international economic 
isolation of the previous decades places it among those developing countries on the 
margin of the globalisation process. Moreover, South Africa's fragile economic 
position has not been helped by its classification as a developed country in terns of 
the WTO requirements, reducing its claims for special and differential treatment. This 
is compounded by the fact that the country missed the opportunity during the UR to 
negotiate for commitments commensurate with its institutional capacity to meet them 
-- thanks to the confusion and political uncertainty that surrounded the tabling of its 
initial UR. Yet market opening has benefited South Africa by not only improving 
access for its goods and services to traditional markets (North America) but also by 
exposing it to new ones (Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe). 
South Africa has also gained from the waivers and exemptions it has been granted by 
the WTO regarding the implementation of UR agreements. The re-integration of' 
South Africa into the global economy has thrown up numerous possibilities for the 
335 Interview with Tshediso Matona, Pretoria, 7 April 2002. 
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country to benefit from the international trading system. South Africa stands to gain 
immensely from the expanded trade opportunities brought about by the WTO market 
access agreements, as well as the WTO's strengthening of the rule of law in 
international trade. Yet the country still has several hurdles to overcome if it is to 
become economically successful. It must shed its poor competitiveness rating and 
export performance. Although there's no substantial recent economic analysis to 
draw on, a cursory examination of post-apartheid South African manufacturing 
performance reveals an increasingly robust, resilient and growing export sector (sec 
Graph 3). 
Prior to 1994, South Africa's manufacturing was beset by a crisis, shrinking at an 
annual average rate of close to 2 per cent between 1989 and 1994 and reaching its 
lowest point in 1993. However, the contribution of manufacturing to GDP saw a 
sustained upward trend since 1994 - South African manufacturing exports have 
grown by 12 percent per annum in real terms since 1994 - even though some labour- 
intensive sectors grew slower than the average manufacturing rate. "` There are 
encouraging signs that the number of outward-looking companies has increased, and 
that exports - not only con-imodity exports but also manufactures - have increasingly 
become part of the country's GDP. Trade reform has enabled South Africa to 
specialise and invest more in competitive industrial sectors and to source cheaper 
inputs for its uncompetitive sectors. 337 
316 Interview with Alan Hirsch, Pretoria, 5 April 2002. 
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Graph 3- Growth Rate of SA Exports 
Growth Rate of SA Exports: 1994-2000 (Selected Countries) 
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A notable feature of manufacturing has been the statistical "substitution" of jobs 
between manufacturing and the services sector - which has experienced the fastest 
employment growth - as the manufacturing sector outsourced a number of functions 
such as logistics. This means that manufacturing has not only expanded but has also 
undergone important structural changes. First, the structure of' output and exports has 
shifted from low to mediLim- and high-technology production, with the automotive 
industry taking the lead. Second, exporting has become a permanent characteristic of 
manufacturing, rather than a conduit for domestic surpluses. Third, export production 
has diversified from dependence on minerals and mineral-related intermediate 
manufactured goods, to a wider variety of non-mineral based manufactured exports. 1-; ` 
339, Manufacturing in SA alive and kicking, ' Business Day 16"' September 2003. 
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This transformation of the manufacturing sector has been driven by both macro- and 
micro-economic policy instruments. A major reform for shifting production towards 
export has been market access negotiations, especially the FTA deals with the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the ELI. Furthermore, the 
DTI implemented two sector specific programmes for the automotive and clothing 
and textiles industries, selected for their vulnerability to the general tariff phase-down 
under South Africa's WTO obligations. The Motor Industry Development 
Programme (MIDP) has been acknowledged as very successful, turning around an 
industry unlikely to have survived in any significant way without government support. 
This is reflected in annual average export growth of 36 per cent between 1995 and 
2002, and sustained investment growth during this period. As such the automotive 
industry plays a critical role in the South African economy, in its own right as well as 
through its multiplier effect on other sectors. The textiles and clothing sector, 
however, has adapted less rapidly even though it has experienced substantial export 
growth: 25 per cent between 1995 and 2002. Its export success can be attributed to 
the duty credit certificate scheme, growing market access spurred, in particular, by 
AGOA. - 
Overall, it would appear that the trade reforms introduced in line with UR 
commitments have had a significant impact on the South African economy. (growth 
in total merchandise exports from South Africa has remained positive over the period 
1994 to 2001 at an inflation- adjusted rate of 4.8 per cent a 
_year 
while manufactured 
exports have grown at 9.1 per cent a year in real terms. But these positive 
developments need qualification. While there has been a structural transformation of 
South Africa's export basket during the second half of the 1990s with some sectors 
139 Ibid. 
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beginning to reap the benefits of liberalisation and selective export promotion this 
has been achieved from a very low base. Moreover, the export gains that have been 
made in new sectors have been reversed by export losses that have been incurred in 
industries such as gold, coal and other mining. 340 South Africa has a long way to go, 
therefore, before it can optimally bolster its industrial manufacturing base, whose 
development was stifled by over-prolonged inward-oriented industrialisation policies. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed South Africa's role in the multilateral trading system 
within the framework of the UR of trade negotiations. It has been contended that by 
acceding to the Marrakesh Agreement of the GATT in 1994 South Africa agreed to 
liberalise its trade policies in line with the rules-based global trade regime after 
decades of operating beyond the GATT rules. Nonetheless, the reinstatement oC 
South African trade prerogatives also entailed multiple obligations that must he 
fulfilled in their entirety. By adopting the disciplines of the WTO, contained in the 
negotiating results of the UR, South Africa committed itself to comprehensive 
reforms in its economic policy. 
The UR of trade negotiations occurred as a consequence of a growing recognition by 
both developed and developing countries in the 1 980s of the structural changes in the 
global economy and the necessity to develop policies to accommodate them. The 
importance of the UR lay with its inclusion in international trade policy not only of' 
agriculture, a key concern of many developing countries, but also of new issue-areas 
340 'Astute strategy gives SA an edge in world trade, ' Bio4ness Day 29Th October 2003. 
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such as trade in services, investment and intellectual property. However, the UR has 
failed to produce a substantial improvement in the position of developing countries in 
the international trading system. 
Although South Africa, as a founder member of the GATT, took part in all the 
previous rounds of multilateral trade liberalisation, years of international isolation 
induced by its apartheid policies prevented the country from benefiting from the 
substantial liberalisation attained in the consecutive pre-UR negotiating rounds. As 
such, South Africa's pariah status meant that it was marginalised from the emergent 
patterns towards the internationalisation of production, investment, technology, and 
trade flows. In part, this explains why South Africa has lagged behind other upper- 
income developing countries (such as Brazil) in respect of industrial competitiveness 
and export growth. 
Notwithstanding its marginal role in the negotiations, South Africa supported the UR. 
Yet its participation in the negotiations was undermined not only by its weak 
negotiating team, but also by the very defensive posture of its negotiating positions 
a hangover from the paranoia of the apartheid era. Moreover, South Africa's 
participation in the UR was overshadowed by a growing domestic political crisis and 
dogged by demands for inclusive and accountable economic decision-making on the 
part of the liberation movement led by the ANC. 
Even so, the economic consequences of the UR for South Africa have been far- 
reaching. Not only did the ratification by South Africa of the final agreement of the 
UR necessitate substantial internal economic reform but it also entailed a commitment 
108 
to implement as a single undertaking all the agreements of the UR. This required 
South Africa to demonstrate seriousness about its trade liberalisation commitments 
and to put in place policy measures designed to restructure the economy and launch it 
on a path of outward-oriented growth, and to create the domestic institutions 
necessary for the management of South Africa's international undertakings. " How 
the South African state went about reforming its economy and crafting the appropriate 
institutions for executing South African trade policy constitutes the focus of the next 
chapter. 
341 Interview with "Tshediso Matona, 7 April 2002. 
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Chapter 5 
South African Trade Policy in the 1990s: Ideas, Institutions and Interests 
This chapter, as well as Chapters 6 and 7, elaborates on the central argument of this 
thesis. It examines the trade policy reforms that have been implemented by the 
South African state since 1994 to restructure South Africa's formerly isolated 
economy and facilitate its emergence as an outward-oriented manufacturing and 
trading nation. The key theme of the chapter is that trade policy in South Africa has 
fundamentally mirrored economic changes ushered in by the ANC government since 
it came to power in 1994. These changes have been aimed primarily at opening up 
the economy to external competition and undoing years of economic 
underperformance and mismanagement. 
Yet the South African state's motives for introducing trade reform cannot he restricted 
to economic explanations, as mainstream accounts of South African trade policy are 
wont to suggest. As enunciated in the introductory chapter, international and 
domestic political economy factors also played a pivotal role in the ANC 
government's calculations to embark on trade reform to the degree it has. The 
international adjustment strategy pursued by South Africa can he characterised as 
`offensive' at both domestic and international levels. Internationally, it has sought to 
contribute towards the generation of new "rules for the game" for international 
interactions. And domestically, it has involved attempts to alter the structure of 
national institutions and industries to promote domestic economic adjustment. `4` 
342 See John G. Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Ad. justment, " World Politics, vol. 
XXXIX, (October 1986-July 1987). 
170 
The chapter is in four parts. First, it documents the process of economic restructuring 
that has been undertaken in South Africa against which the new trade policy has 
evolved. Second, the chapter discusses trade policy in South Africa since 1994, 
concentrating on the reforms that have been carried out in the post-1994 period in 
order to align the country's trade policy with the disciplines of the rules-based 
multilateral trading regime. Third, it explores trade policy decision-making in post- 
apartheid South Africa, focusing on the transformed institutional set-up for 
formulating and managing trade policy. The analysis is anchored in the political 
economy prism, focusing on ideas, circumstances, interests and institutions. 34 
1. Domestic Economic Restructuring 
Democratic South Africa inherited a moribund economy "buckled by almost two 
decades of steadily worsening difficulties which manifested in earnest after the 1973 
oil shock . 
"3aa The economic crisis drew attention to it panoply of structural 
deficiencies: declining investment rates; a paucity of skilled labour; vast racially- 
based social and economic disparities; appalling industrial relations; low investment 
in research and development; a stunted small and medium-sired business sector; and 
industrial decay, a product of limited production of capital goods and the täilurc to 
develop a dynamic export sector through the beneficiation of raw materials. `45 In 
many ways the crisis represented the failure of the South African post-war 
accumulation strategy detailed in Chapter 2. It was against this backdrop that the 
incoming ANC government forged a new economic strategy to extricate South Africa 
343 Sec Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and information: Domestic Politics and 11ntcr11ational 
Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
344 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 100. 
345 Ibid. 
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from decades of economic morass. When it ascended to power in 1994 the ANC 
government was faced with a formidable double-pronged economic challenge: to 
implement policies geared at redistributing income, wealth and economic power while 
simultaneously creating a climate conducive to the pursuit of rapid economic growth. 
Herbst captures this conundrum aptly: 
Any new government would find the economic problems facing South 
Africa to be daunting. Indeed, many countries have found simply the 
task of removing structural inefficiencies and making the economy 
more outward-looking to be exceptionally difficult, without worrying 
about distributional implications.; 
46 
The problem is that the ANC did not have a credible economic policy when it was 
legalised in 1990 and, until then, had paid negligible attention to economic matters. 
Historically, the ANC's economic thinking had been embodied in the Freedom 
Charter, the ANC's ideological font and guiding vision. Adopted in 1955, the Charter 
called for, among other things, the nationalisation of mines, banks and monopolies 
while demanding equal access to health, education and legal rights. Its main shortfall, 
though, is that it failed to specify how its commitment to social and economic change 
would translate into a practical economic policy programme. This vagueness in the 
ANC economic policy pronouncements was to become a recurring feature in 
subsequent decades. For example, although the 1988 ANC Constitutional Guidelines 
had proclaimed a need for a mixed economy, they had desisted from outlining specific 
policy proposals on how the envisaged economy would be brought about. 
347 
340 Jeffrey Herbst, `South Africa: Economic Crises and Distributional Imperative, " in Stephen John 
Stedman (ed. ) South A_fica: The Political Economy of Transformation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
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The obscure nature of ANC economic policy statements could be blamed partly on 
the fact that during the liberation struggle the organisation had been too preoccupied 
with the immediate challenge of overthrowing the apartheid regime to worry about 
economic issues. But a more plausible explanation points to the nature of the 
liberation movement. Given the broad church character of the South Africa liberation 
movement - which provided a political home to opponents of apartheid system 
irrespective of their race, class, sex, creed and religion it made strategic sense for 
the ANC at all times to maintain the cohesion of these disparate forces. Sticking to 
nebulous economic policy positions had proved to be a tested way of uniting, albeit 
artificially, the fragile anti-apartheid coalition. 
34 
Given this state of affairs, it was not surprising that the ANC was caught off guard by 
former president de Klerk's decision to unban it in 1990. This accounts for the 
ANC's move in the same year to construct in earnest a viable economic strategy, 
which came in the shape of a 1990 draft economic manifesto published by the 
organisation's newly inaugurated Department of Economic Policy (DEP). The 
document was notable for its overarching emphasis on economic `restructuring, ' 
prompting the outspoken economist Nicoli Nattrass to observe scornfully that this 
could "include anything from extensive state intervention to conventional market- 
driven structural adjustment. 049 It also suggested a crucial role for the state in 
strategic industrial planning and wealth redistribution, while demanding the overhaul 
of the financial sector which "does not sufficiently direct savings into productive 
14" Ibid., p. 344. 
149 Ibid., p. 346. 
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activity nor into critical areas of infrastructural development" but which perpetuated 
41 a scramble for short-term speculative profit. "35° 
Furthermore, the ANC's economic document advocated a break-up of the small 
number of white-controlled conglomerates that had traditionally dominated the South 
African economy so as to foster competition and facilitate the growth of the small and 
medium-sized business sector in the economy. Although it conceded that mammoth 
financial resources would be needed to meet South Africa's social demands, the 
document eschewed the route of `inflationary financing' as a means to achieve this 
goal, arguing that these needs would be fulfilled through "mobilising of domestic 
savings (possibly through prescribed assets) and raising taxes on companies and the 
rich. "351 Additionally, it called for a high-wage economy and a greater role for 
organised labour in the formulation of economic policy. In sum, the ANC economic 
document argued for a `growth through redistribution' model, which envisaged that 
wealth redistribution would propel growth and the benefits of growth redirected to 
meet basic needs. 
Parallel to the work of its economics department, the ANC established in 1991 the 
Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG) to craft a new macroeconomic economic 
model for South Africa. MERG published its report in 1993 "amid controversy over 
the strong contingent of foreign economists on the team and, more tellingly, resistance 
from members of the ANC's DEP, who felt that MERG was usurping their roles. "`s' 
The report's central contention was that the economy could optimally he reformed 
through the labour market -- improved training and higher wages and through 
3S0 Ibid., p. 347. 
Ibid., p. 348. 
392 Ibid., p. 158. 
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measures designed to enhance the structure of business. It advocated a two-phase 
growth plan, comprising a "public-investment-led phase" and a "sustained growth 
phase, " that would link growth to increased savings and investment. This marked a 
departure from the demand-led growth trajectory proposed under the erstwhile 
"growth through redistribution" model . 
35' The report envisioned a growth rate of 5 
percent per annum and a generation annually of 300 000 jobs. This would he 
achieved through, among other things, expanded state investment in social and 
physical infrastructure, a robust industrial policy which champions training, education 
and technological progress, and the restructuring of institutions responsible for 
formulating and managing South African trade and industrial policies. 354 
Furthermore, the MERG report espoused the establishment of a strong yet slim 
developmental state: an active state was necessary to provide leadership and 
coordination for economic transformation, but such a state ought to he lean and 
efficient. It stressed, however, that advocating strong state structures did not 
necessarily imply that the private sector would he excluded from national economic 
development. On the contrary, the report argued for a mixed economy, 
acknowledging that "in South Africa, the change to a new economic system will 
depend on a strong private sector interacting with a strong public sector. 355 
In respect of trade and industrial policies, the report argued that "the existing trade 
regime is marked by uncertainty, complexity and the imnrint of sIecial interests. "`s'' 
It recommended, therefore, trade reform, whose key objective "should he to lower 
"' Ibid., p. 159. 
354 Nattrass, "Politics and Economics, " p. 359. 
155 Ibid., p. 265. 
356 Macro-economic Research Group (MI: RG), Makin; l)entoci"nc, v Work. A Framework fin- 
Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa (Bellville: ('entre fier Development Studies, 1993), p. 233. 
175 
costs by reforming protection, without jeopardising development strategies, and to 
coordinate export programmes with protection policy, thus making them more 
effective. 5357 To this end, it proposed that the country's complex, unpredictable and 
inconsistent tariff regime be rationalised. It also recommended the strengthening of 
the export programme which, notwithstanding its relative success, had become 
ineffective and vulnerable to abuse. The report also called for investment in specific 
manufacturing sectors, and recommended "a policy of maintaining a stable real 
effective exchange rate with the range chosen to increase and maintain international 
competitiveness .,, 
358 
Other specific proposals included: the introduction of a workable anti-dumping 
system from the beginning of the import liberalisation programme; the reform of the 
inefficient system of customs and excise policing; the provision of subsidised loans 
for the export sector; the development of a suitable strategy to provide suppliers a 
grace period before the institution of the duty-free regime for exports; the 
maximisation of access to overseas markets and bolstering of' complementary 
industrial linkages in Southern Africa; and the rechanciling of public expenditure 
towards increasing productivity. 3'9 Notwithstanding the criticisms levelled against 
the MERG model attracted in some circles, commentators conceded that it 
"represented the most sophisticated popular economic strategy ever devised in South 
Africa. "360 Even so, the ANC dismissed the MERG recommendations and settled for 
a conservative economic programme. Why it chose to pursue a different policy 
trajectory is the subject of the next section. 
's' Ibid., pp. 233-234. 
3511 Ibid., p. 275. 
3"' Ibid., pp. 236-239. 
3"" Marais, South Africa: Limits to (, huuge, p. 160. 
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2. Explaining the Shift to Economic Orthodoxy 
The period before and after the release of the MERG report in late 1993 was narked 
by a rapid shift to conservative economic thinking on the part of the ANC. This shift 
had become first evident in the ANC's May 1992 policy guidelines, which had made 
no reference to the "growth through redistribution" approach that had formed the 
centrepiece of the earlier documents. In the ensuing years, ANC activists had been 
increasingly dissuaded from defending the "growth through redistribution" model and 
greater attention had been instead devoted to extolling the virtues of free market 
economics. 361 It is difficult to isolate a single definitive reason for the ANC's 
dramatic conversion to neo-liberal economic orthodoxy. According to the literature 
on South Africa's transition, a coalescence of factors seems to have played a role in 
bringing about the ideological turn-about. First, the demise of the Soviet Union and 
its command economies triggered a robust debate within the South African liberation 
movement and raised questions about the efficacy of central economic planning. 
Second, the ANC and its partners were also constrained by the fiscal and monetary 
prescriptions of the IFIs. During this period, a wide array of studies and conferences 
sponsored by the IMF and World Bank took place in South Africa with the express 
purpose of winning the ANC elite over to the neo-liberal economic agenda. The 
World Bank, in particular, deliberately set out to cultivate the ANC and its partners by 
initiating dialogue and recruiting researchers linked to the liberation movement into 
its projects. In the words of Marais: 
361 Nattrass, "Politics and Economics, " pp. 355-356. 
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The soil of conciliation and consensus was being diligently toiled. The 
Bank's Reducing Poverty report became the public component of an 
intensive process of lobbying and `trust building' with the ANC and 
other popular organisations. It melded detailed analyses of South 
Africa's economic plight with somewhat restrained neo-liberal 
directives that were often offset by incorporating aspects of 
progressive thinking. 
362 
Third, the series of corporate scenario planning interventions undertaken after 1990 
had a significant effect on the thinking of the ANC leadership. These included: the 
Nedcor/Old Mutual's Prospects for a Successful Transition; Sanlam's Platform for 
Investment scenario; the celebrated Mott Fleur Scenarios; and the South African 
Chamber of Commerce's (SACOB's) Economic Options for South Africa scenario. 
363 
It is worth pointing out, however, that this charm offensive by the IFIs and fractions 
of domestic South African business did not go unchallenged: the ANC's ideological 
metamorphosis was not a seamless process accepted passively by all its members. 
Within the ANC resistance to the unfolding conceptual shift had first become clear at 
the May 1992 ANC Policy Conference where "the economic policy resolutions were 
clearly influenced by the militant populists and by delegates sympathetic to 
Cosatu. 364 
As such, the final text of the adopted policy guidelines was devoid of the conciliatory 
posture towards capital found in previous drafts and more radical in content. 
COSATU's opposition to the neo-liberal ideological onslaught was two-pronged. 
First, it pushed for a greater influence in macro-economic policymaking. Second, 
the labour federation mooted the notion of a `reconstruction accord, ' whose intention 
"was to make Cosatu's electoral support conditional on the ANC committing itself to 
3(2 Ibid., p. 152. 
'" Ibid., pp. 150-151. 
364 Nattrass, "Politics and Economics, " p. 355. 
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the pact. "3ý's Significantly, the accord paved the way for the fashioning of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a set of socio-economic targets 
against which the performance of the ANC government would be evaluated by the 
trade union movement. As such, the RDP became the socio-economic platform upon 
which the ANC fought the first democratic elections in 1994. 
Originating within the popular movement, the RDP "emerged as the most concerted 
attempt yet to devise a set of social, economic and political policies and practices that 
could transform South Africa into a more just and equal society. "3"" It outlined a 
comprehensive analysis of South Africa's developmental problems, stressing the 
importance not only of a new growth trajectory for the country but also of reordering 
its politics, economy and society. In the shape of the RDII Base Document, the RDP 
promised, among other things, to: generate 2,5 million new jobs in a decade; 
construct a million low-cost homes by the year 2000; supply electricity to 2,5 million 
homes by the year 2000; provide running water and sewage systems to a million 
families; redistribute 30 percent of agricultural land to small-scale black farmers 
within five years; provide 10 years of compulsory, free education; upgrade and 
increase infrastructure through a public works programmnme; and reform state agencies 
to mirror the racial, class and gender demographics of South African society. 167 Not 
only did the RDP attract widespread criticism, especially in business circles, it also 
sparked heated debate within the ANC. The 1994 RDP White Paper outlining 
how the government would translate these vague policy proposals into policy 
reflected significant changes from the original Base Docunment. For example, while 
365 Ibid., p357. 
366 Marais, South Africa: Limits to ('bange, p. 177. 
"'' For a detailed discussion of the RDP see African National Congress, The Recouxtruetion trail 
Development Programme: A Policy Framework (Johanneshurg: [lntanyano Publications, 1994). 
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some of the Base Document's targets were left intact in the RDP White Paper, others 
were supplanted by more general objectives. Crucially, the key principles of the 
Base Document were changed, with the original focus on redistribution replaced by a 
stronger emphasis on obstacles to growth and investment. The watering down of the 
progressive content of the RDP reflected ongoing tensions within the newly elected 
government of national unity led by the ANC. 
369 
The preceding sections of this chapter have highlighted the historical and ideological 
circumstances against which the ANC's economic policy choices were made. The 
next part discusses how the development of South African trade policy in the post 
apartheid fitted into these policy choices. 
3. Impetus for Trade Liberalisation 
The early 1990s saw trade liberalisation in South Africa gain momentum. Trade 
policy reforms proceeded along two tracks: multilateral trade reform in the context of 
the WTO and unilateral trade lihcralisation. It is worth reiterating that although 
trade reform had been initiated by the apartheid regime in the late I 980s a few years 
before it was ousted from power in South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994 
it had already been endorsed by the ANC. Improved manufacturing export 
performance had already been acknowledged within the ANC as an important 
factor 
in mitigating South Africa's serious balance of payments difficulties and reducing its 
reliance on revenue from primary commodity exports. The liberalisation of South 
African trade within the context of the W"1'O should he seen, thcrclore, as a 
""' Marais, South Arica; Limits to Change, p. 18 1. 
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continuation of the unilateral trade reforms implemented by the NP government since 
the late 1980s. 
The trade reforms undertaken in the 1990s accorded with a new market-oriented 
thinking within the ANC government, which was codified in the ANC government's 
macroeconomic policy framework, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
Strategy (GEAR). GEAR viewed an outward-oriented trade regime as central to 
South Africa's economic success and, therefore, prescribed accelerated trade 
liberalisation. Yet it has championed trade reform as part of a wider raft of policies 
designed to win the confidence of international and domestic financial markets, which 
were initially skeptical about the ANC government's ability to manage the South 
African economy. In particular, it has sought to create conditions for the attraction of 
foreign investment to South Africa. For instance, GEAR asserts that "accelerated 
investment in the South African economy requires international capital inflows to 
complement domestic savings and finance the increased imports of capital and 
intermediate goods which accompany faster growth. "; `'`' Also, it points out that 
"international experience favours foreign direct investment as a more stable source of 
international finance and as a crucial clement in a more outward-oriented growth 
strategy . 
"370 
In this respect, trade liberalisation and export-oriented growth have been touted as 
crucial levers of a wider strategy to reassure international and domestic investors 
about South Africa's commitment to far-reaching economic reform in the hope that 
""' See Department of Finance, Growth, Enrplnynrerrt and Redistribution: A Mac roeconnnric" Strategy 
(Pretoria: Department of Finance, 1996), p. 45. 
370 Ibid. 
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they will invest in the country's economy. This fits in with what Krugman has 
described as `playing the confidence game. ' As he put it: 
The overriding objective of policy must therefore be to mollify market 
sentiment. But, because crises can be self-fulfilling, sound economic 
policy is not sufficient to gain market confidence; one must cater to the 
perceptions, the prejudices, the whims of the market. Or rather, one 
must cater to what one hopes will be the perceptions of the market. 37 1 
This observation is particularly pertinent to South Africa which, notwithstanding 
comprehensive policy measures adopted by the state to make South Africa attractive 
to foreign investors, has failed to secure much-needed direct investment to fulfill its 
investment needs and to stimulate growth. Since 1994 the South African government 
has made the attraction of foreign investors the central pursuit of its economic policy. 
High levels of GDP growth - at least 6-7 percent -- are needed to address pressing 
social and developmental problems, including a 40 percent national unemployment 
rate. However, South Africa cannot finance the investment levels it needs for growth 
due to its low domestic savings. As such, the country is virtually dependent on 
foreign capital inflows to fuel economic expansion. The South African state has 
implemented wide-ranging economic reforms to improve investor confidence, 
including the phased removal of exchange controls, introduction of labour market 
flexibility, trade liberalisation, fiscal reforms, financial deregulation, and the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Yet despite the implementation of all these 
policy measures, the expectations of major direct investment flows have not 
materialised. On the contrary, most post-apartheid FDI flows have been of the 
merger and/or acquisition type: they have not been channelled towards job-creating 
37 1 Krugman, The Return, p. 1 13. 
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greenfield operations but they have gone towards purchasing market share or 
establishing partnerships with South African firms. The other investment pattern has 
assumed the form of portfolio flows, which have resulted in vast amounts of "hot 
money" flowing into South Africa's market share. 372 
The failure of GEAR to deliver required levels of foreign investment has presented 
the ANC government with a conundrum. On the one hand, it has been acutely aware 
that it must take radical economic measures to address the problems of widespread 
poverty and joblessness plaguing South Africa. This is necessary if the government 
is to retain its political support and avert social instability. It has, however, refrained 
from pursuing such a course of action for fear that adopting monetary and fiscal 
policies that diverge from international trends would damage its international 
reputation for fiscal prudence. On the other hand it has been excoriated by COSATU 
and the SACP, and civil society groups for putting the interests of foreign investors 
ahead of those of its bedrock constituency - the black working class - because of its 
refusal to abandon its austere fiscal and monetary policies in favour of a more 
expansionary, demand-driven economic strategy. "` 
72 BuinessMap, South African Investment Report 2003 (Johannesburg: BusinessMap, 2003). ;" `Losing patience, ' Financial Mail 19`x' May 2000. 
183 
4. Institutions and Trade Policymaking: The Role of State Actors 
4.1 Government Departments 
An understanding of national institutions and decision-making processes contributes 
to useful insights about policy. 
374 The responsibility for formulating, managing and 
implementing South African trade policy lies primarily with the DTI. Charged with 
an extensive and wide-ranging remit, the DTI has been at the heart of economic 
restructuring in South Africa. Not only does it formulate policies on investment, 
commercial regulation, consumer protection, international trade relations and 
industrial development. It also plays an integrating role, coordinating national 
economic departments and facilitating cooperative governance over economic policy 
matters between the national government and its provincial and local counterparts. In 
recent years the DTI has taken on additional economic roles, including the promotion 
of black economic empowerment policies and the spearheading of the 
New 
Partnerships for Africa's Development (Nepad) a pledge by African leaders to end 
poor governance, corruption and conflicts in their countries in return for increased aid, 
private investment and a reduction of trade barriers by industrialised countries. 
7S 
Furthermore, the DTI presides over a wide range of development, regulatory and 
specialist agencies collectively known as the DTI Group, cementing its status as a pre- 
eminent strategic actor in the South African economy. 
ý7`' 
374 See for example Stephan Haggard, Richard N. Cooper and Chung-in Moon, "Policy Reform in 
Korea, " pp. 294-332, in Robert Bates and Anne 0. Krueger (eds. ), Political und Econurnic Interactions 
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Keohane and Helen V. Milner (eds. ), Internationalisation and Donºestic Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 48-75. 
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It is worth noting that whilst the DTI is responsible for formulating and implementing 
trade policy, this policy reflects priorities and preferences already determined by the 
ruling ANC party. This is a particularly important point to make not only because of 
the turf battles that arise periodically between politicians and technocrats but, more 
importantly, because it helps cast light on motivations other than economic for certain 
policy preferences. 37 That the DTI technocratic elite plays a decisive role in the 
South African trade policymaking process is beyond dispute. What remains to be 
seen, though, is whether it will succeed to insulate itself adequately from societal 
pressures, in the same way as its East Asian counterparts did, and pursue its economic 
reform agenda unhindered. In the South African context it does seem that trade 
policymaking has been as political as it has been a technocratic process: there has 
been dynamic interaction between political structures and the bureaucracy. 
The DTI has emerged as one of the three most powerful state agencies in democratic 
South Africa -- the other two are the Presidency and the National Treasury (NT). 
This is a far cry from the Cinderella status the DT1 enjoyed during the apartheid era, 
when it was forced to play second fiddle to the foreign affairs and security ministries. 
The ascendancy of the DTI is no less attributable to the internationalisation of the 
state, which, according to Cox, involves "the global process whereby national policics 
and practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of 
international production. "37 This process is seen to give "precedence to certain state 
Accreditation System, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, South African Bureau of 
Standards, and Export Credit Insurance Corporation for South Africa. 
377 See Deepak Lai and Sylvia Maxfield, "Political Economy of Stabilisation in Brazil, " in Robert 11. 
Bates and Anne 0. Krueger, Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 37-40. 379 Robert W. Cox, Production. Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Muki, ºg o/ History (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 253. 
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agencies - notably ministries of finance and prime ministers' offices - which are 
key 
points in the adjustment of domestic to international economic policy. 
379 
The process of trade policymaking in contemporary South Africa has 
been an 
evolving one, with very little reference to the past. There is very little 
in previous 
policy processes that policymakers have learnt from in respect of trade policy 
formulation. 3s0 The present incumbents in the DTI inherited bureaucratic structures 
that were not only poorly organised and ineffective, but also which were dominated 
by an introverted culture that was inimical to international trends and practices. 
Policymaking was shrouded in secrecy, with little regard for democratic 
accountability, and was driven by the overriding imperative to defend apartheid and 
achieve self-sufficiency. Pursuing an economic transformation agenda has 
necessitated, therefore, implementing a range of institutional reforms designed to 
professionalise and strengthen South African trade policy. 
These reforms have been a direct response to two key challenges. First, in respect of 
policy development the DTI has been faced with the task of developing strategies, 
based on an analysis of the world economy, geared at ensuring that South Africa 
engages effectively with economic globalisation (see Chapter 6). Second, at an 
institutional level the DTI has been required not only to transform the organisation 
from one dominated by a `Calvinist Afrikaner ethos' into a non-racial and accountable 
institution, but also to remould its internal structures in order to align them with the 
179 Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, 
in Robert W. Cox and "Timothy J. Sinclair (eds. ) Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 109. 
T° Interview with Tshediso Matona, Pretoria, 7 April 2002. 
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government's global economic strategy. 
381 This has involved changing the 
demographic profile of its senior management to make it representative of the wider 
South African populace, and bolstering the technical and managerial expertise of the 
DTI in order to ensure that it carries out its mandate effectively. Still, in terns of 
technical capabilities South Africa still lags behind other emerging economic powers 
such as Brazil or India, even more so behind the stronger East Asian countries like 
Korea or Taiwan. 32 
Institutional reform has also entailed recasting the ways in which the various 
components of the DTI Group function in order to ensure that they operate coherently 
and cooperatively. This has been demonstrated by the new corporate ethos that has 
underpinned the operations of the DTI in recent years. A great deal of energy has 
been expended to align the DTI institutions with their core functions and to ensure 
that they observe good corporate practices. Most importantly, these institutions have 
been restructured so they can execute their core business: the development of the 
South African economy. 33 
Spearheading South Africa's bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations agenda 
has been the International Trade and Development Division (ITED). It played a 
crucial role in concluding South Africa's free trade agreements with the EU and 
SADC, and in renegotiating the SACU Agreement. South Africa's ballooning trade 
negotiations agenda has also been evidenced by the ongoing FTA negotiations with 
various regional trade blocs and countries aimed at prising further market opening 
opportunities. These negotiations, which are detailed in Chapter 6, have been 
Interview with Moosa Ehrahini, Pretoria, 5 April 2002. 
392 Interview with Alan Hirsch, Pretoria, 5 April 2002. 
3 "' Interview with Pankie Matomela, Pretoria, 5 April 2002. 
187 
taking place with the Southern Cone Market (Mercosur); the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA); Nigeria, India and China. Furthermore, the ITED guided South 
Africa's accession in 2000 to the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
preferential arrangement, and has been conducting exploratory negotiations with the 
US on crafting a US-SACU free trade agreement. The ITED also contributed to the 
development of the NEPAD framework and programme, and has steered South 
Africa's economic bilateral engagements with strategic countries such as Japan, UK, 
Germany, France, and Russia. 384 
Yet this increasingly expansive trade negotiating agenda has imposed strains on the 
DTI's limited technical resources. As James Lennox, the chief executive of 
SACOB, pointed out: 
The main problem about trade policy, both domestic and international, 
is that whilst we agree with the policy, the delivery leaves a lot to be 
desired. The DTI has acquired a lot of good skills and experience with 
regard to negotiating trade agreements. They have very competent and 
innovative negotiators, but the problem with implementation at the 
domestic level is that we do not have resources within government. 
The government should not be trying to implement all the things 
themselves - they should try to involve the private sector. 
395 
There's a justifiable concern, not only among South African business, about the DTI's 
capacity to carry out and implement all of these negotiations, and the consequences 
this has for negotiated outcomes. 3x`' This is particularly pertinent to FTA 
negotiations for which South Africa, unlike multilateral negotiations at WTO level, 
194 See Department of Trade and Industry, "Report on South Africa's Trade Negotiations, " Pretoria 
May 2002. 
385 Interview with Mr James Lennox, South African Chamber of Business, 9 April 2002. 
"" For the views of key South African corporate-decision-makers on the importance of trade 
negotiations for their business processes see Peter Draper, "South African Business and Trade 
Negotiations - Findings from a Survey of South Africa Foundation Members, " Occasional Paper No. 1, 
(May 2004), p. 4. 
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cannot depend on international alliances for negotiation inputs and political backing 
to execute them. Moreover this problem is compounded by the lack of robust, well- 
oiled research expertise within the DTI, a conspicuous weakness. In the absence of 
sufficient resources being channelled into shoring up the DTI's technical resources in 
keeping with its expanding negotiations agenda, there is a danger that the South 
African government will in future find it increasingly difficult to fulfil its trade 
liberalisation obligations. 
Although the DTI has been the lead ministry in trade policy decision-making, other 
state departments have been involved too. Globalisation and interdependence have 
necessitated increased coordination and cooperation among government institutions 
over policy matters. In a globalising world order, many governments have recognised 
the need to conduct their business in a more integrated fashion. As such, whereas the 
DTI has directed policy initiatives in the field of trade, it has interacted with a motley 
array of other state agencies over issues of common concern, including the ministries 
of home affairs, communications, health, labour, foreign affairs, agriculture and 
finance. For the purpose of this study only the roles of the latter three will he 
discussed. 
In the post-apartheid era the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has emerged "as a 
weak and ineffective bureaucratic player, lacking clarity of purpose and a long-term 
strategic perspective. "; x' This was partly a consequence of the department's lack of 
firm leadership and organisational incoherence. But, crucially, it was also the product 
of internal schisms -- between the so-called `internationalist; and `neo-mercantilist' 
'%' Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, South Africa's lost-Apartheid Foreign Policy %runl Reconciliation 
to Revival? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p14. 
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groups - that paralysed the DFA in the early years of the new order. As Alden and 
le Pere explained: 
A common assessment was that South Africa's foreign policymakers 
are divided between `internationalist' and `neo-mercantilist' camps. 
Officials representing the previous government belonged to the latter 
group, which `consistent with the logic of neo-realism, emphasise[s] 
the importance of trade and self-interest over all else. ' The 
`internationalists' were mainly those who returned from long years in 
exile with an orientation towards `a demonstrably greater degree of 
solidarity with the collective problems of the developing 399 
Even so, the DFA has become increasingly enmeshed in trade policy matters. This 
marks a significant departure from the days of apartheid when its remit was limited to 
the defending apartheid policies on the global stage and engaging in sanctions busting 
campaigns. In part, this change in mindset can be attributed to the recognition on the 
part of South African policymakers of the primacy of economics in foreign policy. 
It could be argued in this respect that they have taken a leaf from the experiences of 
countries such as Australia, which led the way in prosecuting "foreign policy in a 
manner in which the search for economic welfare in the international economic order 
is every bit as significant as the search for national security. ""m 
The reorientation of South Africa's foreign relations started under the stewardship of 
the DFA's former director-general, Jackie Sclehi, whose success(ül chairing of the 
Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Landraines in 
1997 earned him international acclaim. 390 The DFA played an important role in 
'9" Ibid. 
389 Richard Higgott, "The Dilemmas of Interdependence: Australia and the International Division of 
Labour in the Asia-Pacific Region, " in James Caporaso, The New International Division of Labour 
(Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1987), p. 149. 
'90 See Janis van der Westhuizen, "Working with the Good, the Bad and the Ugly: South Africa's Role in the Global Campaign to Ilan Landraines, " in Philip Nei, Ian "Taylor and Janis van der Westhuizen 
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South Africa's attempts to secure Lome Convention status and in its accession to the 
SADC, both seen as key foreign policy considerations. The emergence of the DTI, 
however, as the main custodian of South African bilateral and multilateral diplomacy 
has undercut the role of the DFA in shaping South Africa's foreign economic policy, 
engendering mutual tensions between the two departments. 
The Department of Agriculture (DA) has been an active player not only in shaping 
South Africa's agricultural trade policy, but also in participating in the negotiations 
that led to the conclusion of a trade and cooperation agreement between the EU and 
South Africa (see Chapter 6). The DA has produced strategy documents on those 
aspects of trade policy affecting agriculture, and has included other government 
departments in its processes through a body called the Agricultural Trade Forum. 3` 1 
For its part, the NT has concerned itself with tariff and customs policies, which it has 
managed jointly with the DTI. 
4.2. Parliament 
Apart from government departments, the South African Parliament has been another 
crucial state actor in trade policy decision-making. The role of parliament in 
apartheid South Africa was severely circumscribed: it was limited to rubber-stamping 
the decisions of the executive. Policymaking tended to be dominated by a handful of' 
politicians and bureaucrats. As Raymond Suttner, the former chairperson of the 
foreign affairs portfolio committee, remarked: 
(eds. ), South Africa s Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change: The Limits u( Reformism 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 31-44. 
"" Interview with Ms Gugu Njolobe, Department of Agriculture, 5 April 2002. 
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There were not vehicles for ensuring that the legislature made a 
creative input into the governmental process. Parliamentary 
committees in the old system were basically called in to refine the 
language of what had been drafted by the executive. They met in 
secret and seldom made significant changes to what had been 
. drafted`'`' 
In the post-1994 political dispensation the national legislature has played a crucial 
oversight role in the domain of policy, not least trade policy. The Portfolio 
Committee on Trade and Industry (PCTI) is charged under the rules of the legislature 
with overseeing the performance of the department and its budget, and with making 
policy recommendations. 393 Constitutionally, there is a separation of powers between 
the executive and the legislature over areas of trade policy. For example, tariff 
reductions (some of which are driven by international agreements) take place through 
the Board of Trade and Tariffs (BTT), a quasi-independent body appointed by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry. The BTT makes recommendations on tariff 
reductions to the minister who, in turn, makes decisions in conjunction with the 
minister of finance. Multilateral and bilateral agreements, however, are negotiated 
by the executive and approved by the Cabinet, whereafter they are referred to 
Parliament for ratification. 
In recent years the PCTI has tried to carve a dynamic and pro-active role for itself in 
the trade policy domain. 394 This has been demonstrated by the fact that over the past 
years, in addition to dealing with the legislation that has been referred to it, it has, on 
its own initiative, produced three reports dealing with various aspects of policy. 
First, together with the portfolio committees on Agriculture and Foreign Affairs, it 
392 Centre for Southern African Studies, Special Report - Purliurnenis and Poreeign Policy: The 
International and South African Experience (Be41ville: University of the Western Cape, 1995), 1). 2. 39" Parliament of the Republic of' South Africa, Rules of the National Assennhly (Cape 't'own: 
Government Printer, 2000), pp. 50-51. 
394 Interview with I)r Rob Davies, Cape Town, 27 March 2002. 
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responded to the invitation of the DTI to offer suggestions and proposals on the 
mandate to guide South African negotiators on a trade and development agreement 
with the EU. Secondly, it held hearings and prepared a report on tariff and industrial 
policy that was debated by the wider legislature. Thirdly, it prepared a report on 
small and medium enterprises that fed into a debate on the forging of a national 
business development strategy. More recently, the PCTI has been part of official 
government trade delegations to Seattle and Doha where it participated in the 
proceedings, "which was a bit unusual as delegations of MPs are merely observers, 
but we were allowed to take part within the boundaries laid down . -395 Furthermore, 
the PCTI has been actively involved in negotiations designed to achieve a free trade 
pact among members of the SADC. In sum: 
There has been, in general, a high level of support within the 
Committee for the basic thrust and design of trade policy. There is 
broad agreement with the basic direction of trade strategy, with the 
aims and objectives of industrial policy, and with such matters as the 
policy towards the promotion of small and medium enterprises. In 
respect of actual policy implementation, the role of the committee can 
be best described as one of critical support. The Committee has taken 
the view that the most effective support it can render to programmes 
whose basic intentions and visions it shares, is to monitor closely their 
implementation and delivery, to raise matters of concern and 
sometimes ask hard questions about actual implementation. 396 
Even so, there are some challenges that the national legislature has to confront if it is 
to maintain its influence in the policymaking process in the future. For although the 
institution of parliament has played a crucial role in overseeing policy it has not 
always taken full advantage of the policy instruments at its disposal. This is partly 
because not all parliamentarians are sufficiently empowered to understand and 
participate in policy processes and give true meaning to the intentions of the 
Ibid. 
ý, c, Ibid. 
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legislature. Uneven levels of confidence and ability among public representatives 
have sometimes undermined the ability of the legislature to engage effectively with 
policy and legislation. As such it is debatable whether the legislature, 
notwithstanding its immense oversight powers and the relatively good relationship it 
enjoys with the DTI, will be able to exercise its prerogatives in another era - in the 
absence of powerful and assertive MPs such Rob Davies, the chairperson of the PCTI. 
It is also necessary to be mindful of the adverse effects that party politics and an 
under-resourced legislature could have on the development of trade policy in the 
future. 3` 7 Furthermore, Parliament might in the future he constrained by the 
constitutional provisions governing international agreements. Although international 
agreements have to be ratified by the legislature before implementation, under Section 
231 of the Constitution Parliament is not authorised to alter these agreements a 
prerogative of the Executive. 
In addition to the national government, provincial governments have also been 
concerned with shaping trade policy. Schedule 4 of the South African constitution 
empowers provinces to determine trade policy in their designated areas of 
competence, although not industrial policy: trade policy is a section 76 (unction (a 
concurrent national and provincial competence) whereas industrial policy is a section 
75 function (an exclusively national competence). 398 All nine South African 
provinces are authorised exercise jurisdiction over such matters as consumer 
protection, gambling, liquor licensing, trading regulations, markets and street trading. 
Yet given their uneven levels of development, not all provinces have exploited their 
constitutional prerogatives maximally. For example, the Gauteng, Western Cape and 
397 Interview with Mohseen Moosa, Pretoria, 15 April 2003. 
19" See South African Government, Constitution o/ the Republic o/' South Africa Act 10$ o/ 1996 
(Pretoria: Government Printer, 1996), pp. 1-82-1-195, 
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Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces - all of which are relatively better resourced than the other 
six provinces - have been very active in the trade policy sphere. Invariably, this has 
occasionally caused tensions between various provinces. Mindful of the apartheid 
legacy of regional polarisation induced by resource disparities among provinces, the 
South African government set up in 1997 the Fiscal and Financial Commission (FFC) 
to regulate intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa. An independent 
statutory body, the FFC was established "to provide advice with respect to the 
equitable sharing of revenue and other intergovernmental fiscal issues, and to limit 
subjective political decisions regarding the allocation of public resources in the 
spheres of national, provincial and local government. "; '`' 
The Gauteng province, which accounts for 40 percent of South Africa's GDP, has led 
the way in driving trade and industrial initiatives. In particular, its Blue IQ project 
has been acclaimed as an exemplary model that can he emulated by other 
provinces. 400 The same cannot be said, however, about the poorer provinces such as 
the Eastern Cape, North West and Limpopo. Languid political leadership, poor 
technical capacity and inadequate financial resources are some of the reasons that 
have hamstrung these provinces. And their woes have not been eased by the 
unfavourable image that the DTI has formed of them, which has induced a tendency 
on the part of the latter to control policy implementation from the centre. 401 
399 Fiscal and Financial Commission, "The role of the FFC, " at httpJ/wwwstC, co. za 
ano  F he Blue IQ project is a multibillion initiative undertaken by the Lauteng provincial government, in 
conjunction with the DTI, to invest in economic infrastructure development in ten major projects 
clustered around the areas of tourism, technology, transport and high value-added manufacturing. 401 Interview with Thabo Mokwena, Pretoria, 14 April 2003. 
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5. Trade Policy and South African Tripartism 
Although trade policy formulation in South Africa has been led by state agencies, 
principally the DTI, non-state actors have also been active participants in trade policy 
processes. Primarily, their involvement has found expression in the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a corporatist institutional 
arrangement set up in 1995 to bring together the state, capital, labour and community 
organisations with a view to seeking negotiated, consensual solutions to social and 
economic policy problems. NEDLAC is the product of a push by the labour 
movement in South Africa in the early 1990s for an institutionalised role in economic 
and industrial policymaking. Not only was it conceived to counter the unilateral 
economic restructuring that was taking place in the dying days of the apartheid 
regime, it was also seen as a crucial mechanism to advance the social objectives 
propounded by COSATU, the ANC's alliance partner. The origins of NFDLAC, 
therefore, sprang from the struggle against apartheid and from societal demands for 
inclusive and transparent government decision-making. Although NFDLAC draws 
on international experience of social dialogue, it has unique features anchored in the 
peculiarities of the South African political economy: for example its membership goes 
beyond the traditional partners - government, business and labour and includes 
organised civic formations in South Africa. 
Through its Trade and Industry Chamber, NEDLAC has sought to develop 
negotiating consensus on most trade issues, including WTO matters, the trade and 
cooperation pact between South Africa and the EU, the free trade protocol concluded 
by the SADC states, the free trade negotiations between South Africa and the 
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Mercosur, as well as on domestic legislation related to trade. In the same ways as its 
forerunner the NEF actively participated in crafting South Africa's negotiation offer 
in the UR of trade negotiations, NEDLAC has played a key role in the Doha trade 
negotiations. In the post-Doha period a special task force has been created within 
NEDLAC to continually review South Africa's strategies and positions in multilateral 
trade negotiations. 402 This, according to South Africa's former chief trade negotiator 
Tshediso Matona, is central to maintaining consistency, coherence and cohesiveness 
in a country's negotiating positions. As he explained: 
I have observed other countries where there is a difference inside the 
same national delegation, and that weakens the country. Their 
negotiating positions can become unsustainable because they 
unravel. 403 
The divergent nature of NEDLAC's constituent members' interests renders it a 
politically charged forum. This makes trade policy a contested terrain and explains 
why it is sometimes difficult to reconcile the interests of the diverse constituencies: 
the DTI's task is made hard by the fact that it has to engage in consultations about its 
tariff liberalisation programme with parties whose interests are threatened by reform. 
What drives social dialogue is power - the power of the constituencies. As such 
while NEDLAC's rationale is to facilitate consultation between its constituencies, it is 
the power of those constituencies that eventually shapes policy decisions. In this 
context NEDLAC's concern is to build as much consensus as possible. 404 The virtue 
of the NEDLAC process - and this is what differentiates South Africa from many 
countries -- is its very clearly structured and intense consultation processes. Even so, 
previous experience has shown that, ultimately, it is the state that has the final say on 
4°Z Interview with Philip Dexter, Johannesburg, 9 April 2002. 
403 Interview with Tshediso Matona, Pretoria, 7 April 2002. 
404 Interview with Philip Dexter, Johannesburg, 9 April 2002. 
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trade policy decision-making. And this is a prerogative it has guarded jealously. This 
point is echoed by Matona: 
Consultation is necessary but at some point a judgement has to be 
made by the Minister. The mandate of the Minister is not to please 
business or labour but to implement policies that make sure that trade 
makes its contribution to the economy. Trade policy is inherently 
horizontal; it cuts across a range of interests. The challenge is to find 
that point where you can justifiably make the point that it is in the best 
interests of the economy, in the best interests of everyone. ` 0 
Therein lies the rub. There has never been universal agreement on what constitutes 
corporatism in the South African context. Nor, indeed, has there been any elsewhere 
in the world. 406 This perhaps explains why corporatist theory has been vulnerable to 
attacks from all angles. Referring to the case of Britain, Grant reasoned that: 
Corporatist theory was attacked from all directions: by pluralists, who 
resented this attempt to invade their intellectual territory; by neo- 
marxists who regarded it as an inadequate theory, because of its 
pluralist roots and its failure to develop a theory of the state; and by 
Conservative politicians who saw cor? oratism as one of' the major 
sources of British economic decline... `30 
To a significant degree, the contested nature of corporatist theory has been reflected in 
the internal debates of the tripartite alliance in South Africa. Within the labour 
movement, in particular, tripartite social contracts became a source of fierce 
polemical jostling in the early 1990s. The debate pitted, on the one hand, those who 
embrace corporatism (the so-called "participationists") and, on the other hand, those 
405 Interview with Tshediso Matona, Pretoria, 7 April 2002. 
406 See for example Wyn Grant (ed. ), The Political Economy of ('or7poruti. sm (l; asingstokc: Macmillan, 
1985); Gerhard Lehmbruch and Phillipe C. Schmitter (eds. ), Pattc'r, r. c of ('orpouatist Polic'l'nt(tkinsý 
(London: Sage, 1982). 
407 Wyn Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 1). 52. 
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who completely rejected it (the so-called "anti-corporatist school"). 409 Proponents 
of codeterrnination within COSATU argued that it was an unavoidable phenomenon 
that ought to be engaged with. What concerned them, then, was not whether 
corporatism needed to be engaged with but how such engagement ought to evolve. 
Their support for it was based mainly on the belief that it could prevent the state and 
capital from engaging in unilateral decision-making. Opponents, in contrast, 
maintained that "corporatism will lead to the emasculation of the working class, the 
cooptation of its leadership and a prolonging of the life of capitalism .,, 
409 Yct even 
within the business sector differences of opinion existed about the value of corporatist 
institutional arrangements. Although some sections of capital saw codetcnnination as 
an instrument for economic growth and international competitiveness, other fractions 
of business were concerned that "negotiated economic policies would prevent the 
`strong medicine' of adjustments from being administered. "410 
South African tripartism runs the risk of unravelling for five reasons. First, because 
such elite-pacting privileges the strongest voices, it is prone to engendering social 
divisions. Institutional collaboration enables the state, capital and labour to reap the 
preponderant share of economic benefits at the expense of other parties and interest 
groups. This is a recipe for social conflagration, which ultimately will require 
authoritarian measures to suppress. Second, growing tensions within COSA"('U have 
meant that agreements concluded by negotiators in structures like NEDLAC have not 
been accepted readily by constituencies. Third, while significant progress has been 
achieved in uniting business associations that were previously segregated on racial 
lines, the legacy of fragmentation remains. Aggravating this problem has been the 
409 See Schreiner, "Beyond Corporatism, " pp. 3-6. 
409 Ibid., p. 2. 
aio Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 231. 
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haphazard manner in which the government and business have collaborated in 
preparing negotiation positions. 41 1 Consolidating the unification process, therefore, 
between black and white businesses is necessary if organised business in South Africa 
is to play a meaningful role shaping trade policy. 
Fourth, the problems associated with tripartism have been worsened by South Africa's 
orthodox economic policy, with its conflicting demands on labour - greater stability, 
productivity and flexibility. Fifth, the destabilisation of NEDLAC by its key 
members - labour, capital and the state - has eroded the institution's credibility in the 
eyes of respective constituencies. 412 As Marais opined: 
The restriction of NEDLAC's role harks back to the purely advisory 
status originally conceived for one of its forerunners, the National 
Economic Forum. This regressive shift is linked to a broader attempt 
to steer tripartite structures away from formative policy-making and 
towards facilitating the implementation of policies decided elsewhere 
4 in the system. 13 
This insight echoes the contention made in this thesis. Trade reform, carried out 
within a disciplined corporatist framework, has been deployed by decision-making 
elites in South Africa not only to lock in and entrench the government's neo-lihcral 
macroeconomic economic policy but also to curtail the power of domestic interests 
that have benefited from trade protectionism in the past. In return for their co- 
operation during a difficult period of economic restructuring, the South African state 
has allowed these interests - notably business and labour - strengthened institutional 
representation in economic policymaking, in addition to providing a wide array of 
all Draper, "South African Business, " p. 5. 
412 Ibid., p. 232. 
413 Ibid.. 
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supply-side measures to mitigate the negative effects of competitive pressures. This 
does not, of course, imply that the South African state has not been able to elaborate a 
national developmental agenda consistent with its political and economic objectives. 
The constricted nature of corporatism in South Africa - which has tended to reduce 
the role of labour and business in economic policymaking to a purely advisory one -- 
has enabled the decision-making elites to manage domestic tensions induced by their 
trade liberalisation policies. Nor does it suggest that capital and labour have been 
generally weak; on the contrary, these two social groups still have enormous 
economic and social clout thanks to the highly concentrated corporate structure of 
South Africa and the massive social power enjoyed by the trade union movement. 
Rather, what is meant is that corporatism has provided the state, albeit within the 
limited confines of an institutional setting, with a leverage to bargain with its social 
partners over economic policy and with a breathing space to consolidate its economic 
reform agenda both at international and domestic levels. In this sense trade policy has 
served political as much as economic ends. 
6. Trade Policymaking and NGOs 
South Africa has a very poor history of trade policy activism. This is not surprising, 
given the negligible role that was accorded to trade policy during the apartheid era. 
However, the emergence of trade as a dominant aspect of the post-apartheid South 
African state's policy agenda has sparked a burgeoning interest in trade matters on the 
part of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It is worth noting though that 
NGOs such as policy institutes and think tanks arc not represented in NEDLAC 
structures: only constituency-based civil society formations are provided for. Three 
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types of NGOs can be identified in terms of how they relate to the WTO: 
`conformers, ' `reformers' and `radicals. ' The `conformers' support the goals and 
operations of the WTO system, and believe that the WTO could play a crucial role in 
fostering global economic integration and spreading the benefits of free trade. 
Although they also appreciate the value of the rules-based global trading system and 
open markets, `reformers' are unhappy with what they consider to be `inefficient' 
WTO procedures and rules. As such, they believe that reforming the WTO system 
could produce better and more efficient outcomes. For their part, `radicals' want to 
eliminate the WTO completely, which they see as part of a sinister plot to advance a 
global domination agenda by multinational corporations. 
414 
South African NGOs interested in trade policy matters fall into two categories 
namely `conformists' and `reformers. ' The `conformists' have been represented by 
such NGOs as the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), the South African Institute of 
International Affairs (SAIIA) as well as the Trade and Industrial Strategies (TIPS). In 
response to requests by the DTI and the DFA, the IGD (together with other civil 
society formations) has played a central role in preparing the summit agendas of the 
NAM, the UNCTAD as well as the Commonwealth. SAIIA has undertaken a series 
of projects - for example the publication of trade policy briefings and reports aimed 
at encouraging communication and cooperation among trade policy constituencies in 
South Africa. TIPS has been the most high-profile NGO and probably the most 
influential in policymaking. TIPS was born out of a recognition that there was no 
tradition within government of harnessing research from the academic communities 
into policymaking. It was set up as a clearing-house to keep the government abreast 
414 See Jan Aart Scholte, Robert O'Brien and Marc Williams, "The World 'trade Organisation and civil 
Society, " in Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire (eds. ) Trade Politics - lntei'nationu/, Domeestic and Regional Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 162.178. 
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of research developments within the academic community and to receive feedback 
regarding how the latter can set the agenda for research. 
TIPS is not a government institution: it is an independent research institute with an 
established reputation for independent research. However, it does not merely engage 
in `blue sky' research since it believes that research ought to be tied to the needs of 
government. Although interaction between the DTI and TIPS is `informal' - it is 
restricted to senior policymakers - this puts TIPS in a good position to influence trade 
policymaking in South Africa, albeit not in a direct manner. The mutually beneficial 
relationship between the two institutions can be attributed largely to the fact the 
current DTI leadership has been receptive to outside research and has a strong 
tendency to encourage democratic thinking and reflection. But this kind of close 
interface cannot be guaranteed in the future. As Rashad Cassim, the head of"TIPS, 
stated: 
But I worry that in the future the current leadership may be replaced by 
a closed and inward-looking leadership and which is less receptive to 
external research. We will have a problem then. For this reason 
think it is important to have an empowered civil society that keeps 
government in check and makes it accountable for its policies. 4' 
The `reformers' flag has been flown by outfits such as the Alternative Information 
and Development Centre (AIDC) and a motley crew of academics such as the 
political economist Patrick Bond. They have all been united in their condemnation 
not only of the WTO, but also of South Africa's approach to the multilateral 
institution. For instance, they have accused the South African government for not 
415 Interview with Rashad Cassim, Johannesburg, 8 April 2002. 
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questioning and challenging the inequities of the global trading SySteM. 
410 Moreover, 
they have denounced South Africa's Doha negotiating strategy for fomenting disunity 
among African countries, thereby undermining their interests and weakening their 
bargaining power within the WTO (see Chapter 7). 417 The problem with the 
`reformers' analyses is that while in some respects their criticisms are understandable 
and valid they provide very little by way of concrete alternatives. There are signs 
that trade policy activism among South African non-state actors is on the ascendancy. 
In 2003 an informal grouping was set up with a view to enabling domestic business to 
have a more structured input into South Africa's trade negotiations. The forum has 
been established in response to low-key involvement of South African business in 
debates about South African trade policy both at bilateral and multilateral levels. 
This initiative has come about against the backdrop of several tracks of free trade area 
negotiations in which South Africa has been involved, including negotiations with the 
US, the Mercosur, India and China. It is hoped that the forum will not only enable 
business organisations to alert South African trade negotiators to commercial 
opportunities and hurdles domestically and abroad but it will also facilitate their 
involvement in developing long-term trade strategies. 418 
7. Domestic Interests 
Trade policy is first and foremost about domestic politics. Because it determines the 
relative positions of various social groups in the domestic political economy, trade 
416 See Dot Keet, "South Africa's Official Position and Role in Promoting the Works 't'rade 
Organisation and a New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, " a presentation to the Southern 
African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN) workshop on the World 'T'rade Organisation and 
Globalisation, Johannesburg, 19-22 July 2001, pp. 1-20. 
41 See Patrick Bond, "South Africa's Sub-Imperial Trade Agenda - Splitting Africa to Launch a New 
Multilateral Round, " undated, pp. I-10. 
418 `Business group bids for say on SA trade policy, " Business flau 12"' December 2003. 
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policy is always politically contested. Trade policy consists, therefore, of both 
allocative economic aspects as well as redistributive political elements: in addition to 
efficiency considerations trade policy must also account for the interests of the state 
apparatus and the conflict among different internal social groups. Trade reform in 
South Africa has been carried out not under the command of organised domestic 
interests. Nor has it been undertaken at the behest of the IFIs. On the contrary, it 
has occurred as a part of a deliberate adjustment strategy conceived by the state not 
only to restructure the domestic economy but also to reintegrate South Africa into the 
wider global economic order after decades of international ostracism. However, 
South Africa's trade reform programme has not gone without resistance fron 
organised social interest groups. 
As alluded to in Chapter 4, South Africa's accelerated trade liberalisation agenda has 
been criticised by fractions of capital and labour, particularly those in sensitive sectors 
such as clothing, textiles and the automotive sectors who have accused the 
government of adopting policies that have aggravated the already high levels of 
national joblessness and posed a grave danger to the long-term viability of their 
industries. Lobbying the government has been harder among the losers from trade 
liberalisation than it has been among the winners. The labour unions have been 
among the key losers from trade reform. They have been concerned about the 
massive job losses that have resulted from the hasty liberalisation process, and have 
also been concerned that the government's reform programme has not been 
adequately sequenced to take into account the impact of trade reform on employment 
in South Africa. 419 
419 Interview with Fiona Tregena, Cape Town, 26 March 2002. 
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According to COSATU, formal employment has declined rapidly since 1990, leading 
to a drastic rise in unemployment especially among young people. Using the narrow 
definition that excludes people too discouraged to keep searching for jobs, between 
1995 and 2001 unemployment increased from 16 percent to virtually 30 percent . 
420 
COSATU has blamed South Africa's high national unemployment rate on many years 
of labour force de-skilling and the privileging of capital-intensive over labour- 
intensive projects by the apartheid state, the massive disinvestment by domestic 
capital since the late 1970s coupled with the tendency to favour financial speculation 
over productive investment, and the one-sided concentration on competitiveness and 
export orientation which have underpinned a large part of industrial policy since 
1994. The trade union federation has maintained that "South Africa's trade policy 
must be driven, not by an abstract commitment to free trade, but by a well-defined 
industrial strategy. , 421 It has also argued that growing exports do not always lead to 
high employment, warning that in several cases the restructuring of production has 
actually induced job losses. 
Furthermore, COSATU has stated that the experience of its affiliated unions at 
sectoral level has shown that job losses have occurred concurrently with tariff 
reduction, and that tariff reductions have slowed the rate of job generation. For 
these reasons it has argued that tariff policy ought to be used by the state to steer the 
economy and promote certain industrial sectors. While it has acknowledged that there 
is massive inefficiency in South African industry, and that significant domestic 
restructuring is necessary, COSATU has called for a state policy approach that 
harnesses domestic industry through a selective deployment of protective measures, 
420 Cosatu, "Cosatu Submission on Public Hearings on Industrial Policy, " Cape Town, 30 April 2002, 
p. 5. 
421 Ibid., p. 29. 
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and deliberate industrial strategies designed to strengthen domestic capacity. To 
this end, it has proposed that the existing tariff policy should be modified as follows: 
0 South Africa's general tariffs should not be reduced at a rate faster than that 
demanded by the country's WTO obligations; 
9 The reduction of tariffs ought to be preceded and concurrently backed by 
active industrial policies to foster competitiveness; 
0 Where tariff reduction leads to retrenchments, social adjustment programmes 
should be introduced to assist workers find new jobs; 
0 In cases where tariff reduction has produced negative outcomes, attempts 
should be made to increase tariffs - within the boundaries laic] down by the 
WTO - to attenuate these outcomes; 
0 The South African state should deploy tariffs strategically: lower them to raise 
competitiveness while increasing them to safeguard employment and advance 
industrial development. 422 
Concerns about South Africa's rapid liberalisation programme have been echoed by 
the business sector. For example, the clothing and textile industries have expressed 
disgruntlement with the manner in which textile tariff reductions were carried out 
following the UR. The WTO had granted South Africa twelve years to phase down 
its textile tariffs, but the South African government opted to introduce the tariff phase- 
down over a period of seven years and terminate end rate tariffs. By September 2003, 
South Africa's tariffs on yarns, fabrics and clothing amounted to 15 percent, 22 
percent and 40 percent respectively, far below the 27 percent, 38 percent and 73 
422 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
207 
percent extended to the country by the WTO. 
423 These industrial sectors have 
pleaded with the South African government not to contemplate further tariff 
reductions in the Doha negotiations until the tariff schedule agreed in the UR has been 
completed in five years' time. This, they believe, is essential to boosting job 
creation and investment in the textile industry and the small business sector. 
In a quest to accommodate the concerns of business, labour and other key social 
actors, the DTI unveiled in 2002 an industrial strategy document which "tries to 
define a common understanding of what challenges we face with regard to the 
manufacturing process in the economy; to devise common actions that can be taken 
by economic citizens; the main areas of focus of our actions and what the DTI will 
undertake to do. , 424 In essence, the proposed industrial strategy seeks to foster high 
employment, wealth and small business growth through the development of 
competitive industries. It notes that since industrial restructuring started in the 1990s 
some industries have shown that they can be competitive while others have weakened. 
Historical distortions have been removed by eliminating trade barriers and creating a 
competitive economic environment through the implementation of competition 
legislation. Specific support programmes have been developed both for the 
automotive industry and the textile sector to improve their competitiveness. 
Other industrial sectors have benefited from generic support measures designed to 
encourage the international competitiveness of firms, including export support, 
investment support, quality improvement, strategy development, research and 
423 The Textile Federation, "Submission by the Textile Federation to the Portfolio Committee on "frade 
and Industry on Industrial Policy, " Cape Town, 9 April 2002, pp. 4-5. 
424 The Department of Trade and Industry, Accelerating Growth and Development - 11w ('on1rihu1iun 
of the Integrated Manufacturing Strategy (Pretoria: Government Printer, 2002), p. 6. 
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development as well as targeted empowerment and small business development 
programmes. There has been a shift recently to focus on certain industries much more 
substantially. These have been clustered around eight industrial sectors - agriculture, 
tourism, information and communication technologies, cultural industries and export 
sectors, clothing and textiles, automobiles, agro-processing and chemicals -- and in 
each of these groups specific supply-side programmes have been developed to enable 
them to compete internationally. The industrial strategy has been predicated on the 
assumption that the domestic market would not grow very fast for the early years of 
South Africa's post-apartheid era and that most growth, therefore, would have to 
come from increased exports. 425 In essence, the present industrial strategy is 
designed to stimulate competitiveness, create a value-added export-oriented 
manufacturing economy and increase employment. 
This represents a marked departure from the policy instruments that guided industrial 
policy in the apartheid era. As elaborated in Chapter 3, erstwhile industrial policy 
was geared at ensuring protectionism and inward-looking development of the 
economy. Domestic industry was protected by high tariff barriers, high exchange rate 
subsidisation and other demand-side assistance to industries that were generally 
uncompetitive. Through parastatals like the IDC and ISCOR, the government 
invested heavily in what was considered to be strategic intensive mega-projects, 
stimulating downstream industries. In turn, the high protection enjoyed by these 
parastatals resulted in high costs for downstream industries. Reinforced by an 
oppressive industrial relations system, this approach did not create it competitive 
manufacturing sector nor did it support desired job growth. 
425 Ibid., pp. 1-40. 
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It is worth noting that some industrial sectors have adapted better than others to 
economic restructuring. Nowhere has this clearer than in the cases of the automobile 
sector and the clothing and textiles industry. A number of reasons can be advanced 
for this discrepancy in performance. First, the clothing and textiles sector is a much 
more basic industry in that it is labour-intensive and not technologically advanced; the 
levels of machinery, automation and skills required in this sector are not high. It is 
easy, therefore, to set up business in the clothing and textile market. Of course this 
sector can become a sophisticated industry, but at a basic level it is still seen as the 
bedrock industry in developing countries. On the contrary, the automobile industry is 
much more complex: not only is it capital-intensive, it relies on much more complex 
processes of integrating manufacturing such as components assembly, robotics and 
automation. Second, the dependence of the automotive industry on a small number of 
large international companies makes it easier for it to cultivate long-terra relationships 
with these corporations. 426 
By contrast, the clothing and textile industry does not work like that at all: the big 
clothing sellers such as Nike and Gap can move their operations relatively very easy 
and they are not loyal to any particular firm. Third, and interestingly, it appears that 
sectors where the South African state has been active in leading and driving change 
have fared better in terms of economic reform. The automobile industry case, with 
its history of social dialogue and consultation, has demonstrated that this sector was 
more prepared for and adapted easily to economic restructuring. Fourth, the 
automobile industry learnt to export during the apartheid years while the clothing 
industry did not. Fifth, unlike the automotive industry the clothing and textile sector 
42b Interview with Anthony Black, Cape Town, 28 March 2003. 
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has traditionally not enjoyed a strong domestic market. Fifth, the role of skills 
development cannot be downplayed. Wage bargaining trends in the automotive 
sector have historically been influenced by skills: people's careers could only advance 
if they could increase their skills. In the clothing and textile sectors, by contrast, such 
intervention did not exist until at a late stage - this is not because the labour unions 
did not demand it but it is because it was never seen as a priority. -127 
It remains debatable as to whether the South African government could have halted 
the negative impact of trade liberalisation over the past years by cushioning 
those 
industries that suffered most adversely. What is clear, though, is that whichever 
direction the trajectory of economic restructuring had assumed it was poised to affect 
some industrial sectors in a more negative way. That said, policymakers ought to 
ensure in the future that tariff reductions are properly sequenced and that appropriate 
safeguard measures - such as anti-dumping actions -- are implemented to support 
vulnerable industries, subject to their multilateral rules and surveillance. Adequate 
supply-side measures must also be put in place to ensure that the drive to make South 
African industry globally competitive does not inadvertently lead to the weakening of 
domestic productive capacity. Which raises the fundamental issue of the role of the 
state in driving and managing economic change to offset its socially deleterious 
effects. To what extent can the state act as a propeller and manager of change'? And 
to what degree can that role be left to the markets? One school of thought asserts that 
the government cannot do anything but provide the regulatory framework. Yet 
there's another worldview that argues that the state must not only provide the 
regulatory framework but must also provide the resources required to pursue specific 
427 Interview with Alan Hirsch, Pretoria, 5 April 2002; Interview with Phillip Dexter, Johannesburg, 
April 2002. 
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social objectives such as job creation. The automobile industry has been exemplary 
in this respect. Although initially it was only labour and business that drove the 
change process in this sector, in the post-apartheid era the state has played a crucial 
role in the automotive industry through its Motor Industry Development Programme 
(MDP). Through the MDP, the state, capital and labour have committed themselves 
to pursuing industrial competitiveness in the automobile sector with a view 
contributing the economic and social goals of growth and poverty reduction. 
Achieving these goals, however, will require long-term, sustained domestic political 
consensus among the key social partners. 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the trade policy reforms that have been put in place by the 
South African state since 1994 to restructure South Africa's previously isolated 
economy and promote its ascendancy as an outward-oriented manufacturing and 
trading nation. Its central contention is that trade policy in South Africa has 
essentially reflected economic reforms introduced by the ANC government since it 
came to power in 1994. These changes are designed principally to open up the 
economy to external competition and reverse decades of economic underpertormance 
and mismanagement. The ANC government inherited a stagnant economy that was 
characterised by many structural weaknesses, including decreasing investment rates, 
an unskilled workforce, a poor industrial relations regime, a paucity of investment In 
research and development, a decaying industrial sector, and an underdeveloped small 
and medium-sized business sector. On assuming office the democratic state was 
faced with a dual challenge: to introduce policies geared at income, wealth and 
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economic power redistribution while at the same time creating conditions ripe for the 
pursuit of economic growth. Crafting a new economic strategy to disentangle South 
Africa frone decades of economic stasis and providing a climate conducive to the 
realisation of high levels of growth were thus considered to be an overwhelming 
imperative. 
The ANC's rise to power in the early 1990s coincided with a marked shift in its 
economic principles and beliefs. Previously, the ANC's economic thinking had 
been encapsulated in the Freedom Charter, which propagated socialist ideals such as 
the nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy. However, a 
combination of internal and external factors - including subjective weaknesses within 
the liberation movement, coupled with ideological pressures to which the ANC was 
subjected by domestic capital and the IFIs - conspired to force a rethink in the ANC's 
economic philosophy. This ideological volte-face reached its apogee with the 
advent of GEAR, the market-oriented macroeconomic policy framework that has 
guided South African economic policy since 1996. GEAR has advocated an outward- 
oriented trade regime as crucial to South Africa's economic success. Specifically, it 
has touted trade liberalisation and export-oriented growth as key levers of it broader 
strategy to reassure international and domestic investors about South Africa's 
extensive economic reform in the hope of enticing investment to South Africa. 
However, the ANC government has failed to secure adequate direct investment to 
meet its investment needs and fuel growth - notwithstanding the fact it has adopted 
comprehensive market-friendly measures to make South Africa attractive to foreign 
investors. 
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The failure of GEAR to yield desired levels of foreign investment has presented the 
government with a predicament. On the one hand, it has been acutely aware that it 
must take radical economic measures to address the problems of widespread poverty 
and joblessness plaguing South Africa - measures that are necessary to ensure that it 
retains the support of its political base and ward off social instability. It has, 
nonetheless, desisted from pursuing such a path of action for fear that embracing 
monetary and fiscal policies that diverge from international policy trends would erode 
its international reputation for fiscal austerity. On the other hand it has been 
criticised by its tripartite alliance partners and civil society groups for privileging the 
interests of foreign investors at the expense of those of its political supporters because 
of its refusal to discard its austere fiscal and monetary policies in favour of a more 
expansionary, demand-driven economic strategy. 
Yet the discussion in this chapter has demonstrated that the ANC government's 
motives for implementing trade reform to the extent it has cannot he explained in 
solely economic terms as mainstream accounts of South Africa trade policy tend to 
suggest: international and domestic political economy factors also have also played a 
pivotal role in the policy choices made. For South Africa has pursued a global 
adjustment strategy calculated to achieve specific political economy objectives at 
domestic levels and international levels. Domestically, this has involved attempts to 
alter the structure of national institutions and industries to facilitate domestic 
economic adjustment, which have culminated in the reformed institutional 
arrangements for trade policy-making in South Africa. In particular, this transformed 
institutional set-up has found expression in the corporatist structures centred around 
NEDLAC - that have underpinned social bargaining between the state, capital and 
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labour in post-apartheid South Africa. The restricted nature of corporatism in 
South Africa which has tended to reduce the role of labour and business in 
economic policymaking to a purely advisory one - has enabled the political elites to 
manage domestic tensions caused by their trade liberalisation policies. This should 
not be interpreted, however, to mean that that capital and labour have been generally 
weak, especially considering South Africa's (still) heavily concentrated corporate 
structure and enormous social power wielded by the trade union movement. On the 
contrary, what is meant is corporatism has provided the state, although within the 
constrained context an institutional setting, with a leverage to bargain with its social 
partners over economic policy and with a breathing space to consolidate its economic 
reform agenda both at international and domestic levels. In this sense trade policy has 
served political as much as economic objectives. Internationally, South Africa has 
sought to forge alliances with like-minded countries to push for the generation of new 
"rules for the game" for international interactions so as to create propitious conditions 
for the fulfilment of its global, regional and bilateral trade strategies. What these are 
and how South Africa intends to accomplish them is the subject addressed in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Re-orienting South African Trade: South Africa's Global Trade Strategy 
This chapter undertakes an assessment of South Africa's global trade strategy. It 
argues that the strategy ought to be understood within the context of the country's 
broader global economic agenda, which is designed to promote the ascendancy of 
South Africa as a vibrant export-oriented manufacturing economy. Against this 
backdrop, the strategy seeks to reconfigure the position of the South African state in 
the global political economy by decreasing its reliance on traditional developed 
country markets (especially the EU) and by forging trade relationships with new and 
expanding markets in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Three pillars undergird South 
Africa's global trade strategy: multilateral ism; regionalism; and bilateralism. 
South Africa's multilateral engagement is aimed at facilitating the country's re- 
integration into the global economy and at pushing for a greater role for developing 
countries in shaping global economic governance, especially in the sphere of' world 
trade. Whether this pillar of the strategy can succeed or not will depend, to a large 
measure, not only how South Africa executes it within the global trade regime but 
also on the degree to which the presently beleaguered system of economic 
multilateralism can be adequately reformed to serve the needs oC developing countries 
such as South Africa. Regionally, South Africa has not only used trade policy as a 
foreign policy instrument to normalise political relations frayed during the apartheid 
era - with neighbouring countries in the Southern African region, but it has deployed 
it to pursue its hegemonic ambitions and to consolidate regional trading arrangements 
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as stepping-stones towards the incorporation of Southern Africa in the global 
economy. In this respect, the thesis maintains, South Africa's hegemonic designs 
appear to have found greater accommodation within the SACU but far less so in the 
SADC. At a bilateral level, South Africa has sought to forge strategic collaboration 
with designated developing nations - principally India and Brazil but also China and 
Nigeria - in order to challenge the structural inequities of the contemporary global 
order and work towards the attainment of a balanced, fair and just multilateral trading 
regime. Given its newness, it is still too early to tell how effective this alliance of 
developing countries will be but it has to overcome several challenges if it is to avoid 
the fate of other failed erstwhile developing country coalitions. 
This chapter is in seven sections. The first briefly explains South Africa's global 
economic strategy. Building on this, the second part analyses South Africa's 
strategic approach to the WTO within the context of the Doha Round (DR) of trade 
negotiations. The third and fourth sections examine South Africa's regional and intra- 
regional trade within the context of the SACU, the SADC and the wider African 
continent. The fifth section details South Africa's burgeoning trade relations with the 
US, focusing specifically on the US trade strategy and its ramifications for the 
ongoing FTA negotiations between the US and SACU. Sixth, bilateral trade relations 
between South Africa and the EU (South Africa's biggest foreign trade partner) arc 
assessed. Lastly, the chapter examines South Africa's efforts to deepen its trade 
relationship with key developing countries -- principally India and Brazil as a tool 
for reducing the dependence of its trade on the industrialised world and diversifying 
its export base. 
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1. South Africa's Global Economic Strategy 
South Africa's approach to the WTO ought to be understood within the wider context 
of the country's global economic strategy. The strategy is inspired by two critical 
imperatives: the necessity to take account of South Africa's national political, 
economic and developmental circumstances; and the obligation to confront the 
growing marginalisation of the Southern African region under conditions of enhanced 
economic globalisation. 428 It posits a convergence of South African interests and 
those of other developing nations, centred principally on market access and economic 
development. And it is predicated on three distinct pillars of engagement: 
multilateralism; regionalism; and bilateralism. At the multilateral level, the strategy 
seeks to engage assertively with economic globalisation and to reverse the precarious 
position of South Africa (and its Southern African trade partners) in the international 
division of labour. 
To this end it emphasises the importance of multilateral ism, which South Africa 
regards as the developing countries' best hope for mitigating the uneven power 
relations between large developed nations and small developing countries in the 
trading environment. Regionally, it seeks to consolidate regional trading 
arrangements and deploy these as launch-pads towards the integration of Southern 
Africa in the global economy. At a bilateral level, it identities specific countries for 
engagement as South Africa's strategic trade and investment partners. 4l') South 
Africa's expanding trade negotiations agenda reflects the government's policy of 
42' Department of Trade and Industry, "South Africa's Global Economic Strategy: A Policy Framework 
and Key Elements, " May 2001, p. 10. 
429 Ibid., p. 12. 
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systematically opening the economy to foreign competition and promoting exports 
and inward investment to support growth and employment. 
Central to South Africa's global economic strategy has been an overarching objective 
to ameliorate the disproportionate reliance of the country's trade on traditional foreign 
markets (particularly the EU) and facilitate the emergence of South Africa as a 
dynamic, outward-oriented manufacturing economy. This has been propelled by the 
supposed `butterfly strategy' by which South Africa has striven to diversify its trade 
relationships and cultivate comprehensive and wide-ranging ties with important new 
markets in Africa, Latin America and Asia. These markets "oller vast export 
opportunities to South Africa because they are growing rapidly and because the 
structure of our trade reflects a higher proportion of value-added exports. """ 
2. South Africa's Strategic Approach to the WTO 
South Africa played an active role in the crafting of the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) and supported the text of the Doha Declaration (DD) which inaugurated the 
DR as a development round - even though it believed that certain elements of the 
declaration, notably the provisions on agriculture and development, could have been 
strengthened further . 
431 The key elements of South Africa's strategic approach to the 
DR were spelled out for the first time in a landmark speech by its Minister of Trade 
430 Ibid., p. 21. 
41' For an analysis of South Africa's role prior to and during the Doha ministerial summit scc 
Fatournata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes (it the WT() The Real World of Trolle 
Negotiations (London: Zed Books, 2003), pp. 50-113. 
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and Industry, Alec Erwin, in Geneva in April 1999.432 In essence, he asserted that the 
key to sustainable global economic growth resided with unleashing the growth and 
developmental potential of developing countries through the exploitation of their 
comparative advantages. Attaining the full potential of these advantages, however, 
would require industrialised nations to eschew their mercantilist and protectionist 
trade practices and undertake far-reaching `structural adjustment' in their domestic 
economies. Among other things, this would necessitate that developed countries 
curtail the protection extended to their inefficient `grandfather' industries and 
undertake a fundamental reform of their agricultural trade regimes. Not only could 
this facilitate a relocation of production and investment to developing countries, it 
could also promote industrialisation and development as well as holster North-South 
and South-South trade. 433 
For South Africa the success of its strategic objectives is contingent upon 
strengthening the rules-based multilateral trade regime. The country is committed, 
therefore, to preserving the credibility of the WTO and preventing its fragmentation. 
And it believes that the WTO system provides enhanced certainty and security For 
market access while reducing the scope for unilateral trade measures. Furthermore, it 
has argued that a rules-based global trade order is crucial to guaranteeing that trade 
dispute resolution is not determined exclusively by economic power machinations. 
For these reasons South Africa believes that if developing countries do not engage in 
multilateral negotiations trade agreements will he concluded plurilaterally (through 
voluntary codes) nevertheless -- as was the case at the Singapore WTO ministerial 
432 Alec Erwin, "The Integration of Developing Countries in the Multilateral Trading System, " speech 
presented by the South African Minister of Trade and Industry at the high Level Symposium on Trade 
and Development, Geneva, April 1999. 
'"; Ibid.; see also Department of Trade and Industry, "The Fourth Ministerial ('onference Analysis 
and Strategy, " Pretoria (November 2001), p. 1. 
ý"'"". . 
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conference in 1996 - thereby jeopardising the tenets of inclusivity and universality 
that are the hallmark of multilateralism. 434 It was against a backdrop of this 
perspective that South Africa advocated a comprehensive round of multilateral trade 
negotiations at Doha. Even though it supported calls by most developing countries 
that the DR ought to prioritise outstanding issues arising from the UR, South Africa 
opposed the exclusion of the `new issues' from the negotiating agenda: it agreed with 
the substance of developing country grievances but not with the strategy proposed to 
deal with them. South Africa views the DR as an opportunity for developing 
countries to provide leadership on issues of multilateral trade and development; it 
believes that developing world ought to strive to lead the multilateral trade process, 
not merely follow it. To this end the country has sought to carve a role for itself as a 
facilitator and broker in multilateral trade negotiations. ` 35 Higgott has argued that if 
the key global actors do not provide leadership smaller states with technical and 
entrepreneurial skills have a responsibility to develop coalitions and direct multilateral 
initiatives. 436 In this respect he points out that: 
A state such as South Africa has a sufficiently well developed 
intellectual-cum-bureaucratic infrastructure and an accepted position as 
a significant international or continental "citizen" to take on such 
entrepreneurial-leadership roles. If it is to over-state the case at this 
point in time, then we can at least assert that South Africa has the 
ability to develop the requisite range of skills - to accompany its own 
national and wider regional interests -- to ensure that it takes on the 
necessary leadership roles commensurate with its size and significance 
in Southern Africa, continental African and indeed international 
contexts. 437 
414 Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach to the W"fO and Key 
Elements of ' 1234a Negotiating Position, " Pretoria (December 2000), pp. 1-2. 
435 Interview with Faizel Ismail, Geneva, 13 March 2003. 
43' Richard Higgott, "Leadership, Niche Diplomacy and International Cooperation Sonic "Theoretical 
Insights for Southern Africa, " in Heribert Dieter (ed. ) The Regionalisation of the World E'cono n and 
Its Consequences for Southern Africa (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 1997), p. 73. 
437 Ibid., p. 78. 
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Yet South Africa is not fatally committed to multilateralism. In effect, as the number 
of FTAs the country has been exploring (for example with India), has been 
negotiating (for example with the US), or has concluded (for example with the EU) 
can attest, it has not refrained from pursuing bilateral or regional FTAs where it has 
felt that these would further its broader economic objectives; although it has been 
conscious of the propensity of regional blocs to perpetuate regional protectionism as 
well as the danger that they pose to economically weaker developing economics. 
South Africa's strategic approach to the WTO is encapsulated in its negotiating 
objectives which are calculated to: contribute to structural shifts in the location of 
global production; establish disciplines that level the playing field, address concerns 
and imbalances in existing multilateral agreements; extend and elaborate more 
effective provisions on special and differential treatment; extend disciplines to new 
forms and dimensions of trade in recognition of the increasingly integrated nature of 
the global economy, and the need to manage the globalising world market; as well as 
ensure Africa's meaningful participation in the negotiations. 4 S In addition, South 
Africa has sought to ground its negotiating strategy on three principles: principles of 
balance, sustainability and consultation. It has also called for a balance of interest 
between development and the unleashing of the global trade system, and has argued 
that strategies ought to be developed to ensure that the majority of developing 
countries participate meaningfully in trade negotiations while not unnecessarily 
hindering negotiating processes. It has also maintained that for the global trade 
system to become sustainable it must be predicated on equity and social justice. 
Lastly, South African policymakers have striven to ensure that the country's 
439 Ibid. 
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participation in WTO negotiations is informed by extensive domestic societal 
input, 
encompassing key state and non-state actors in the trade policy domain. 
431) 
3. The SACU and SADC Projects: The Dynamics of Economic Integration in 
Southern Africa 
3.1. The SACU 
Southern Africa constitutes the highest priority in South Africa's post-apartheid 
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foreign economic policy. Yet the erstwhile experience of SACU shows that the 
region has not always been treated with respect by South Africa. Originally set up 
in 1910, SACU is made up of South Africa and the BLNS states (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland). It is the oldest customs union in the world and the most far- 
reaching form of integration in Africa. The SACU Agreement of 1910 facilitated the 
governance of the BLNS territories as sub-regions of the South African economy. It 
established a common market that was underpinned by a common external tariff 
determined by South Africa, a common pool of currencies linked to the South African 
rand, intimate administrative structures as well as an integrated infrastructure. 
Provision was made for the unhindered exchange and flow of manufactured goods 
and for the distribution of customs union revenue through a formula that stipulated a 
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fixed share for each of the countries. 
439 Department of Trade and Industry, "Report on the Proceedings of a Consultative Conference in 
Preparation for the WTO Seattle Ministerial and the Upcoming Round of Multilateral Negotiations, " 
24-25 August 1999, p. 2. 
440 See Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy, " Foreign AJfrirs, vol. 72, no. 5,1993, 
p. 90. 
441 Colin McCarthy, "South African Trade and Industrial Policy in a Regional Context Economic 
Challenges and Policies for the Future, " in Lennart Petersson (ed. ), Post-Apartheid Southern A%ricu -- 
Economnic Challenges and Policies for the Future (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 75. 
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During the apartheid period, South Africa implemented policies that undermined the 
economic development of the BLNS nations. The adoption by South Africa in 1925 
of an import substitution strategy, based on high protective tariff barriers, to foster 
industrial growth had harmful effects on the BLNS economies. Not only did this 
policy induce trade diversion in the region as the BLNS states were forced to buy 
high-cost South African goods, it also resulted in a decline in the overall level of 
customs revenue as a portion of GDP. Furthermore, industrial development behind 
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high tariff walls led to polarised industrial growth centred in South Africa. 
In an attempt to accommodate the concerns of the BLNS states and redress the 
imbalances of the regional arrangements, the South African government renegotiated 
the SACU agreement in 1969 with a view to infusing it with a development 
dimension. In this regard, the structure of the agreement was modi lied: the neutral 
revenue distribution method was abandoned in favour of a development-oriented 
mechanism that accommodated differences in trade flows and provided for the effects 
of South Africa's protectionism and the impact this had on the common external 
tariff. SACU's smaller member states received compensation for trade diversion and 
higher prices in their markets by including South African imports in the revenue- 
sharing formula of the customs union. In addition, the revenue-sharing formula 
compensated the BLS states through fiscal transfers for polarised development, trade 
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diversion and surrender of fiscal autonomy. 
Even so, the customs union remained plagued by problems. Although the 1969 
agreement provided for the economic development and diversification of the least 
442 Richard Gibb, "Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: The Case of' Renegotiating 
the Southern African Customs Union, " Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 23, no. 1 (March 
1997), p. 75. 
443 McCarthy, op. cit., p. 75. 
224 
developed SACU countries - through, for example, the preservation of infant 
industries and the establishment of new ones - there were misgivings on the part of 
444 
the BLNS countries about South Africa's commitment to achieving these goals. 
Their governments were also concerned that "South Africa continued to unilaterally 
make all policy decisions and control every aspect of economic policy from 
445 
determining revenue allocation to its distribution. " They protested that they were 
not being sufficiently compensated for the disadvantages stemming from their SACU 
membership. Moreover, there were unhappy about the two-year lag in revenue 
distribution, which gave South Africa a two-year interest free loan from its SACU 
partners. And while the BLS states did gain some significant benefits from SACU -- 
including the yearly government income they received from the common revenue 
pool, the fact that they did not have to run their own customs service, and the "free 
access to supplies from South Africa and access to foreign exchange and a senmi- 
convertible currency... along with the prospects of accumulation, enrichment and 
speculation offered by the relatively sophisticated South African Financial 
446 
infrastructure, which in turn is plugged into global circuits" 
The arrival of democracy in South Africa in 1994 laid the basis not only for the 
revision of the SACU agreement but also for deeper engagement between South 
Africa and its SACU counterparts, which was absent during the apartheid era. It is 
important to recognise that the impetus for transforming the SACU arrangement did 
not emanate exclusively from the BLNS states. South Africa was also keen to 
introduce changes to the existing agreement: the incoming ANC government was 
determined to underline its credentials in the region by supporting SACU's 
... Margaret C. Lee, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa (Cape "Town: UC'I' 
Press, 2003), p. 75- 
445 Ibid., p. 76. 
446 Ibid., p. 77. 
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democratisation and dispensing with the `colonial' image associated with erstwhile 
SACU agreements. It could be argued that the ANC's view of SACU had been 
shaped by the dependency school, which had characterised the SACU arrangement as 
a product of colonialism and a tool that had been used by the apartheid state to 
maintain its political and economic dominance in Southern Africa; this, however, was 
also informed by individual experiences while in exile of post-colonial decline in 
447 
many African states. Indeed, responding to concerns raised by the Botswana 
Confederation of Commerce that the SACU agreement favoured South Africa over 
the smaller economies of the BLNS states, Nelson Mandela acknowledged that the 
agreement was "a reflection of the colonial oppressors' mentality" and denounced the 
previous apartheid regime for having used its "economic muscle to bully and 
448 
intimidate small neighbours. " This explains why the ANC identified the 
renegotiation of the SACU arrangement as one of its foremost priorities on the post- 
449 
1994 regional trade agenda. 
Following a protracted negotiation process, the five SACU member states signed in 
October 2003 a comprehensive, revised SACU Agreement. The new agreement has 
introduced unparalleled changes. It provides for the harmonisation of policies on 
competition, industrial development, agriculture, and unfair trade practices within the 
wider common SACU economy. It also establishes new democratic institutional 
structures for SACU. All the SACU institutions will be serviced by a SACU 
Secretariat that will perform an administrative role. Key amongst these institutions is 
the SACU Tariff Board, the body that will be responsible for making decisions 
concerning tariffs. The board will operate completely independently even though it 
447 See for example Rob Davies, "Post-Apartheid Scenarios for the Southern African Region, " 
Transformation, 11 (1990), pp. 12-39. 
448 See Hansard, Debates of the National Assemnbly, 4 June 1996, cols 1751-1783. 
449 Mandela, op. cit., pp. 92-93. 
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will be based within the SACU Secretariat. The highest decision-making authority 
will reside with the Council of Ministers, which will provide the general mandate for 
the SACU Tariff Board and ratify decisions on tariffs made by the latter. Each SACU 
member state will set up its own investigative institution to carry out tariff and trade 
remedy investigations - in turn, these institutions will make recommendations to the 
SACU Tariff Board for decision. Additionally, the agreement provides for the 
establishment of an independent tribunal to arbitrate disputes that cannot be resolved 
at the highest level. It also exhorts the member countries to conduct future trade 
relations and negotiations with third parties as a single entity. Significantly, it 
considerably revises the revenue-sharing formula. The new revenue-sharing fornmula 
will consist of a customs component, an excise component, and a development 
450 
component. 
This is in recognition of the fact that trade relations between South Africa and its 
SACU counterparts have continued to be skewed in favour of the former (sec Graph 
4). For example, in 1998/1999 the total trade surplus between South Africa and the 
BLNS states exceeded R20 billion . 
451 During 1999/2000 South Africa cxportcd 
goods and services valued at more than R34 billion to the BLNS states. In contrast, 
the imports of the BLNS states from South Africa accounted for 75-90 per cent of 
their overall import needs. The revenue obtained from SACU's common external 
tariff plays a crucial role in advancing economic development and preserving political 
stability in the region: it makes up approximately 50 per cent of Swaziland's and 
450 Sifiso Ngwenya, "Fair Deal: The New SACU (Southern African Customs Union) Draft 
Agreement, " Sisebenza Sonke issue 4 (March 2002), pp. 24-32. 
451 Ibid., p. 28. 
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Lesotho's budget revenues, while it accounts respectively for 30 per cent and 17 per 
cent of the budget revenues of Namibia and Botswana. 
452 
In terms of the new agreement customs revenues will be distributed according to 
intra-SACU imports, which implies that South Africa will provide considerable 
compensation to the BLNS states for the trade benefits - the so-called `polarisation' 
effects - that flow to South Africa as a consequence of the customs union. The excise 
component of the revenue-sharing formula will be determined according to the size of 
each of the SACU member states. In this respect South Africa, the biggest SACU 
economy, will keep about 80 per cent of the total excise revenue collected - 15 per 
cent of which will go towards the regional development/stabilisation fund. In 
response to concerns broached by Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland about the 
decrease in real terms of the customs pool as a consequence of the Trade and 
Development Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) entered into by South Africa and the 
European Union (EU), the growing use of duty rebates by South Africa, and 
additional rounds of multilateral trade liberalisation, the SACU member states agreed 
to include in the revised revenue-sharing formula a development component from 
which the smaller and fragile SACU economies would benefit . 
451 
452 Ibid., p. 26. 
453 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
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Graph 4- Trade Between South Africa and the BLNS States 
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3.2 The SADC 
From its inception, the SADC was essentially political in character. Its predecessor, 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), was 
established in 1980 with the primary objective of reducing the economic dependence 
of the region, primarily on South Africa. 
454 It represented a collective response on 
the part of the Frontline States to the ravages wrought by South Africa's historical 
domination and destabilisation of the region. The demise of apartheid in South 
Africa created conditions conducive to regional political and economic co-operation. 
This culminated in the transformation of the SADCC to SADC in 1992, and 
subsequently in South Africa's accession to the latter in 1994. The SADC was 
'5' The SADC is made up of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Seychelles, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
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established in terms of the SADC Treaty and the Windhoek Declaration of 1992, 
which affirmed the organisation's intention to establish a framework for co-operation: 
... which provides 
for... deeper economic co-operation and integration, 
on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross- 
border investment and trade, and freer movement of factors of 
production, goods and services across national borders. 
455 
The SADC integration process has evolved against a backdrop of gross economic 
inequalities and imbalances among member states. Essentially, the region's economy 
is located within South Africa. South Africa's political and economic predominance 
is underscored by the fact that it produces approximately 80 percent of Southern 
Africa's GNP, occupies 18 percent of the region's land area, and makes up 32 percent 
of its population. Enormously lopsided trade relationships pertain, with South Africa 
maintaining a massive trade surplus. This disparity in economic power is reflected in 
the region's trading patterns. South Africa's overall economic output (estimated at 
around US$121.9 billion) far exceeds that of its neighbours: the other thirteen SADC 
member states jointly produce only about US$33 billion. In 1997 the GDP of the 
second largest economy, Zimbabwe, accounted for only 4.5 percent of the South 
African total figure. The sum of exports of all the other SADC countries in the same 
year amounted to only 48.6 percent of South African exports. 450 
South Africa is the largest foreign investor in Southern Africa. South African direct 
investment in the thirteen SADC countries exceeded US$5.4 billion by 2000, 
surpassing the investment shares of the US and the United Kingdom (UK), the next 
ass Cited in Peter Meyns, "From Co-ordination to Integration: Institutional Aspects of the Development 
of the SADC, " in Heribert Dieter (ed. ) The Regionalisation of'thc World Economy and Consequences 
for Southern Africa (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 1997), p. 167. 
456 Department of Trade and Industry, Trade Statistics (Pretoria: DTI, 1997). 
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huge investors. 47 In 2001, South African investment in the region amounted to 
R14.8 billion, followed by that of the UK at R3.98 billion. 458 Significant South 
African investment deals in the region in 2001 and 2002 included: US$20 million by 
South African Airways for its stake in Air Tanzania; US$6 billion by Eskom 
Enterprises in the Inga project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); US$56 
million by Sun International in its hotel in Zambia; US$142 million investment by 
Vodacom in Tanzania and an additional US$139 million investment in the DRC; 
US$53 million by Pretoria Portland Zimbabwe in merger activity in Zimbabwe; a 
US$860 million investment by BHP Billiton, the IDC and Mitsubishi in the 
development of the Mozal aluminium smelter in Mozambique; a further investment of 
US$1.1 billion by Sasol in the Pande and Temane gas fields in Mozambique. 45 
Critics have expressed concerns about the skewed and lopsided nature of regional 
integration in the SADC region. 400 Considering the disproportionately superior 
political and economic status of South Africa in the region, the model of unfettered 
market integration was considered to be not ideal for the SADC as it would polarise 
the region further while perpetuating unequal and unsustainable development. As the 
SADC founding documents testify, a strategic developmental regionalism based on 
economic co-operation and integration for the mutual benefit of member countries 
was deemed to be the most appropriate policy option, 401 The implicit understanding 
was that such an integration approach would demand high degrees of reciprocity from 
457 'Investment: SA tops Africa's investors' list, ' Financial Mail 7"' February 2003. 
q5s Diana Games, "The Experience of SA Firms Doing Business in Africa -A Preliminary Survey and 
Analysis, " Business in Africa Research Project, Report No. 1, South African Institute of International 
Affairs, September 2003, p. 12. 
459 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
460 See for example Fredrick Söderbaum and Ian Taylor (eds. ), Regionalism and Uneven ! )evclopnient 
in Southern Africa - The Case of the Maputo Development Corridor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 
4 See for example SADC, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Builclini' the Community 
(Gaborone: SADC, 1993). 
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South Africa: it would allow other countries to enjoy greater access to the South 
African market and create conditions for investment decisions to be guided by the 
need of other countries "to promote growth and diversify their productive bases and 
not strictly by short-term profitability. "462 Furthermore, it would necessitate the 
fashioning of regional solutions to the wide array of political, security and economic 
problems confronting regional partners, including illegal migration and intra-regional 
conflicts. 
To a limited degree, South Africa has fulfilled the expectations of its regional partners 
in this regard. At a political level, South Africa has been a keen participant in the 
now downgraded Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, a SADC sub-structure that 
undertakes initiatives designed to foster political and security reforms in the region. 
At an economic level, South Africa has played a pivotal role in cultivating 
sectoral/functional cooperation in areas such as telecommunications, transport 
(Maputo Corridor and Beira Port) and power supply (Cahorra Bassa and Lesotho 
Highlands Water Projects). It ardently sponsored the SADC Trade Protocol (STP) 
of 1996, an FTA agreement designed to advance regional economic integration and 
development. In force since 2000, the STP calls for the establishment of a regional 
free trade area by 2005. It provides for an asymmetrical reduction of industrial 
tariffs, with South Africa making the speediest and deepest cuts to offset regional 
trade imbalances. 463 Some allowances will be made for infant industries, thereby 
granting some SADC countries a leeway to apply for "extended grace periods" during 
which tariff and subsidy reductions could be limited (within WTO provisions). 
462 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 136. 
463 All the SADC member states are signatories to the STP except Angola, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and the Seychelles which are not yet part of the FTA. 
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South Africa has undertaken to speed up the process of phasing down tariffs for 
clothing and textiles that fulfill the two-stage transformation rule. This is calculated 
to spur a faster liberalisation of South Africa's clothing and textiles market than those 
of the other SADC nations. Given the strategic importance of the clothing and 
textiles industry in many SADC countries, the treaty enforces a one-stage 
transformation rule that permits a derogation from its liberalisation provisions by the 
least developed SADC countries on a gamut of issues, including the rules of origin, 
the improvement of tariff offers to expand the trade coverage of the treaty, and the 
development of a work programme in respect of technical barriers to trade, and 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 464 
It could be argued that the SADC represents the most important initiative undertaken 
by the SADC in pursuit of regional economic integration. Concerns, however, have 
been raised about whether it can be enforced effectively given the lack of a clear 
policy on the SADC institutional framework for its implementation. This is largely 
due to the fact that from its inception the SADC has operated according to 
decentralised institutional structures. Even though it has a permanent secretariat, the 
organisation has been careful not to nurture a centralised bureaucratic apparatus 
similar to that of, for example, the EU. Individual member countries have been 
assigned responsibility for a sectoral portfolio -- that is, transport, communications, 
food security, energy and so forth. While this loose form of co-operation has fulfilled 
the desire of member countries to safeguard national sovereignty, it has hampered 
464 See SADC, Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Devc'lopnic! nt Comnnrnity (Gaborone: SADC, 
2000). 
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decision-making at regional level, with decisions taken at regional level often not 
being implemented . 
465 
Notwithstanding its relative progress, the SADC regional integration process endured 
some testing difficulties. These can be attributed to a number of factors. First, 
SADC has continued to be weakened by its not insignificant institutional problems, 
particularly the lack of managerial expertise to tackle the multitudinous facets of 
regional integration. 466 Second, SADC's principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of member states has also been blamed for the organisation's paralysis: the 
integration project has been undermined by the absence of democracy and poor 
governance in some SADC countries (for example Zimbabwe and Angola). Third, 
there has been a perception among some SADC nations that SACU has been a 
hindrance to faster and deeper regional integration. As Marais explained: 
SACU members are keen to expand their power and leverage within 
the customs union rather than stake all on the possible advantages of a 
SADC-wide integration project. Non-SACU members of SADC have 
reacted petulantly to that stance, withholding major concessions in 
SADC negotiations with the argument that the restructuring of SACU 
might well upend their bargaining positions. The upshot has been a 
further factor contributing to the delays in regional integration 467 
Fourth, economic integration in the SADC region faces the danger of becoming 
weakened by the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) negotiations 
between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The 
negotiations began in September 2002 under the Cotonou agreement that seeks to 
replace the Lome Convention, which since 1975 has provided the structure for trade 
465 Meyns, "From Co-ordination to Integration, " pp. 165-166. 
466 Hein Marais, "Reinforcing the Mould: The Character of Regional Integration in Southern Africa, " 
Regionalisation Study for the Third World Forum and the Foundation for Global Dialogue (February- 
May 1998), p. 119. 
467 Ibid. 
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and cooperation between the EU and ACP countries. The Cotonou agreement 
provides for the termination in 2007 of the EU non-reciprocal concessions to exports 
from ACP countries in keeping with the undertakings made by the EU and ACP 
countries to enter into trade arrangements that are consistent with the disciplines of 
the WTO from 1 January 2008. In this respect, the ACP countries are required to 
negotiate reciprocal EPAs with the EU, either bilaterally or regionally. 
468 Some 
scholars have expressed a concern that the introduction of reciprocity in trade between 
unequal economic partners such as the EU and developing countries, as well the 
regional differentiation envisaged in the EU's post- Lome strategy, have the potential 
to undermine the cause of regional solidarity among developing nations and undercut 
their bargaining power in the WTO 469 This bears particular relevance to Southern 
Africa where multiple, and in some cases conflicting, memberships of countries in the 
SADC and other FTAs - such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) - are likely to complicate the EPA negotiation processes and 
encourage disintegrative regional tendencies. 
Fifth, whilst South Africa's internal political transformation is fully consolidated, the 
country is still saddled with massive social and economic concerns. Unemployment 
is very high (estimated at 40 percent) and the social and economic expectations of the 
previously disadvantaged sections of the population have not been fully met. The 
problem has been aggravated by the negative effects, such as huge job losses, that 
economic liberalisation policies have wrought in sensitive economic sectors such as 
468 European Union, Economic Partnership Agreements -A New Approach in the Relations Between 
the European Union and the ACP Countries (Brussels: European Union, 2002). 
469 See for example Richard Gibb, "Post-Lome: the European Union and the South, " Third World 
Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3,2000, pp. 457-481. 
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textile and clothing industries. 70 This has prompted COSATU to challenge the 
government's policies and, in an attempt to placate the trade unions, the South 
African government has occasionally resorted to "a mercantilist policy vis-a-vis the 
other countries in the region. 9471 
And nowhere have these protectionist tendencies been more starkly illustrated than in 
the country's explosive trade relations with Zimbabwe, South Africa's biggest 
African trading partner until 2002.72 Historically, Zimbabwe's clothing and textile 
industries have benefited from preferential treatment on the South African market. 
However when the preferential bilateral pact (which dates back to 1964) between the 
two countries expired in 1992, South Africa imposed high tariffs - rising as high as 90 
percent - on competitive Zimbabwean textile imports. 
73 What exacerbated the plight 
of the Zimbabwean clothing and textile industries was the import duties imposed by 
South Africa against cheap imports from East Asia, with adverse consequences on 
employment. Related to this has been a demand by COSATU that the South African 
government insist on the inclusion of a social clause in all bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements. In particular, it has demanded that South Africa's trade partners 
observe and fully implement the four core sets of internationally agreed labour rights: 
freedom of association and collective bargaining; freedom from discrimination; 
prohibition of child labour; and prohibition of forced labour. On the other hand, 
since South Africa signed on to the Marrakesh Agreement of the GATT in April 1994 
there has been a concern within sections of the domestic labour movement that a 
deeper integration with other southern African countries - whose labour laws are 
470 'Textiles in need of unravelling, ' Mail and Guardian 15°' July 1994; `Tough time ahead for the 
textile industry, ' Mail and Guardian 24th March 1994. 
471 Dieter, "Regionalisation in the Age of Globalisation, " p. 221. 
472 In 2002 Mozambique replaced Zimbabwe as South Africa's biggest African trading partner. 473 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 136. 
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relatively slack when compared with those of South Africa - will result in South 
African factories relocating to other regional destinations in search of cheaper labour. 
These problems are reflective of the wider anxieties that have been voiced by the 
SADC member states about the regional integration process. Second, in the early 
1990s some SADC countries accused South Africa of not consulting with them 
adequately about the implications for the regional economies of an FTA it was 
planning conclude with the EU. 74 Fears had been expressed about the potential 
harmful effects of the envisaged South Africa-EU FTA (which is discussed later in 
this chapter) on the neighbouring economies. Third, concerns had been raised by 
opponents of economic liberalisation about the commercial activities of South African 
business corporations in the region, which had been blamed for undermining the 
developmental basis of the economic integration process. 75 This is partly due to the 
fact that some of the major companies have successfully lobbied the South African 
government to insist on deregulation as a precondition to "open up the region to South 
African exports and capital investment, from which benefits would allegedly trickle 
down into the targeted countries, " and in the process "enable greater penetration of 
the region by South African capital, and reinforce South Africa's image as the `natural 
gateway' and partner for foreign investors in southern Africas476 It is for these 
reasons that South Africa's regional partners have previously called into question 
South Africa's commitment to the central tenets of developmental regionalism to 
which the genesis of the regional project can be traced. 
41 'Considering the neighbours, ' Financial Mail 24th January 1997. 
475 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 137. 
476 Ibid. 
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3.2. Regionalism in Southern Africa: Economic Globalisation or Political 
Regionalisation? 
The integration pattern in Southern Africa has highlighted the difficulties associated 
with integration schemes involving countries at 
different levels of economic 
development. According to Jakobeit, integration projects of this nature are 
epitomised by concerns about the distribution of costs and 
benefits from integration: 
differences in geographical position, size, resources, and industrial capacity lead to an 
uneven distribution of costs and benefits from trade liberalisation. 
77 The 
economically stronger countries tend to derive greater benefits from integration than 
weaker countries, whilst the integration process tends to increase disparities 
in an 
integration area. In Southern Africa, the two processes of economic globalisation 
and political regionalisation have proceeded simultaneously. The SADC integration 
project has evolved along two parallel tracks: trade integration track (a strictly 
market-driven economic project that emphasises trade and investment) and 
development integration track (a politically driven process that stresses political, 
security, environmental and cultural issues). 
78 
The proponents of trade integration - including large international and South African 
firms, private sector interests in the other SADC countries, donor agencies and 
mainstream economists - have pushed strongly for open regionalism and unrestricted 
movements of trade, investment and capital flows. Their influence has been evidenced 
by the significant market reforms that have been undertaken by governments in the 
region and the significant rise in regional trade flows. Extensive liberalisation of 
477 Jakobeit, "The Theoretical Dimensions, " p. 26. 
478 Bertil Oden, "New Regionalism in Southern Africa: Part of or Alternative to the Globalisation of the 
World Economy? " in Bjorn Hettne et. al (eds. ), Globalism and the New Regionalism (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 170. 
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trade and investment policies in the 1990s - most of which took place outside the 
formal trade integration scheme - saw private investment jump tenfold, from less than 
US$1 billion a year in the early 1990s to almost US$12 billion in 1996. Further, the 
region's fledgling stock markets have become increasingly enmeshed in the global 
financial markets: rates of return in Africa averaged 24 percent between 1990 and 
1994 compared with 18 percent for all emerging markets. 79 This deep transformation 
in Southern Africa's macroeconomics has demonstrated a growing, albeit still limited, 
incorporation of the region's economies into the global economic system. 
The development integration track, on the other hand, has focused more on regionally 
based activities in areas such as regional politics, security, environment and culture. 
The main social forces supporting developmental integration in the SADC region 
have been labour unions, NGOs and sensitive industries such as textiles and clothing. 
A large part of the work of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security has 
fallen within this purview. Based on the original SADC documents, the notion of 
development integration is primarily concerned with developing territorial identity 
and regional coherence. Development integration includes trade integration, but 
advocates less openness than what open regionalism demands. Instead, it calls for 
market integration which is based on the principles of "flexibility of multi-speed" and 
"variable geometry. , 480 This means that integration is viewed as providing a crucial 
framework within which to undo gross social and economic inequities generated not 
only within the region but also between the countries of the region; specifically, 
between South Africa and the neighbouring countries. Furthermore, regional 
419 Timothy Shaw and Julius E. Nyang'oro, "African Renaissance in the New Millennium: From 
Anarchy to Emerging Markets? in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds. ), Political 
Economy and the Changing Global Order (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 276-277. 480 Oden, "New Regionalism, " p. 170. 
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integration is seen as giving the SADC countries a temporary economic `breathing 
space' not only to manage the process of economic globalisation but also to develop 
and diversify their economies with a view to improving their export capacities. 
However, the strategy of developmental integration has not yielded significant results 
in the SADC context: although there has been greater regional integration and co- 
operation, this has proceeded without reference to the principles of balance, equity 
and mutual benefit that the SADC members had initially proclaimed. 
Although the SADC founding treaty and other policy documents embrace the 
integration approach of developmental regionalism, this position has gradually 
changed over the past few years. Partly, this change can be ascribed to the fact that 
the SADC member states have stepped up the liberalisation of their economies in 
accordance with the strictures of economic globalisation. Yet the change also reflects 
concessions made by the countries to accommodate the demands of private sector 
interests, which have vigorously lobbied for a more open and liberal regime for the 
trade of goods, investments and capital flows. This is confirmed by subsequent 
SADC documents, which put a greater emphasis on the importance of open 
regionalism and the central role of the private sector in creating growth and 
development. 
To unleash the private creativity and entrepreneurship, investment 
incentives such as guarantee against nationalisation of private 
enterprise, the right to repatriate capital, profits and dividend, lower 
corporate tax rates, including tax exemptions, have been employed to 
local and foreign investment. The direct role of governments have 
been minimised whilst their management capacity, as well as that of 
providing infrastructural support have been enhanced 481 
481 Ibid. 
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The growing support for the classical model of economic integration in the SADC 
rhetoric in recent years points to the increasing dominance of private sector interests 
in the regionalisation discourse. This shift in the integration approach raises questions 
about how the SADC intends to reconcile its support for open regionalism with the 
positions enunciated in previous SADC documents, which endorse development 
integration and state intervention as a means of redressing regional imbalances. How 
will the SADC deal with the social contradictions thrown up by the parallel processes 
of economic globalisation and political regionalisation? Given the deep regional 
imbalances, how will the SADC ensure that the push by economic actors for classical 
market integration does not aggravate the marginalisation of the weaker countries? 
These contradictions ought to be addressed if the SADC is to reverse the polarisation 
of the regional landscape, and to realise its original ideal of balanced, equitable and 
mutually beneficial regional co-operation and integration. 
3.3. What Role for South Africa? 
South Africa's political and economic fortunes are integrally linked to those of its 
neighbours in the SADC region. As the dominant regional economic player, South 
Africa's status and role will continue to have a crucial impact on the cohesion and 
economic development not only of the SADC but also of Africa as a whole. The 
marginalisation of the African continent is underlined by the fact that the region 
accounts for less than 1 percent of global GDP, and for about 3 percent of world 
investment flows, the majority of which are concentrated in the extractive industries, 
predominantly oil, in a handful of countries. 82 This marginalisation has been 
particularly evident in the complex and protracted UR negotiations over the WTO as 
482 World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), pp. 64-66. 
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well as in regular talks about the series of Lome Conventions with the EU. For the 
LDCs, the majority of whom are African, trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
and trade-related investment issues have been disadvantageous. These countries have 
also demanded the reduction of the abuse of trade measures in areas like anti- 
dumping, and sanitary and environmental standards. 
As the biggest and most developed regional economy, South Africa's status and role 
will continue to have a crucial impact on the cohesion as well as the economic 
development of the SADC. It is, therefore, in the interest of the country to safeguard 
the political, economic and institutional coherence of the SADC integration process. 
The success of the SADC project is contingent upon South Africa assuming 
leadership of the region and discharging its responsibilities in accordance with its 
hegemonic designs. For this to happen South Africa must have "the capacity and the 
will to create and maintain a mutually beneficial hegemonic regime. " 
483 This means 
that South Africa must eschew its protectionist trade policies, a source of tension 
between itself and some SADC countries such as Zimbabwe. It also means that 
South Africa must be prepared to overwrite the bulk of the costs of the integration 
process - for example, allow a rapid increase in imports from the other SADC 
countries in order to reduce their economic burdens. In return, the other countries in 
the region must be willing to accept South Africa' leadership. 
The extent to which South Africa's hegemonic position can effectively be translated 
into a leadership role in Southern Africa depends on two considerations. First, South 
Africa's internal political situation. South Africa is still grappling with the challenges 
483 Oden, "New Regionalism, " p. 167. 
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of consolidating internal democratic transformation. The new political order still 
bears the deep scars of the apartheid legacy: vast social and economic problems. As 
such, there is still a great reluctance on the part of politicians and policymakers to 
pursue policies that are likely to undermine the material interests of key domestic 
constituencies. Second, the historical regional legacy and, more significant, the 
continuing regional tensions within the SADC around issues of security, 
leadership 
and democracy. Given its historical role in the political and economic destabilisation 
of the region, South Africa has been anxious to prove that it is a good regional citizen: 
South Africa has striven to ensure that it acts in a manner that does not undermine the 
cohesion of the SADC. Over the past few years, South African regional diplomacy 
has focused on building regional unity and consensus-building, tackling the SADC's 
institutional problems, and pursuing multilateral solutions to regional conflicts. Even 
so, South Africa's leadership role in Southern Africa, especially in conflict resolution, 
has not produced unqualified success thanks to stiff resistance to South Africa's 
efforts by some SADC countries. As Alden and le Pere pointed out: 
The determination of the leadership in Angola, and (until Kabila's 
death) the Congo to resist any outside interference, especially by South 
Africa, shut Pretoria out of an area where it had hoped to play a 
constructive role. Even in those crises - Zimbabwe in particular - 
where South African interests were most directly affected and leverage 
was assumed to be considerable, the range of actions available that 
would not exact costs in terms of SADC unity, domestic politics and 
relations with G8 countries, turned out to be far smaller than 
policymakers in Pretoria had anticipated 494 
Not only has South Africa's `quiet diplomacy' in Zimbabwe made a mockery of its 
leadership credentials in the SADC region, it has highlighted sharply the constraints 
that can be imposed on even a regional powerhouse by its smaller neighbours. 
494 Alden and le Pere, South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy, p. 54. 
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Nonetheless, it is in South Africa's political and economic interests to maintain 
sustained engagement with the region. A peaceful and stable region could contribute 
not only towards regional economic stability but could also provide a conducive 
environment for the fashioning of regional solutions to political and security problems 
including illegal immigration, arms trafficking and cross-border crime, concerns that 
have gained prominence in the SADC region in recent years. For this to happen, 
South Africa must spell out its regional policy more assertively and clearly in ways 
that will not invoke the insecurities of its weaker partners. This means that South 
Africa has to cultivate trust between itself and its neighbours and convince them of 
the sincerity of its intentions. 
4. Intra-Regional Integration 
South Africa has identified intra-regional economic integration as a vital imperative 
for African development. The regionalisation of the world economy has heightened 
the susceptibility of Africa in the international political economy and underlined the 
importance of intra-regional integration to the continent's development. Globalisation 
pressures, combined with Africa's economic reversals of the past two decades, have 
undermined the logic of pursuing nationalistic development and highlighted the 
urgency of developing a collective agenda for African economic resurgence 485 As 
such, regional and sub-regional integration among African states is necessary if they 
are to undo their precarious position in world trade and ease their integration into the 
global political economy. 
485 Onimode, Africa in the World of the 21" Century, p. 265 
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Africa's low levels of intra-regional trade attest to the general failure of regional 
economic integration across the continent. In 2000,. merely 2 percent of African 
cross-border trade occurred among African states; the overwhelming majority of 
Africa's trade takes place-with the US and the EU. But this very limited intra- 
regional trade has disguised a deepening of bilateral trade and investments between 
certain countries, largely a consequence of the normalisation of economic relations 
between South Africa and the broader African region since the early 1990s. South 
Africa's export-led growth strategy has resulted in a phenomenal growth of South 
African exports to African markets (see Graph 5). There remains, however, a vast 
trade discrepancy between South Africa, which accounts for 40 percent of Sub- 
Saharan Africa's total GDP, and its continental trade partners. This disparity must be 
reversed if South Africa is to dispel accusations that it is a new colonial power in 
Africa 486 Furthermore, if the goal enhanced intra-regional integration is to be 
realised, Africa has to tackle effectively a panoply of structural problems including 
the lack of adequate transport and communications infrastructure, the poor 
implementation of regional trade agreements, the absence of complementarity in 
production, as well as weak financial sectors. 
0 
486 See `Awe and unease as South Africa stretches out,, New York Times 17th February 2002. 
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Graph 5- South Africa's Exports to Africa, 1991-2001 (Rbn) 
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5. US Trade Strategy and South Africa 
5.1. Contemporary US Trade Policy 
Contemporary American trade policy is predicated on two pillars. The first is a 
distrust of economic multilateralism. The second pillar is a resurgence of the 
aggressive unilateralism that epitomised US trade policy in the 1970s and 1980s. 487 
The early 1970s saw the US relinquish its leadership of the open multilateral trading 
system. This was triggered principally by the declining relative position of the US in 
the global economy. The weakening of US hegemony stemmed from the enormous 
structural changes that the global economy underwent in the 1970s, characterised 
4&7 Higgott, "The Limits to Multilateral Economic Governance" p. 18. 
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mainly by the internationalisation of production processes and the realignment in the 
industrial hierarchies of the world. These changes coincided with the resurgence of 
Europe, the emergence of Japan as a great economic power, and the ascendancy of the 
`tiger economies' of East Asia. Moreover, the decline of American leadership was 
accompanied by the erosion of support on the part of the US for the ideal of free trade, 
especially the principles and norms - enshrined in GATT - that had guided the 
international trading regime since 1945.88 It is worth emphasising, nonetheless, that 
the decline in American support for the global trade system did not imply a complete 
abdication of its multilateral obligations. To be sure, the US played a key role in 
initiating the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of trade negotiations 489 (And in recent 
years the US also played a leading part in the creation of the WTO and the launch of 
the Doha Round). Yet these actions took place in a context where the US was no 
longer willing to use its power and resources unconditionally, in a spirit of 
enlightened self-interest, to maintain collective goods for the international community 
and underwrite the costs of the liberal international economic order. 490 
In the 1980s, US trade policy assumed a double-pronged character. On the one hand, 
it moved away from its unqualified support for liberal international economic order 
and embraced an ambiguous commitment to multilateralism. On the other hand, it 
reflected a growing penchant for `aggressive unilateralism' on the part of the US. 
This entailed the use by the US of retaliatory measures against countries deemed to be 
engaging in `unfair' and `unreasonable' trade practices. These actions are authorised 
in terms of the Super 301 and Special 301 provisions of Section 301 of the Trade and 
488 Reich, "Beyond Free Trade, " pp. 780-781. 
489 See Spero and Hart, The Politics of International, pp. 49-95. 
490 See John G. Ikenberry, "State Power and the Institutional Bargain: America's Ambivalent 
Economic and Security Multilateralism, " in Rosemary Foot, Neil MacFarlane, and Michael 
Mastanduno (eds. ), US Hegemony and International Organisations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), pp. 289-321. 
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Tariff Act. Super 301 requires the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to 
compile a list of external trade barriers, identify a priority list of countries and their 
unfair trading practices, and set a deadline for progress in rectifying these practices. 
If the designated countries fail to comply, the US institutes retaliatory actions against 
them. Special 301 operates in a more or less similar manner to Super 301, except 
that it is specifically targeted at infringements of intellectually property rights. 
Although these provisions were originally directed at Japan, they have been used 
widely in recent years. 91 
Under the current Bush administration the unilateralist streak has without doubt 
predominated. The past few years have witnessed a significant increase in US 
interest in bilateral and regional trading arrangements. These form an integral part of 
a broader strategy of "competitive liberalisation" deployed by the US to open key 
foreign markets through bilateral and regional free trade accords. And they extend 
beyond the traditional trade negotiating agenda - market access for industrial and 
agricultural goods - to cover the so-called `new generation' trade policy issues such 
as trade in services, investment, competition policy, intellectual property rights as 
well as labour and environmental standards. Already the US has either concluded or 
is in a process of initiating bilateral FTA negotiations with an array of countries, 
including Singapore, Chile, Australia, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Jordan, Morocco, 
Thailand and Bahrain. These have been complemented by an expanding number of 
regional FTA arrangements, including the recently concluded pact between the US 
and the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The US has not been 
alone in its drive to push for comprehensive trade liberalisation. 
491 For a detailed discussion of the policy of `aggressive unilateralism' see Bhagwati J and Hugh PT, Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1990, pp. 1-48. 
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Although in its rhetoric the EU extols the virtues of multilateral trade, it is equally 
determined to use bilateral deals in order to attain its goal of opening up the markets 
of developing countries. Japan followed suit recently by concluding a free trade deal 
with Singapore. Although bilateral and regional FTAs are permitted under Article 
24 of the GATT, such trade arrangements have been criticised for undermining 
multilateral trade and distorting the global trade system. In particular, they have been 
condemned for weakening the bargaining strength of poor countries in the WTO 
system and for preventing the emergence of developing country coalitions as they 
ditch principle in favour of wringing small concessions from the powerful negotiating 
partner. 492 
There has been a concern that the failure of the Cancun ministerial summit may 
strengthen the unilateralist impulse in US trade policy. In the aftermath of Cancun 
the US made it clear that a failure to achieve progress in the DR could result in it 
pursuing the unilateral route: namely, it would accelerate its efforts to conclude 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Tied to this has been a propensity to 
subsume trade policy within the wider imperatives of the US-led war against global 
terrorism. In the wake of the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks, the Bush 
administration has argued that free trade is the best means to improve global 
economic development and foster peaceful co-existence among different nations. 
Indeed, the launch of the DR in 2001 was justified on the grounds that it would 
contribute to the war against terrorism, in the same way as trade was viewed as an 
antidote to communism at the height of the Cold War. 493 
492 Bhagwati J, Free Trade Today (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
493 See Zoellick R, "The WTO and New Global Trade Negotiations: What's at Stake, " a speech 
presented before the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C., October 30,2001. 
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In this respect political and security calculations have become, therefore, as important 
as economic ones in the determination of US bilateral trading arrangements. The 
cases of Singapore and Australia have demonstrated that countries that have backed 
the Bush administration's policies and have co-operated with the US in their 
implementation have been duly rewarded. On the contrary, countries that have 
challenged US policies - such as New Zealand and Egypt, which respectively 
opposed the Iraqi war and failed to support the US case against the EU on the issue of 
genetically modified products - have been excluded from free trade deals. 94 Owing 
to pressure from the US, a number of Central American countries (notably Costa 
Rica, Guatemala and Colombia) pulled out from the G20+ coalition. On December 
17,2003, the CAFTA countries completed FTA negotiations with the US, signalling 
that their long-term economic interests are tied to those of the US. 495 
It was only in January 2004 that the Bush administration announced that Canadian 
firms would now be allowed to bid for US-financed reconstruction projects in Iraq: 
Canada had previously been barred from bidding for such contracts because it had not 
supported the US-led invasion in Iraq. These examples provide a graphic 
illustration of how a dominant state such as the US can employ trade as a weapon to 
alter the behaviour of other states and to advance particular strategic goals in the 
international system. It does appear that in the future US engagement with its trade 
partners will be more than ever before conditional upon the willingness of these 
countries to support American national security or foreign policy interests. This 
494 Higgott, "The Limits to Multilateral Economic Governance, " pp. 19-20. 
°95 The CAFTA is made up of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. It is 
worth noting that the Costa Rican government temporarily pulled out of the US-CAFTA negotiations - it only joined on 25 January 2004 - in response to domestic protests against US demands to open the 
country's telecommunication and insurance sectors to foreign competition. The US has begun 
negotiations with the Dominican Republic, which it seeks to bring into the CAFTA negotiations in 2005, before Congress ratifies the agreement. 
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raises questions about how this US policy will affect South Africa, given the latter's 
anti-Iraq war stance and its prominent role within the G20+ in Cancun. To be sure, 
Charles Grassley, chairman of the US Senate committee on finance, warned after the 
Cancun fiasco that the US would in future determine the suitability of countries 
seeking bilateral trade pacts with it by the way they conducted themselves in 
Cancün. 496 
It is interesting that no punitive actions have been taken against South Africa to date. 
This state of affairs can be explained in two ways. First, South Africa is one of the 
very few geopolitically important African states that remain central to the US foreign 
economic and security agenda. This fact was confirmed by the country's designation 
- together with Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia - in the US national security strategy as 
an anchor for regional engagement. The US is unlikely to engage at present in 
actions that could unnecessarily upset this strategically vital bilateral relationship. In 
any case, the manner in which the US and South Africa dealt with the Zimbabwe 
crisis suggests that both countries prefer to resolve their differences through bilateral 
diplomacy rather than confrontation. Second, the proposed FTA negotiations between 
the US and SACU, given the negligible impact they will have on the US economy, are 
unlikely to trigger massive resistance from US domestic sectors that fear what they 
perceive as unfair competition from the developing countries. As such, the FTA 
negotiations are likely to be concluded without a great deal of political controversy. 
These observations, however, do not detract from the recognition that the US might in 
the future choose to act against even a small economy such as South Africa where it 
feels its fundamental interests are being threatened. 
496 `Crushed at Cancun, ' Financial Times 15`h September 2003. 
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5.2. Rationale for SACU-US FTA negotiations 
The US regards an FTA with SACU countries - its first FTA in sub-Saharan Africa - 
as essential to realising its objective to prise open these countries' economies to its 
commercial interests. An FTA would enable the US to gain guaranteed preferential 
access to its largest export market in sub-Saharan Africa, which accounted for nearly 
US$3.1 billion and US$2.5 billion of US exports in 2001 and 2002 respectively. 
Leading US exports in the SACU region include machinery, vehicles, aircraft, 
medical instruments, plastics, chemicals, cereals, pharmaceuticals, as well as wood 
and paper products. Total bilateral trade between the US and SACU amounted to 
approximately US$7. billion and US$7.3 billion in 2001 and 2002 respectively. US 
foreign direct investment in the SACU region totalled US$2.8 billion in 2000, mainly 
in the manufacturing, wholesale and services sectors. The SACU nations are the 
important suppliers of non-fuel goods to the US under the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), accounting for more than a third of US non-fuel goods 
from eligible sub-Saharan African countries. 97 
Through an FTA, the US also seeks to `level the playing field' in sectors where US 
exporters feel that they have been disadvantaged by the South Africa-EU free trade 
accord. In this regard the US is likely to focus its efforts on sectors where its 
domestic industries compete for market share with the EU. The US has also argued 
that bilateral and regional FTAs provide an impetus for competitive liberalisation, and 
can serve as models for liberalisation at the multilateral level and contribute towards 
advancing common objectives in the WTO. Furthermore, in the same way as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was viewed as a catalyst for 
491 Office of the USTR, "US and Southern African Nations Plan for Upcoming PTA Negotiations, " Press Release, 13 January 2003. 
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political and economic reforms in Mexico after 71 years of unbroken Institutional 
Revolutionary Party rule, the mooted FTA between the US and SACU has been 
touted by some commentators in the US, and in the SACU countries, as essential to 
locking in the political and economic reforms that have been implemented by SACU 
member countries in recent years. 
The most important piece of reform has been the signing of the SACU Agreement by 
the five member states in October 2002. Not only does the SACU Agreement 
provide for a new democratic institutional structure, it enables the member countries 
to carry out future trade relations and negotiations with third parties as a single entity. 
It also provides for the harmonisation of policies on competition, industrial 
development, agriculture, and unfair trade practices within the wider common SACU 
economy. In addition, the SACU Agreement creates a dispute settlement and new 
revenue-sharing formula. Along with these institutional reforms, it is envisaged that a 
free trade zone would improve the commercial competitiveness of SACU nations, 
help them attract much-needed foreign direct investment, and consolidate regional 
economic integration in southern Africa. 
For SACU members the proposed FTA accord represents not only an opportunity to 
bolster their bilateral trade with the US, but also to build on the success of AGOA 
while redressing some of its drawbacks. Introduced in October 2000, AGOA is a 
crucial part of the American trade and investment policy toward sub-Saharan Africa, 
designed to promote free markets and expand US-African trade and investment. 
With thirty-eight beneficiaries, AGOA designates over 1800 products from sub- 
Saharan Africa for duty-free access to the US - in addition to the 4650 products 
already eligible under the GSP. This is in line with the policy of `trade not aid' 
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initiated by the Clinton administration in the late 1990s in terms of which the US 
undertook to spearhead a trade and investment drive in Africa that would compensate 
for reductions in its aid to the continent. By most accounts the SACU countries have 
scored relative gains from their participation in AGOA. They are the leading AGOA 
beneficiaries in sub-Saharan Africa, making up over 70 percent of U. S. non-fuel 
imports under this programme in 2001. Thanks to its relatively diversified economy, 
South Africa has been the biggest provider of these non-fuel exports to the US. 
Lesotho is one of the important exporters of clothing goods, while Botswana, 
Namibia, and Swaziland recorded a 40 to 75 percent increase in their total exports to 
498 the US in 2002 
Yet critics of AGOA have argued that its key shortcoming is that it is a unilateral 
trade initiative that can be withdrawn arbitrarily by the US administration. In 
contrast, they have pointed out that a free trade treaty is more preferable as not only 
would it be more difficult to rescind but it would also include goods not covered by 
AGOA. These views have been echoed by a study that has cast doubts on whether 
AGOA will create new export opportunities for South African products. This, the 
study argues, is due to the fact that before the advent of AGOA US tariffs on South 
African exports were already low. It points out, however, that some South African 
agricultural exports (such as pears, avocados, oranges, pimientos, citrus juice and 
grape juice) have benefited enormously from AGOA, recording exponential growth 
over the last few years. These products could benefit further from a two-way trade 
agreement with the US. Furthermore, the study argues that although some clothing 
exports have gained from AGOA, a considerable share of clothing products does not 
qualify for AGOA preferences. This is because the rules of origin - which favour 
498 Ibid. 
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the least developed nations and not South Africa - have prevented South Africa 
clothing producers from accessing AGOA benefits 
499 
The SACU-US FTA negotiations highlight three important challenges for the SACU 
countries. The first challenge concerns the different levels of development and size 
of economies among the SACU countries. The SACU market is very small in 
relation to that of the US. Whilst very few of the SACU countries' products can take 
on the US market, American products and services can do tremendous damage to the 
SACU economies. This calls for a very careful and calibrated approach to the 
negotiations on the part of SACU. SACU should strive to reach an agreement that 
enshrines a balanced set of obligations and rights, and which takes into account the 
imbalances and developmental needs of the region. The experience of Mexico 
shows that a poorly sequenced liberalisation process could produce severe social 
dislocations. A study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that 
although NAFTA led to an increase of 500 000 jobs in manufacturing from 1994 to 
2002, the Mexican agricultural sector - where almost a fifth of Mexican are still 
employed - has lost 1.3 million jobs since 1994.500 As such, it necessary that the 
SACU-US negotiations address the unique needs and economic circumstances of 
SACU economies, including possible internal dislocations and transition costs. 
The second challenge concerns the relationship between trade liberalisation and 
growth. The experience of Mexico has demonstrated that although trade 
liberalisation can create conditions conducive to growth, it is not a panacea for 
°" See Stem M and Netshitomboni N, "AGOA, Africa and Agriculture -A Case Study of South 
Africa, " Trade Policy Report no. 3, South African Institute for International Affairs, Johannesburg, 
February 2004. 
500 Audley JJ, Papademetriou DG, Polaski S and Vaughan S, NAFTA's Promise and Reality - Lessons from Mexico for the Hemisphere (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2003), p. 6. 
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development problems. NAFTA played a crucial role in consolidating reforms 
Mexico initiated in the early 1990s. It also opened the previously massively 
protected Mexican economy to foreign competition, forcing Mexican companies to 
become more efficient and focused. Furthermore, it bolstered the productive capacity 
of specific Mexican industrial sectors - notably the automobile sector - while it also 
exposed Mexicans to a wider choice of goods. However, commentators such as 
Joseph Stiglitz have argued that Mexico's economic boom in the 1990s was 
unsustainable in that it masked serious underlying weaknesses: a weak educational 
system with low investment in technology, low tax base, low spending on research 
and development, high energy costs, and systemic corruption. They have also 
pointed out that although NAFTA enhanced Mexico's ability to supply American 
manufacturing firms with low-cost parts, it failed to transform the country into an 
501 
independently productive economy. Trade liberalisation, therefore, must not be 
viewed in isolation from other policies such as investment policy, entrepreneurship 
development policy, training and development policy, technology policy, and research 
and development policy. 
The third challenge has to do with concerns raised by South Africa's domestic 
opponents of the proposed FTA, who have questioned whether it can deliver tangible 
benefits for SACU countries beyond what AGOA already provides. Moreover, they 
have expressed alarm at the inclusion of "new issues" - such as investment, 
intellectual property rights, government procurement and trade in services - in the 
negotiating agenda, which they fear may undermine the national development 
502 
objectives of SACU countries. The latter concern is particularly pertinent given 
5" 'The broken promise of NAFTA, ' The New York Times 6 January 2004. 
502 See for example Neva Makgetla, 'Free-trade pact is full of dangers, ' Business Day 114' July 2003. 
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that some of these issue-areas, for example services, are not covered by the SACU 
503 
agreement. 
6. The Politics of EU-SA Trade 
The advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 laid the basis for a reconfiguration 
of the bilateral political and economic relationships between South Africa and the EU. 
Historically, trade and investment relations with the EU have constituted the bedrock 
of South Africa's foreign economic policy. The importance of the EU to the South 
African economy is underlined by the fact that the EU member countries collectively 
account for 40 percent and 30 percent of South Africa's exports and imports 
respectively, making the EU South Africa's most important trade and investment 
partner (see Graph 6). Not only did the EU abolish economic sanctions against South 
Africa in 1994, it announced a `package of immediate measures' designed to bolster 
the emergent democracy. These entailed, among other things, committing enormous 
financial resources towards the RDP and increasing bilateral aid to South Africa. 504 
The EU also extended GSP provisions to nearly 2000 South African industrial and 
semi-industrial products. Furthermore, South Africa benefited from the EU's GSP 
for agricultural products, covering 59 percent of South Africa's agricultural exports 
by the end of 1995. The EU announced its intention to conclude an FTA with South 
Africa as early as 1992, the year South Africa embarked upon a political transition 
towards democracy. However, formal negotiations with the EU only began after the 
election of the first democratic South African government. 
sos Interview with Kennedy Mbekeani, London, 7 July 2004. 
504 `Relations between South Africa and the European Union, ' IRC News, November 1996, p. 1. 
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Graph 6- Destination of SA Exports, 2001 
Source: Dianna Games, "The Experience of SA Firms Doing Business in Africa: 
A Preliminary Survey and Analysis, " South African Institute of International 
Affairs, p. 21. 
Presented in March 1996, the EU's negotiation proposal with South Africa was 
couched in terms of its desire to support the nascent democratic order in South Africa 
and to contribute towards redressing historical injustices. 505 The EU contended that 
an FTA was the most effective means through which South Africa could gain 
improved access to the EU market. The EU proposal consisted of three elements. 
First, it proposed to rechannel programme assistance to apartheid's victims to a 
special fund that would be used to bolster the RDP. Second, it sought to extend 
favourable trade terms to South Africa in order to facilitate its reintegration into the 
global economy. Third, it offered South Africa partial membership of the Lome 
"' Department of Trade and Industry, "A Briefing Document to the Parliamentary Committee on the 
Conclusion of the RSA-EU Negotiations for a Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement, " 
Department of Trade and Industry: Pretoria, February 1999, p. 1. 
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Convention, including special bilateral accords encompassing scientific and 
technological cooperation as well as fisheries. 506 
For the large part of 1996 not only did the South African government fail to proffer a 
coherent response to the EU's negotiating mandate, it also did not table its formal 
negotiating position. This was due to internal struggles not only between domestic 
bureaucracies - notably between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and 
Industry - over which state department should lead trade negotiations, but also 
between officials inherited from the apartheid era and those appointed by the ANC. 
As Keet explained: 
In part, this was because of the diverse - and notoriously 
uncoordinated - centres of foreign policymaking within the South 
African government. It was also partly because `old guard' figures in 
the new state with old Eurocentric notions and neo-liberal convictions 
were (and are) still exerting influences on the policy directions of the 
more cautious and accommodating forces in the new government. 
The new incumbents were also overstretched in many directions, and 
were inexperienced in the dynamics of the new global economic order 
and the complexities of international negotiations 507 
Yet it was also evident that South Africa's delay in responding to the EU's 
negotiation offer was part of the former's strategy designed to shift the terms of 
engagement with the EU. Given the significant political, legal and economic 
implications that an EU-SA FTA deal would inevitably have had for the smaller 
SACU members, South Africa was concerned that its SACU partners should not be 
left out in the lurch and that the negotiation process should be as inclusive and 
consultative as possible. Indeed, South African policymakers were wary of what they 
""Relations between South Africa, ' p. 2. 
507 Dot Keet, "Europe's Free Trade Plans with South Africa: Strategic Responses From and Challenges 
to South and Southern Africa, " Development Southern Africa, vol. 14, no. 2, April 1997, p. 286. 
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considered to be divisive and controversial interventions by the EU. For this reason 
South Africa, as part of its negotiating strategy, actively supported the demand of the 
BLNS countries for material resources from the EU to conduct their own impact 
evaluations of the mooted FTA. 
508 
A major point of contention was whether South Africa should participate in the 
negotiations as a developed or a developing country. South Africa had requested 
access to the Lome Convention in December 1994. The EU bureaucracy was divided 
in terms of how to respond to South Africa's appeal. On the one hand, the 
Directorate General (1), which was in charge of external relations, argued for the 
negotiation of a bilateral FTA with South Africa. On the other hand, the Directorate 
General (8), which was in charge of development, was sympathetic to the ANC's 
request for South Africa to be classified as a developing country and wanted South 
Africa to be offered a partial membership of the Lome Convention. This position 
was influenced partly by the WTO decision in its review of South African trade 
policies in 1993 that South Africa was an "economy in transition" (see Chapter 4). 
This implied giving South Africa a degree of flexibility regarding the pace of trade 
policy reform. Ultimately, the EU decided that these proposals were not mutually 
exclusive and made South Africa an offer combining both options. 509 
This culminated in the conclusion of the Trade, Development and Co-operation 
Agreement (TDCA) between the EU and South Africa. The TDCA encompasses a 
wide array of components, including: political dialogue; provisions for a Free Trade 
Area; trade related issues; economic cooperation; financial aid and development co- 
sos Ibid., P. 286. 
S09 Interview with Willem Smallberger, Pretoria, 9 April 2003. 
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operation; and social and cultural cooperation. As part of consolidating a far-reaching 
relationship with the EU, two other agreements were concluded, namely the Science 
and Technology Agreement (signed in December 1996) and Partial Membership of 
the Lome Convention (agreed in April 1997). Granting partial membership of the 
Lome Convention to South Africa implied that the country would be excluded from 
the convention's trade preferences and from the Stabex and Sysmin stabilisation 
funds, but it would be entitled to certain political benefits, regional accumulation in 
respect of the rules of origin, and the opportunity to tender for the Lome funded EDF 
projects. Furthermore, South Africa acceded to a request from the EU to negotiate a 
Wines and Spirits Agreement and a Fisheries Agreement - two of the three (the other 
is agriculture) politically contentious areas of negotiation that are discussed later in 
this section. 
A noteworthy feature of the TDCA is that it provides for free trade with asymmetrical 
coverage of all trade and sectors and special protocols to cover sensitive products. In 
sum, the agreement provides for an asymmetrical reduction of tariffs, with the EU 
making the speediest and deepest cuts to offset current regional trade imbalances. 
Aimed at integrating regional markets, the protocol calls for the establishment of a 
free trade area in the region by 2005. Some allowances will be made for infant 
industries, thereby granting some SADC countries a leeway to apply for "extended 
grace periods" during which tariff and subsidy reductions could be limited (within 
WTO provisions). 510 The TDCA also provided for development and financial 
measures to underpin further regional integration and to facilitate the adjustment 
510 'SADC set to march into new millennium with trade deal, ' Business Day 10th May 1999. 
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process in Southern Africa. Covering nearly 90 percent of trade between South 
Africa and the EU, the TDCA consists of the following components: 
" EU: full liberalisation of 95 percent of imports from South Africa by end of a 
transitional period of 10 years; 
" South Africa: full liberalisation of 86 percent of imports from EU by end of a 
transitional period of 12 years; 
" Includes both traded and non-traded products; 
" Provides for the protection of South Africa's sensitive sectors (automobiles 
and components, textiles and clothing, red meat, sugar, winter grains, and 
dairy); 
" Commits the EU to the provision of support for SACU to adjustment efforts 
resulting from the establishment of the FTA; 
9 Contains several elements that assure a positive regional impact on other 
countries of SADC. 511 
The first politically contested negotiation item was the issue of agricultural trade, 
historically the EU's most protected economic sector and which the EU has generally 
excluded from FTA negotiations. In its negotiations with South Africa the EU 
managed to exclude 46 percent of its agriculture from the FTA agreement. 
Nonetheless, South Africa did make some important advances. First, it successfully 
pushed for the inclusion of the agricultural safeguard clause, which "gives South 
Africa the right to challenge the EU should there be proof that increased imports of 
agricultural products are causing harm or threatening to cause harm to domestic 
industry. "512 Second, whilst South Africa failed to convince the EU to eliminate 
export subsidies, it succeeded to extract some commitments. The EU made an 
undertaking that it would not pay export refunds on cheese exported to South Africa. 
511 Department of Trade and Industry, "A Briefing Document, " p. 3. 512 Ibid., p. 4. 
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It also indicated its willingness to "eliminate export refunds on goods South Africa 
might want to offer for front-loading during the implementation period. "513 
Furthermore, the introduction of tariff quotas meant that South Africa would be able 
to penetrate the EU reserve list and qualify for preferences in exports of interest, 
including canned fruit, fruit juices and cut flowers. The TDCA also heralded a 
significant reduction of the EU reserve list from 46 percent to 38 percent by 1997, 
while subjecting the reserve list to regular reviews with the aim of further opening of 
the market 514 
In addition to the main agreement, South Africa and the EU entered into negotiations 
on two equally politically sensitive sectoral accords, namely a Fisheries Agreement 
and a Wines and Spirits Agreement. At the behest mainly of Spain, the EU proposed 
that the envisaged fisheries deal provide for EU access South Africa's fishing 
resources. To this end, the EU made a linkage between, on the one hand, the 
Fisheries Agreement and, on the other, market access concessions. South Africa has 
consistently contested this attempt at linkage, citing a commitment to the preservation 
of fisheries in its policy. sls Although an understanding regarding the broad outlines 
of a collaborative arrangement on fisheries policy was broached in December 1998, 
no concrete cooperation agreement has been concluded in this regard. Thanks to the 
stalemate over the EU's insistence to gain access to South African waters, 
negotiations on a fisheries agreement have been deferred indefinitely. This implies 
that fishery products will not be included in any of the preferential tariff arrangements 
of the TDCA. Regarding wines and spirits, Spain and Portugal pushed for the 
inclusion in the agreement of an undertaking by South African wine producers to 
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid., p. 5. 
515 Ibid., p. 9. 
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phase out the use of the generic terms port and sherry to describe their wine products. 
This goes to the heart of the debate about intellectual property debate concerning the 
EU demand for the protection of European names and the so-called geographical 
indicators around certain products such as port, sherry, grappa, ouzo, korn/kornbrand, 
jagertee and parcheron 516 
South Africa and the EU reached a political compromise in this regard in 1999. This 
is made up of the following key features: it provides for a phase-out clause for South 
Africa for the use of names port and sherry in exports to third countries; extends the 
definition of the South African domestic market to include all of SACU; it allows 
South Africa to continue the use of names of port and sherry on its domestic market 
throughout the transitional period of 12 years; it reviews the use of names during the 
transitional phase to decide on the names to use beyond the 12 year-period; it allows 
the South African wine industry to enjoy a 42 million litre duty-free quota in the EU 
market, whilst committing the EU to providing financial assistance for the 
restructuring of the South African wine industry. 517 
The TDCA has important implications for SACU. Although the BLNS countries did 
not participate directly in the negotiations - which was a source of concern to them as 
noted above - they were able to develop critical responses and articulate their key 
concerns to South Africa during regular consultation meetings. 518 Even so, the TDCA 
(especially when it gets implemented in full by 2012) will have important 
implications for the BLNS economies. The expected phasing down of the common 
external tariff for EU imports will lead to a decline in the level of tariff revenues 
s'6 See Chapter 7 for South Africa's position on the issue of geographical indicators. 517 Department of Trade and Industry, "Report on South Africa's, " p. 9. spa See Keet, "Europe's Free-Trade Plans, " p. 286. 
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collected by SACU, thereby reducing the amount received by the BLNS countries 
from the common SACU revenue pool. As indicated above, it was with this reality in 
mind that South Africa agreed, in the revised SACU Agreement, to a revenue- 
distribution formula that was far more generous to its BLNS counterparts. Another 
effect, albeit indirect, of the TDCA on the BLNS countries will be the increased 
competition that will result from EU goods enjoying the same preferences as BLNS 
exports in the South African market. 
It was intimated in the introduction to this chapter that one of the key objectives of 
South Africa's global trade strategy is to reduce the dependence of its foreign trade on 
the EU. As Graph 6 illustrates, South Africa still has a long way to achieve that 
objective. Even so, the country has made some progress in its quest to diversify its 
trade; its export-led growth strategy has resulted in a phenomenal growth of exports to 
African markets. Increasingly, South Africa has also been trading robustly with 
Latin America and Asia, regions South Africa historically had weak trade links with 
(see Graphs 3 and 6). A major threat to South Africa's export strategy will come 
from other middle-income developing countries competing for access to developing 
country markets. Specifically, competition to South Africa's exports will emanate 
from countries such as China that have similar competitive advantages to South 
Africa's. Take the case of Mexico, a middle income developing nations such as 
South Africa. Since it joined the WTO in 2001, China has dislodged Mexico as the 
second largest exporter (after Canada) to the US. Though Chinese goods are subject 
to duties, they are generally far cheaper than Mexican products. China has also 
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replaced Mexico as the favoured destination for multinational companies seeking 
cheap labour. 519 
7. Deepening South-South Trade and Multilateralism 
One of South Africa's foreign-policy priorities has been to pursue solidarity with 
other developing nations in the global order. South Africa's multilateral diplomacy 
has sought to "address the pernicious effects of globalisation by strong advocacy for 
greater say by developing countries in global governance, for alleviating debt and 
other economic problems of poor states, and for reform of multilateral bodies to make 
them more sensitive to the particular needs of developing countries. s520 A vital 
component of this mission has entailed forging strategic cooperation with key 
developing countries with a view to working towards the achievement of a just and 
equitable global trading system. To this end, South Africa has been involved in 
exploratory negotiations aimed at promoting special trading arrangements with 
designated developing countries. Specifically, significant diplomatic capital has been 
expended on pursuing FTAs with South Africa's most important strategic allies in the 
developing world - namely Brazil, India, China and Nigeria. These endeavours 
constitute an essential part of putative `butterfly strategy' that has guided South 
Africa's global trade agenda. At the heart of this approach has been a determination 
by South Africa to reduce the historical dependence of its external trade on the EU 
and to extend its `trading wings' from Africa to other regions of the world - mainly 
s2' North America, Latin America and East Asia. 
5'9 `After initial boom, Mexico's economy goes bust, ' Los Angeles Times 2nd January 2004. 520 Alden and le Pere, South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy, p. 66. 521 Interview with Faizel Ismael, Geneva, 13 March 2003. 
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On June 6,2003, the foreign ministers of Brazil, South Africa and India signed a 
declaration - the Brasilia Declaration - that "identified the trilateral cooperation 
among themselves as an important tool for achieving the promotion of social and 
economic development and they emphasised their intention to give greater impetus to 
cooperation among their countries. "522 Following the adoption of the declaration, the 
three countries set up the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) Dialogue Forum to 
institutionalise their relations and coordinate their strategies around issues of trade, 
health, defence and global governance. This culminated in the prominent roles they 
played as the leading members of the Group of 20 (G20+) developing countries in the 
ill-fated Cancun ministerial meeting in September 2003 (see Chapter 7). Within this 
context the three countries, which account for 3 percent of global economic output, 
have been exploring the possibilities of concluding preferential trade agreements; 
negotiations so far have focused on discussing proposals on modalities and timetables 
for the negotiations. Furthermore, the South African government has signalled its 
intention to conclude FTA deals with China and Nigeria in the future. 
The effectiveness or otherwise of this South-South collaboration, on which South 
Africa has staked the success of its global trade strategy, will be influenced to a 
degree by the future trajectory of the crisis-ridden contemporary system of economic 
multilateralism. According to Robert Cox, the "crisis of multilateralism" emerged in 
the 1980s in "a tendency on the part of the US and other powerful countries to reject 
the United Nations (UN) as a vehicle for international action and a movement on the 
part of these countries towards either unilateralism or collective dominance in world 
522 Ministeno das Relaröes Exteriores, Declaracäo de Brasilia, Brasilia, 6 June 2003, p. 2. 
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economic and political matters. "523 A number of factors marked the context in which 
this shift occurred. First, the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, which led to a 
growing reluctance on the part of rich countries to finance aid to the Third World. 
Second, a growing suspicion that the UN system was an "unfriendly political forum" 
and a potential obstacle to economic liberalisation. Third, the shifting geopolitical 
balance occasioned by the end of the Cold War. Fourth, the increasing debt burden 
experienced by the majority of the developing countries and their growing acceptance 
of a new neo-liberal economic paradigm. 
524 
Together, these factors gave industrialised countries a strategic advantage, which was 
used to change the institutional balance in the multilateral system. Asserting the 
supremacy of the Bretton Woods institutions, the industrialised countries promoted 
measures that gave them a far-reaching role in dealing with development issues. They 
took steps designed to erode the UN economic role in the key economic areas of 
trade, money and finance. These measures entailed generously providing for the IMF 
and World Bank while denying some UN specialised agencies of financial resources 
as well as restricting their agendas and institutional mandates. Furthermore, the US, 
the highest UN financial contributor, used its considerable arrears to the UN as 
leverage to secure compliant behaviour from the organisation. As such, the 
developing countries found themselves increasingly drawn into the sphere of 
influence of the Bretton Woods institutions and the GATT, with decreasing 
possibilities of exercising traditional group action within the UN. This resulted in an 
523 Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order, " p. 498. 
524 Ibid. 
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asymmetry in the command over expertise between the Bretton Woods institutions, on 
the one hand, and the UN specialised agencies, on the other hand. 
525 
Cox argues that the forced retreat of the UN from the economic domain created a 
cleavage between the old economic multilateralism, perceived as support to a liberal 
economic order and institutionally located in the IMF and World Bank, and a more 
political pluralism, symbolically located in the UN General Assembly "and perceived 
by the powerful states as harbouring an unfriendly Third World majority. "526 This has 
serious implications for developing countries such as South Africa, which had hitherto 
wielded considerable influence over economic-decision-making through the General 
Assembly in the past. For concerns have been raised that while the UN has continued 
its forced retreat from the economic domain, the Bretton Woods institutions have 
failed to live up to their responsibilities. The World Bank has been criticised for its 
inability to fulfill its mandate in that it has not mobilised adequate resources for 
development and has become one of the most expensive providers of non- 
concessional funds. The IMF, on the other hand, has been condemned for playing 
little or no role in ensuring the stability of global monetary and exchange rate 
environments. 527 
The "crisis of multilateralism" was starkly highlighted by the controversy over the 
IMF's mishandling of the 1997/1998 Asian financial crises and the controversial 
circumstances surrounding the appointment of its new managing director. This led to 
a revival of attacks on the global economic governance institutions from the left and 
from the right. On the one hand, the right expressed suspicions of any form of 
525 South Centre, For A Strong and Democratic United Nations (London: Zed Books, 1996), p. 173. 526 Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order, " p. 498. 
527 South Centre, ForA Strong and Democratic United Nations, p. 153. 
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governance and `sees the Bank and the Fund as relics of a discredited age of 
interventionism. ' The left, on the other hand, has also lost faith in multilateralism for 
a variety of reasons - including the failure of structural adjustment policies and 
by the 
creditor nations to reduce meaningfully the debts owed by poor countries and 
structural adjustment. 
28 Doubts have also been voiced about the future of global 
economic governance following the failure of the WTO ministerial meetings 
in 
Seattle (1999) and Cancun (2003). 
A number of important challenges need to be overcome if legitimacy is to be restored 
to the multilateral model of global governance. The key challenge facing 
multilateralism is the political vulnerability of global governance institutions. 
According to Evans, this vulnerability is attributable mainly to "the powerful elite 
ideology within the United States that is both profoundly distrustful of any kind of 
public governance institutions and deeply apprehensive of anything that might reduce 
the absolute sovereignty of the United States itself. " 529 Meaningful multilateral co- 
operation cannot be attained in the absence of a broader base of political support for 
global governance institutions. It is necessary, therefore, that these institutions are 
endorsed equally by developed and developing countries if the multilateral system is 
to be sustained. The second challenge is the resurgence of regionalism. A key 
concern about regionalism is that it reduces the motivation for and commitment to 
multilateralism. 
52$ See `Do we really need the IMF? ' The Guardian 10th July 1998; see also `Reformers could make a 
world of difference, ' The Guardian 13th March 2000. 
529 Peter Evans, "Economic Governance Institutions in a Global Economy: Implications for Developing 
Countries, " a paper prepared for the tenth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Bangkok, 12 February 2000, p. 5. 
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Two opposing views have been expressed on the compatibility between regionalism 
and global integration. One is that regionalism is leading to new or stronger trade 
barriers and a neglect of multilateral processes, and, because it is inherently 
discriminatory (favouring members over non-members), it is weakening global non- 
discriminatory rules. For example, the EU regionalism has been commended for its 
openness while it has been criticised for its protectionist and trade-diverting features 
such as Common Agricultural Policy. 530 The other view is that some activities are 
best carried out at regional as opposed to global or national levels. It argues that 
regionalism enables states to make advances in co-operation and liberalisation in 
ways that provide a building block for global initiatives. Thus, regional and 
multilateral processes are seen as not mutually exclusive. A number of examples are 
cited to buttress this point. The first one is that the UR of trade negotiations was 
completed alongside parallel regional integration processes in the EU and North 
America. In this context, the political momentum acquired by President Clinton in 
securing the NAFTA Treaty - which was seen as a victory over protectionism - has 
been viewed as important in reinforcing the GATT negotiations. The Marrakesh 
agreement on liberalising public procurement within GATT has been cited as further 
evidence of a EU regional liberalisation initiative acting as forerunner of, and not as 
an impediment to, wider liberalisation. 531 
The underlying asymmetries of international economic regimes constitute another 
challenge to multilateralism. Over the past five decades the number of countries 
represented in the UN has risen dramatically. All these states want to have a voice in 
international economic decision-making. However, there has been a growing tension 
sso Vincent Cable and David Henderson, Trade Blocs? The Future of Regional Integration (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), pp. 12-13. 531 Ibid. 
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between the desire to ensure universal participation and the need to create efficient 
decision-making. What has aggravated this tension is the fact that global economic 
decision-making has been monopolised by the US, Europe and Japan. This is 
evidenced not only by the voting requirements of the IFIs, but also in the exclusivity 
of groups such as the G7/8 and the domination of WTO processes by the key 
economic powers 532 It is imperative that existing economic governance institutions 
are restructured to ensure that they are more pluralistic and participatory, and to 
guarantee that they bridge the interests of both developed and developing countries. 
Tackling these challenges requires that both the developed and the developing 
countries, including South Africa, to accept not only that the current global order is 
unjust but also that it is, in the long-term, neither sustainable nor conducive to global 
stability. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed South Africa's global trade strategy. It has contended that 
the strategy needs to be understood within the framework of South Africa's wider 
global economic agenda, which is calculated to promote the country's rise as a 
dynamic export-led manufacturing economy. To this end the strategy seeks to 
reorder the position of South Africa in the global political economy by reducing its 
dependence on established developed country markets (especially the EU) and by 
entering into new trade relationships with rapidly growing emerging markets in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. South Africa's global trade strategy rests on three 
pillars: multilateralism; regionalism; and bilateralism. 
532 The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995) p. 147. 
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At a multilateral level, South African policymakers have actively encouraged the 
country's re-incorporation into the global economy and campaigned for a more 
substantial role for developing nations in moulding multilateral economic governance, 
particularly in relation to the WTO. Yet the extent to which this facet of the strategy 
can succeed or not will depend on how South Africa implements it within the WTO 
and also on the future of the embattled system of economic multilateralism on which 
the country has staked its fortunes. Regionally, South Africa has employed trade as 
a foreign policy tool to normalise previously damaged political relations, pursue its 
hegemonic ambitions, and strengthen regional trading arrangements in order to 
mitigate the negative effects of economic globalisation. 
The chapter has demonstrated that although South Africa's hegemonic leadership 
seems to have been accepted by SACU countries, it has been far less effectual in 
exercising such leadership over the SADC. Not only has the failure of South Africa's 
`quiet diplomacy' in Zimbabwe undermined its leadership pretensions in the SADC 
region, it has starkly demonstrated that there are limits to what even a powerful 
economic dynamo such as South Africa can accomplish in its regional 
neighbourhood. At a bilateral level, South Africa has concluded an FTA deal with 
the EU in the hope that it will enable South Africa to gain greater access for its 
exports (especially agricultural products) to the EU market and offset its trade deficit 
with the latter. In the long-term, the agreement will have crucial ramifications for 
the smaller SACU economies, including the potentially adverse effects that the 
envisaged phasing down of the common external tariff for EU imports will have on 
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SACU tariff revenues as well as the increased competition that will result from EU 
goods enjoying the same preferences as BLNS exports in the South African market. 
South Africa and the other three SACU countries have also been engaged in FTA 
negotiations with the US that they believe will shore up their bilateral trade with the 
US and lock in the trade preferences they have been enjoying in the US markets since 
the introduction of AGOA in 2000. Yet critics of the proposed FTA have questioned 
whether it can deliver substantial benefits for SACU countries beyond what AGOA 
already provides. Furthermore, South Africa has promoted strategic cooperation with 
designated developing nations - mainly India and Brazil - with a view to challenging 
the structural imbalances of the contemporary global order and agitating for a freer 
and fairer global trade system. It is still too early to offer a considered and 
comprehensive assessment of how the IBSA alliance is likely to unfurl. 
What is clear, nonetheless, is that its durability and resilience will be severely tested 
by a number of questions it raises. Will the IBSA countries be able to sustain a 
balance in the long-term between the necessity for collective cooperation and the their 
individual positions as competitors for export share in the markets of advanced 
countries? How will they tackle concerns voiced by other developing countries that 
IBSA is an exclusionary group? Can South Africa effectively assuage perceptions 
among other African countries that its involvement in the IBSA coalition indicates a 
lack of commitment to Africa? It is in the cauldron of the presently embattled Doha 
trade talks that these questions have to be answered. And it is to the discussion of the 
role of South Africa in the Doha multilateral trade negotiations that this thesis turns to 
next. 
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Chapter 7 
Championing Trade and Development? : South Africa and the Doha Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
This chapter explores South Africa's approach to the DR of multilateral trade 
negotiations. It argues that from South Africa's perspective the DR represents an 
opportunity for developing countries to provide leadership on issues of multilateral 
trade and development. To this end South Africa has sought to carve a role for itself 
as facilitator and broker in the Doha negotiations. South Africa's negotiating posture 
in the DR is founded on the premise that it seeks to champion the interests of 
developing nations, particularly African countries, while ensuring that its interests as 
a trading nation are not bypassed. For South Africa, therefore, preserving the 
integrity of the WTO and preventing its disintegration is an overarching priority. 
Although imperfect, a rules-based world trade system provides a solid basis for 
ensuring that global trade processes are not shaped solely by economic power plays. 
The degree to which South Africa's strategic negotiating objectives can be realised is 
contingent, therefore, not only upon the durability of the rules-based multilateral trade 
regime but also upon degree to which the country can reconcile its global ambitions 
with its domestic and regional commitments. 
1. The Doha Round 
The ill-fated WTO ministerial meeting held in Seattle in 1999 took place within the 
context of circumstances different to those that marked the UR. First, developing 
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countries - which make about two-thirds of the WTO membership - showed that they 
were increasingly aware that their voice mattered in the WTO. Owing to their 
numerical preponderance in the WTO, they proved that trade liberalisation could not 
proceed without their agreement: deals cut in secretive `green room' processes by 
powerful trading nations were no longer sufficient to win consensus on a new trade 
round. Second, most developing countries which took part in the UR expressed 
disappointment and resentment that they had gained little or nothing from it, despite 
the assurances made by developed countries to provide them with larger market 
access and technical aid. Third, the Seattle meeting highlighted a growing public 
disaffection with and distrust of the multilateral trade system, prompting the then US 
Trade Representative, Charlene Barshefsky, to remark that the single biggest threat 
facing globalisation today was the lack of public support for it. 533 
The DR of multilateral trade negotiations was launched in November 2001 in terms of 
the principle of the "single undertaking": nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. 
The decision to initiate the DR flowed from a combination of factors that exerted 
tremendous pressures on the rules-based global trade system, threatening to imperil 
the post-war consensus upon which the multilateral trade regime was founded. These 
factors include an exponential increase in the membership of the WTO, an ever- 
expanding trade negotiating agenda, a governance process over-burdened by 
competing national interests, a burgeoning desire by WTO members to conclude 
bilateral and regional trade deals, as well as increasing concerns about the social and 
environmental effects of free trade. 534 The momentum for initiating the DR also 
533 `Free trade under fire, ' Financial Times 11th October 1999. ssa partick Cronin, "Me Doha Round: Prospects for the Rules-Based Trading System, " in C. Roe Goddard, Patrick Cronin and Kishore C. Dash (eds. ), international Political Economy - State-Market Relations in a Changing Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 369-370. 
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derived from widely shared perceptions that a repeat of the Seattle-type impasse could 
inflict irrevocable harm to the multilateral trade system. Tied to this concern were 
mounting fears about the parlous state of the global economy and the implications for 
the US economy of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11 
2001.535 
The pre-Doha ministerial meetings were marked by tensions similar to those that 
paralysed the failed Seattle summit. These fissures revolved mainly around 
disagreements between developed and developing countries over issues to be covered 
by the Doha negotiating agenda. The EU advocated a broad-based round, 
encompassing negotiations on all the `new issues' including competition, investment, 
trade facilitation as well as transparency in government procurement. Although its 
attitude towards the elimination of export subsidies was lukewarm, it nevertheless 
sought to establish a linkage between trade and the environment in response to 
demands by environmental lobby groups. Furthermore, the EU pushed for substantial 
reductions in industrial tariffs by developing countries and the tightening of labour 
536 standards in the global trade system 
For its part, the US wanted the DR to deal with the established issues of agriculture, 
services and industrial tariffs. But the US has conflicting interests on the issue of 
agriculture. On the one hand, it has supported the position of the Cairns Group of 
agricultural exporters on widening access to the EU market and the phasing out of 
export subsidies. On the other hand, however, the US has enacted legislation that has 
raised domestic farm subsidies substantially. Considered the most generous farm 
 Ibid., p. 378. 
536 Jawara and Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO, p. 53. 
277 
subsidy package in American history, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 
has increased federal spending on farm programmes by US$82.6 billion over the next 
decade, in addition to the US$100 billion Congress was already set to provide to 
farmers. 537 Nowhere have the deleterious effects of US agricultural subsidies been 
felt more than in West Africa. The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development has stated that the massive subsidies provided by the US government to 
its 25 000 cotton farmers threaten to wipe out the livelihoods of ten million West 
Africans who rely on cotton production. At US US$4 billion, US cotton subsidies 
alone surpass by 60 per cent the entire GDP of Burkina Faso. The steady collapse 
in world prices induced by subsidisation has reversed the remarkable success that had 
been achieved by poor West African and Central African countries to make their 
cotton industries among the most competitive in the world. Thanks to US subsidies, 
in the past four years the region recorded a 31 per cent decrease in export revenue 
even though its production rose by 14 per cent. The decline in cotton prices costs 
West African countries about US$1 billion a year in lost exports, three times the US 
aid budget for Africa. It is estimated that the elimination of US cotton subsidies could 
raise world prices by 26 per cent, which could go a long way towards alleviating 
poverty in these countries. 538 The controversy over cotton subsidies was partly 
responsible for the failure of the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun and 
several African countries consider its resolution as central to restarting the Doha 
negotiating process 539 
537 World Trade Organisation Annual Report 2002 (Geneva: WTO, 2002), p. 19. 538 The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, "Elimination of Cotton Subsidies: 
A Development Deliverable for Cancun, " Bridges No. 4 May 2003, pp. 1-2. 539 `Talks unravel over cotton, ' Financial Times 16th September 2003. 
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The US also wanted the round to tackle the issue of transparency in government 
procurement and trade facilitation. Unlike the Democratic administration under 
Clinton, which was indebted to labour interests, the Bush administration has not 
considered it necessary to push for the linking of trade and labour standards. 
Additionally, the Republican government did not see the linking of trade and the 
environment as a priority. 540 The US refused to enter into any discussions aimed at 
reviewing the existing anti-dumping rules, which it has employed extensively. There 
have been mounting concerns about the exponential increase in the use of anti- 
dumping instruments by both industrialised and developing countries in recent years. 
But it seems unlikely that the US administration will give ground easily on this issue 
given its sensitive nature in American national politics: numerous powerful domestic 
lobbies are beneficiaries of US anti-dumping measures and will not countenance any 
attempts to change the status quo. 541 
Many developing countries were opposed to the launch of a new negotiating round, 
especially the inclusion of the `new issues' - also known as Singapore issues - such 
as competition, investment and trade facilitation and transparency in government 
procurement. Opposition to the inclusion of the `new issues' sprang from the belief 
on the part of these countries that they had gained little or nothing from the previous 
UR, notwithstanding pledges made by developed countries to provide them with 
larger market access for their agricultural products and apparel and textile exports, as 
well as with the necessary technical assistance to implement their WTO obligations. 
Developed countries - particularly the EU and Japan - were keen to see the DR build 
on a limited set of investment liberalisation measures that were agreed to in the UR 
sao Jawara and Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO, pp. 53-54; Cronin, "The Doha Round, " p. 383. See Cronin, `"The Doha Round, " p. 379. 
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and "give their corporations maximum flexibility in managing their operations 
abroad. "542 Given the enormous importance of the Singapore issues to the EU, the 
region is unlikely to make substantial concessions to developing countries on its 
protectionist agricultural policy without demanding reciprocity from the latter in this 
important area of its trade interests. 
The inclusion of the `new issues' in the Doha negotiating agenda was opposed 
particularly by the `Like-Minded Group' (LMG), a vocal group of fifteen developing 
countries within the WTO. 543 Not only were these countries wary of engaging in 
negotiations about these issues in the DR, they were concerned about the added 
weight of new responsibilities these entail in light of the formidable UR 
implementation challenges they still had to fulfill. For this reason they insisted that 
the DR negotiations should rather focus on implementing UR agreements on such 
matters as granting greater market access to agricultural products from the developing 
world as well as providing technical capacity for poor countries. It is worth noting, 
however, that some developing nations - such as South Africa, Morocco and Mexico 
- supported a broad-based negotiating agenda while others - for example Brazil, 
Argentina, Paraguay and Chile - stated that they would accept a comprehensive 
negotiating round only if industrialised nations agree to eliminate all agricultural 
subsidies. 5" 
Developing nations have demanded greater access to industrialised country markets 
for their competitive exports - agriculture, textiles and clothing. Of all the issues 
542 Ibid., p. 381. 
543 The `Like-Minded Group' of countries are India, Mauritius, Pakistan, Malaysia, Cuba, Zimbabwe, 
Dominican Republic, Kenya, Egypt, Tanzania, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Honduras and Jamaica. s" Jawara and Kwa, Behind the Scenes, p. 54. 
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considered in the UR of trade negotiations, agricultural reform was the most urgent 
for developing countries. Yet agricultural protectionism in the developed countries 
remains an important obstacle to achieving this goal. Although the subsidisation of 
agriculture in the developed countries is allowed under the Agreement on Agriculture 
agreed in the UR, it has "resulted in creating imbalance in the rights and obligations 
among Members to the detriment of developing countries, as many developing 
countries are deprived of the financial resources to afford such an export competition 
policy. "545 Not only does this agreement penalise developing countries - whose 
exports are concentrated in products where market access is highly restricted - but it 
also fails to acknowledge the critical social and economic significance of the 
agricultural sector in the developing world. A concern has been raised that the 
admittance of ten546 new states into the EU in May 2004 is likely to reinforce EU 
agricultural protectionism as the EU might be faced with pressures to accommodate 
the farming concerns of new states such as Poland . 
547 However, the budgetary 
impact of eastern enlargement in agriculture is likely to be reduced by the 
implementation of a formula that will see agricultural spending phased in over a long 
period - 2013. It bears emphasising that trade protectionism is not the preserve of 
the EU and the US. Agricultural subsidy support is also very high in Japan, 
Switzerland, Iceland, Korea and Norway. 548 
sas United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2001), Current Developments on issues of 
Interest to African Countries in the Context of post-Seattle WTO Trade Negotiations (Geneva: United 
Nations, 2001), p-3- 
" Cyprus, Poland, Malta, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Hungary. 
sal 'Eastward ho!, ' The Economist 20'h June 2002. 
sas According to the WTO, in the Republic of Korea, Norway, and Switzerland, total agricultural 
support is close to, or exceeds, the sector's contribution to GDP. 
281 
Developing countries have called for a greater commitment to the principle of special 
and differential treatment (SDT), and for steps to be taken to deal with their weak 
technical and institutional capacities that have prevented them from exploiting the 
advantages of the multilateral trade system. In particular, capacity constraints have 
severely hampered the ability of the LDCs to understand the new trade issues and to 
cope with the obligations imposed by the WTO system. At Doha developing 
countries extracted a concession from industrialised countries on the issue of SDT: the 
Doha Declaration commits rich nations to providing technical assistance to poor 
countries, although it does not specify the scale of assistance that will be offered and 
how the needs of individual countries will be determined and fulfilled 5.49 Many 
LDCs see a direct link between the issues of technical assistance and market access: 
even if they are granted access to industrialised country markets, their supply-side 
constraints bar them from taking full advantage of these market openings. Improved 
technical assistance could play a vital role, therefore, not only in reinforcing the 
ability of developing nations to assess the advantages and costs of various trade 
agreements and enabling them to participate more effectively in trade negotiations 
and dispute settlement, but also in bolstering their manufacturing capabilities. 
Furthermore, developing countries have drawn attention to the need to address 
asymmetries and imbalances in WTO rules and agreements, which continue to hinder 
their growth and development. In particular they have emphasised the need to curtail 
the abuse by the key industrialised nations, notably the US, of countervailing 
measures such as anti-dumping procedures to exclude their exports. 550 They have 
also raised concerns about the consequences of replacing textile quotas with tariffs, 
549 See World Trade Organisation, Doha Declarations (Geneva: WTO, 2002), pp. 33-35. 550 Ibid., pp. 38-40. 
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agreed in the UR, which had kept out their products and wanted the arrangement 
nullified. 551 In addition, they have demanded a transparent and inclusive decision- 
making process in the WTO, which they see as crucial in restoring the credibility of 
and public support for the multilateral trading system. 
One of the issues central to the DR has been the matter of TRIPs and public health. 
Developing countries secured guarantees from the industrialised nations that the 
existing TRIPs commitments would not obstruct efforts to tackle public health 
problems faced by poor countries - particularly those induced by epidemics such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. 552 Most developing countries have rebuffed 
attempts by the US and EU to include the issues of labour and environmental 
standards in the Doha negotiating agenda. Developing country resistance to the 
incorporation of labour standard dates back to the 1996 Singapore ministerial 
meeting, but it hardened when former US President Bill Clinton, prior to the start of 
the failed Seattle meeting in 1999, proposed a linking of trade and labour in response 
to domestic political pressures. Following a stalemate over the issue, it was decided 
by the WTO to refer the problem to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for 
clarification. The EU has been under pressure from domestic lobbies to push for an 
alignment of trade rules with the environment. Although this EU negotiating stance 
has generally been opposed by developing countries, the EU secured an agreement at 
Doha to commence negotiations in three issue areas to: clarify the relationship 
between existing WTO rules and specific trade commitments outlined in multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs); elaborate procedures for regular information 
5 51 Jawara and Kwa, Behind the Scenes, p. 55. 
352 World Trade Organisation, Doha Declarations, pp. 24-26. 
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exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees; and reduce 
or eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services. 
553 
2. South Africa's Doha Negotiating Position 
South Africa played an active role in the crafting of the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) and supported the text of the Doha Declaration (DD) - which inaugurated the 
DR as a development round - even though it believed that certain elements of the 
declaration, notably the provisions on agriculture and development, could have been 
strengthened further. 554 The essential features of South Africa's strategic approach to 
the DR have been discussed in Chapter 6 so will only be reiterated cursorily here. 
Briefly, South Africa believes that the key to sustainable global economic growth lies 
with stimulating the growth and developmental potential of developing countries 
through the exploitation of their comparative advantages. Realising the full potential 
of these advantages, however, is contingent upon developed countries jettisoning their 
protectionist trade policies and practices and embarking on deep-going structural 
adjustment in their domestic economies. Such adjustment would require 
industrialised nations to reduce the protection enjoyed by their inefficient 
`grandfather' industries and fundamentally reform their agricultural trade policies. 
This could not only promote a transfer of production and investment to developing 
countries but could also advance industrialisation and development and boost North- 
South and South-South trade. 
553 mid., p. 13. 
5" For an analysis of South Africa's role prior to and during the Doha ministerial summit see Jawara 
and Kwa, Behind the Scenes, pp. 50-113. 
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It is this overall strategic posture that has shaped South Africa's Doha negotiating 
stance. South Africa has advanced a wide-ranging negotiating position 
in the DR 
covering: implementation issues (intellectual property rights, anti-dumping, subsidies, 
as well as technical and sanitary standards); mandated negotiations (agriculture as 
well as trade in services); industrial tariffs; `new issues' (trade and competition 
policy, trade and investment, trade facilitation, transparency 
in government 
procurement, and electronic commerce); labour and environmental standards. It 
is to 
the discussion of the salient features of this negotiating position this chapter turns to. 
21 Intellectual property rights (TRIPs) 
South Africa shares the view of many developing countries that the TRIPs Agreement 
is rigged against the interests of poor nations. The TRIPs was one of the most 
contentious and divisive issues during the UR trade negotiations. 
555 The TRIPs 
agreement extends the GATT norms and principles by enjoining WTO member states 
to: provide equal protection to both foreigners and nationals (national treatment); 
grant the same levels of legal protection to other WTO members in a non- 
discriminatory way (most favoured nation); inform the TRIPs Council about their 
national laws and regulations regarding intellectual property, and accede to requests 
for information from the Council and other WTO members (transparency). The 
agreement also calls on all WTO members to institute measures for the national 
enforcement of intellectual property rights while extending the applicability of the 
WTO's dispute settlement procedures to trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property. 556 Furthermore, the TRIPs agreement creates minimum standards of 
555 See Ann Capling, "Intellectual Property, " in Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire (eds. ), Trade 
Politics, (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 84-85. 
556 mid., p. 90. 
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protection that "will lead to the globalisation of US laws governing intellectual 
property. "557 Developing countries have advanced a number of arguments against 
tightening intellectual property rights. Besides questioning patenting on ethical or 
social welfare grounds, they have expressed a concern that it can impede technology 
transfer necessary for their economic advancement: patent owners may place 
burdensome conditions on the use of technology or completely refuse to license new 
technology in order to maintain their monopolistic positions. They have also 
challenged the contention that intellectual property rights are central to fostering 
research, warning that in certain circumstances they could actually hamper research 
and knowledge dissemination. For ethical and national sovereignty reasons, African 
and South American countries have opposed attempts by some industrialised nations 
- notably the US, Japan and Switzerland - to extend patenting to biological processes 
and products. 558 
South Africa has solicited a review of several aspects of the TRIPs agreement 
including the provisions on the continuation of negotiations by members for the 
protection of geographical indications, which South Africa contends should not 
displace the advantages of an open and competitive global trade regime, the 
provisions for the application of non-violation remedy under TRIPs as well as the 
provisions for the protection of plant varieties. At the heart of South Africa's 
concerns about existing TRIPs arrangements has been a quest to secure an equitable 
sharing of intellectual property protection between the owners and users of 
557 Ibid. 
558 Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
286 
technology: intellectual property protection ought to balance the imperative to foster 
technological innovation with the need to tackle social concerns 
559 
To this end South Africa has sought a clarification of WTO guidelines governing the 
provisions on `parallel importation' and `compulsory licensing. ' This 
followed a 
decision by US and British pharmaceutical companies in 2001 to haul the South 
African government before the courts in order to bar it from introducing legislation 
permitting compulsory licensing of essential drugs. The US government had 
stridently challenged the law, arguing that it violated the WTO agreement on trade- 
related intellectual property. However, the Bush administration subsequently changed 
its position and vowed that it would not act against South Africa, either bilaterally or 
in the WTO, if it breached the TRIPs agreement to secure affordable drugs to treat 
HIV/AIDS and other epidemics. 560 Furthermore, South Africa is concerned that 
TRIPs is too weighted in favour of US cultural interests at the expense of other 
countries' national cultural products. It cites as an example its restrictions on the use 
of the Mickey Mouse design while local designs such as the Ndebele artwork are not 
protected by the agreement, reinforcing what Capling calls "the globalisation of a 
mass of commercialised mediocrity. , 
561 
2.2 Anti-dumping 
According to WTO rules, dumping happens when producers sell their products in a 
foreign market at a price below that in the home market or below the cost of 
production. Dumping can lead to trade distortions and is regarded as unfair in 
s59 Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach, " p. 3; see also "South 
Africa's Statement to the WTO's Trade Negotiations Committee, " Geneva, 4-5 December 2002. 
56° 'US gives licence to ignore patents, ' Business Day 50' November 2001. 
561 Capling, "Intellectual Property, " p. 89. 
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international trade. Importing countries are allowed to impose anti-dumping duties to 
redress the harmful effects of dumping on their domestic industries. 
562 There has 
been a phenomenal rise in the use of anti-dumping measures by both developed and 
developing countries in recent years. South Africa has sought to tighten the anti- 
dumping agreement to minimise its possible abuse by excessively mercantilist 
interests in industrialised countries bent on cosseting inefficient `grandfather' 
industries. Although South Africa recognises the anti-dumping mechanism as a 
legitimate trade policy tool, it is concerned that loopholes in existing multilateral rules 
provide scope for trade discrimination against competitive foreign imports. This 
concern stems mainly from the continual barrage of anti-dumping measures to which 
South Africa has been subjected to, especially the high duties that have been imposed 
on South African steel exports by the US. 
563 The country has cultivated alliances 
with countries that seek to increase the threshold for imposing anti-dumping duties on 
imports from developing countries, make the application of the lesser duty role 
mandatory, and pursue deliberations on the definition anti-circumvention. SM South 
Africa has to tread cautiously on this issue though as it is also a frequent user of anti- 
dumping instruments and has deployed these massively since its reintegration into the 
global trade system in the early 1990s. 
565 
2.3. Subsidies 
Apart from setting out a clearer definition of what constitutes a subsidy, the UR 
negotiations established three distinct categories of subsidies: red category (prohibited 
susbsidies); amber category (actionable subsidies); and green category (non- 
562 McDonald, The World Trading System, p. 83 
563 Interview with Francis Moloi, Pretoria, 10 April 2003. 
564 Department of Trade and Industry, "Report on the Proceedings, " p. 12. 56s Interview with Mpho Leseka, Geneva, 13 June 2003. 
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actionable subsidies). Export subsidies, as well as any other subsidies made 
conditional upon the use of domestic goods over imported products, fall under the red 
category and are completely forbidden. Actionable subsidies are not necessarily 
proscribed but may be challenged under certain conditions. These subsidies are not 
overtly directed at the export market or export performance and to be actionable they 
ought to be specific rather than general. General subsidies are those that are 
automatically or generally available in line with published criteria; they are 
considered specific when they get allotted to certain industries, or if their eligibility is 
not deemed automatic. 
Furthermore, a subsidy is actionable if it adversely affects the interests of other 
countries. A non-actionable susbsidy is one that is non-specific and general. 
However, a specific subsidy can be considered non-actionable if it allocated for 
certain purposes such as industrial research and helping poor regions. 
566 The South 
African government has criticised the subsidies agreement for being harmful to the 
interests of developing nations. In particular, South Africa has questioned the 
classification of subsidies employed by industrialised countries - for example to short 
up research and development (R&D) and advance regional development - as non- 
actionable while those subsidies needed by developing countries to promote 
industrialisation and development are categorised as actionable. South Africa, 
consequently, has pushed for a widening of the list of non-actionable subsidies to 
encompass measures required to attain legitimate development goals, including 
566 McDonald, The World Trading System, pp. 103-108. 
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support for industrialisation, economic diversification, and production of high value- 
added goods 567 
2.4. Standards 
South Africa is concerned that technical and health standards are open to abuse by 
advanced countries for protectionist purposes. The WTO standards agreement 
encompasses standards that are applied to industrial and agricultural goods so as to 
achieve a degree of quality or safety for the consumer. 568 This does not include, 
however, subjects contained in the agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
These measures form part of the agricultural agreement and they are designed to deal 
with animal ailments such as foot and mouth and mad cow disease. It is now widely 
recognised within the WTO milieu that an excessive application of standards can 
obstruct trade unnecessarily. The WTO has attempted to overcome this problem by 
impressing upon its members to observe strictly the MFN and national treatment 
principles for imported goods. 569 Even so, a key problem facing poor countries is the 
paucity of resources to meet a burgeoning list of new standards. South Africa has 
highlighted the necessity for developing countries to be provided with technical, 
human and financial assistance so they can improve the quality of their exports 570 
2.5. Agriculture 
As a member of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters, South Africa has 
demanded a substantial liberalisation of farm trade in industrialised country 
567 Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach, " p. 3. 568 McDonald, The World Trading System, p. 116. 
569 Ibid., p. 117. 
570 Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach, " p. 4. 
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markets. 571 At their Punta del Este meeting in September 2001, Cairns Group 
Ministers committed themselves to achieving a far-reaching reform of agricultural 
trade through: the elimination of all forms of export subsidies; substantial 
improvements in market access; and substantial reduction in domestic support, 
including the elimination of trade and production distorting forms of support. srz 
South Africa's broad objectives for the multilateral negotiations on agriculture are to: 
achieve a substantial improvement of market opportunities for all its agricultural 
products with export potential; improve fair trade conditions on imported or exported 
agricultural products; and ensure that South Africa's rural development objectives are 
accommodated within the permissible range of WTO disciplines. The country has 
campaigned for tariff reductions and market access quotas so as to ensure substantial 
market access improvements in targeted markets for its agricultural exports. It has 
fought assiduously for the elimination of export subsidies and all forms of 
subsidisation as part of export credits, and demanded the strengthening of disciplines 
on the use of export credits. 573 
2.6. Services 
The service sector has attained a strategic significance in international trade in recent 
years. 574 The phenomenal expansion of services can be ascribed to the growing 
tradability of numerous services, shrinking economic distance and heightened demand 
for service standardisation. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
agreed in the UR, is designed to liberalise global trade in services and it is based on 
571 South Africa is the only African member of the Cairns Group. 
572 Cairns Group Ministers, "Doha Decision on Agriculture - Cairns Group Position, " Punta del Este, 
12 September 2001. 
573 Department of Trade and Industry, "Notes on South Africa's Approach, " pp. 4.5. spa Michel Kostecki, "International Trade in Services, " in Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire (eds. ) 
Trade Politics (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 69. 
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the principles of non-discrimination, reciprocity, market access, fair competition and 
transparency. 575 The paramountcy of the service sector, especially financial services, 
to the South African economy is underscored by the fact that services constitute 54 
percent of real GDP 576 Yet even though the South African state recognises the 
importance of services for economic development, it is concerned about the 
underlying structural inequalities in the development of the services sector between 
developed and developing countries. Given that the liberalisation of services has been 
at the top of the negotiating agendas of developed countries - principally the EU and 
Japan - but not a priority for most developing countries, the latter are likely to 
demand trade-offs in economic sectors in which they have a direct interest, for 
example agriculture, in return for concessions made in services. 577 
2.7. Industrial tariffs 
South Africa has backed the demands of developing countries on the reduction and 
elimination of industrial tariff peaks and tariff escalation - tariffs increase in line with 
the degree of product processing or manufacture - especially those pertaining to their 
areas of export interest and to value-adding economic sectors that possess the 
potential to expand their comparative advantages. While admitting that tariff 
escalation has decreased since the UR, South Africa has maintained that not only do 
progressive rises in tariffs from raw goods to manufactured products limit export 
opportunities but they also hinder vertical diversification and industrialisation in 
developing countries578 
575 Ibid. 
576 See World Trade Organisation, Trade Policy Review - Republic of South Africa (Geneva: WTO, 
1998), pp. 1-11. 
S" Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach, " p. 4. 578 Ibid., p. 5. 
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2.8. Trade and competition policy 
The impetus for international rules to regulate competition has been inspired by 
concerns about attempts to curb anti-competitive or business behaviour by 
corporations, which has taken the shape of trying to suffocate competition through 
price-fixing or the sharing out of markets. But it has also stemmed from the 
recognition that cutting tariff and non-tariff barriers is not sufficient to improve access 
to foreign markets for firms. 579 South African trade negotiators have pushed for the 
establishment of multilateral disciplines for trade and competition policy, which they 
consider to be central to addressing restrictive business practices and multi- 
jurisdictional aspects of company mergers. And they have contended that a balanced 
agreement on trade and competition policy should contain elements that: promote 
transparency in legislation and regulation governing competition law and policy; 
discipline cartels; encourage voluntary cooperation between competition agencies; 
define obligations to establish competition policy, law and enforcement agencies as 
dependent on the provision of multilateral financial and technical support; provide 
sufficient scope for preferences, derogations and exceptions for public policy and 
development objectives such as promotion of small and medium enterprises; and 
accommodate different national regimes in terms of policy, law and enforcement. sso 
2.9. Trade and investment 
Besides the GATS, which is concerned with trade or trade-related policies, WTO 
rules do not cover policies related to FDI. Any WTO member is allowed to pursue 
any FDI policies of their choice in non-service industries on condition that these 
579 McDonald, The World Trading System, pp. 285-286. 580 Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach, " p. 6. 
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policies do not result in discriminatory treatment of products. 
581 Some of the reasons 
put forward to justify the need for an international agreement on investment are that: 
such an agreement could help reduce investor uncertainty; since the GATS 
encompasses FDI, there's no justification not to have WTO disciplines covering non- 
service FDI; and an investment agreement would strengthen the hand of governments 
against those who oppose foreign investor entry. 
582 At Doha a number of countries - 
led by the EU but also including Japan, Canada, Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan and 
Norway - argued strongly for negotiating a global investment accord that would 
subject foreign investment to a multilaterally agreed regime that does away with 
583 
restrictions on investment and facilitate its free flow among WTO members. 
South Africa has argued that should a multilateral accord on investment be included 
in future trade negotiations, such an accord ought to be constructed in ways that 
prevent disruptive investment patterns in the economy as a whole or in particular 
sectors. This agreement would have to take account of concerns of developing 
countries and should, among other things: provide for transparency; provide for 
flexibility by permitting countries to impose limits and conditions on the right of 
establishment, MFN status, market access, and national treatment; permit appropriate 
performance requirements; provide for investor protection through intergovernmental 
dispute settlement procedures; and discipline incentives that divert investment to 
industrialised nations. 84 The push for the liberalisation of global FDI is not new. A 
few years ago the OECD tried without success to set up a multilateral agreement on 
investment (MAI). Although most developing countries had removed national 
say Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System 
- The WTO and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 418-419. 582 Ibid. 
S83 Jawara and Kwa, Behind the Scenes, p. 239. 
584 Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach, " pp. 5-6. 
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controls on inward FDI and MNC activity, they challenged the MAI on the grounds, 
among others, that "... a multilateral agreement would be binding and hold the threat 
of potential cross sanctions for transgressors; and that developing countries were 
wholly unprepared for such negotiations, either individually or as a group. "585 In 
particular, developing countries were concerned that industrialised economies were 
seeking to extend the definition of FDI covered by the proposed multilateral treaty to 
include intellectual and portfolio investment. 
Furthermore, the relentless drive to liberalise worldwide FDI and MNC activity had 
renewed concerns that globalisation has compelled states to take part in a "race to the 
bottom. " This refers to a situation whereby developing countries, in their quest to 
generate foreign investment, have resorted to lowering labour and environmental 
standards so that MNCs will be attracted to the countries with the least burdensome 
controls. In this context, competition for FDI has put downward pressure on global 
standards, leading to high levels of pollution and social dumping. This scenario poses 
an interesting challenge to the South African government, which recognises the 
"social clause" principle. Theoretically, this implies that South Africa would be 
forced to turn down FDI offers if it was deemed that such investment would 
undermine social standards or threaten economic stability. Given the country's 
desperate need for FDI, it remains to be seen whether the ANC government will 
always insist on the maintenance of social standards in its bargaining with MNCs. If 
a MAI-type arrangement were adopted by the WTO it would have an adverse impact 
on South Africa. For instance, the abortive MAI stipulated that "developing 
countries would not have the right to choose the composition of their total capital 
585 South Centre, Foreign Direct Investment, Development and the New Global Order (Geneva: South 
Centre, 1997), p. 9. 
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inflows, to select between FDI projects or to decide on the phasing of foreign 
investment in their economies. "586 
Furthermore, "they would also be precluded from setting performance requirements 
for foreign investors with a view to ensuring they contribute to the country's socio- 
economic development objectives. s587 If they had been implemented, these 
provisions would have constrained South Africa in two ways. First, they would have 
reduced its ability to pursue a strategic approach to FDI within the context of its 
national development objectives. Second, they would have prevented the country 
from imposing restrictions on the entry of FDI if it felt the costs of such investment 
outweighed the benefits. It is important that South Africa engages in bilateral and 
multilateral processes aimed at ensuring that the envisioned global investment regime 
is sensitive to its national development requirements and economic stability. 
2.10. Trade facilitation 
The concept of trade facilitation refers to "the simplification and harmonisation of 
international procedures affecting trade flows"588 At Doha the EU campaigned for 
the adoption of a series of measures to facilitate cross-border trade including: that 
Article X of the GATT - on publication and administration of trade regulations - be 
changed into an agreement; that WTO members' ability to take action at the border 
ought to be restricted to what is permissible in the WTO agreement; and that a regular 
consultative structure made of governments and the private sector be set up to 
586 South Centre, Foreign Direct Investment, p. 70. 
517 Ibid. 
sas Hoelanan and Kostecki, The Political Economy, p. 434. 
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recommend new laws and regulations prior to their implementation. 
589 South Africa 
contributed to the forging of an agreement aimed at simplifying trade procedures and 
believes that efficiency gains could be derived from this in terms of time, finance and 
human resources. Developing country trade is hobbled by numerous problems, 
including poor customs administration procedures and deficient physical 
infrastructure. South Africa has emphasised the urgency of developing a 
comprehensive and integrated plan to improve technical cooperation, financial 
support, and human and infrastructural capacity-building. 
590 
2.11. Transparency in government procurement 
The UR negotiations resulted in the adoption of measures, mainly procedural, to 
strengthen the agreement on government procurement. One of the key improvements 
is the procedure that allows a firm that has failed to secure a tender to appeal through 
an administrative or judicial mechanism; although administrative appeals existed in 
the previous system, it was not compulsory to have them. By making administrative 
appeals obligatory the new arrangement reinforces the transparency requirements of 
the new government procurement agreement. 91 Given that commitments to 
transparency will increase the financial, institutional and administrative burdens of 
developing states, the South African government has argued that the realisation of 
such commitments will depend on the degree to which industrialised states are willing 
to provide technical and financial backing and graft the necessary special and 
differential provisions into multilateral disciplines. South Africa has warned against 
the use of measures to improve transparency to pursue market access goals or 
589 Jawara and Kwa, Behind the Scenes, p. 243. 
59° Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach, " p. 7. s" McDonald, The World Trading System, p. 128. 
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undermine domestic development concerns and has emphasised that any multilateral 
agreement reached in this respect should take the shape of non-binding guidelines - 
it 
must not be subject to the dispute settlement mechanism 
592 
2.12. Labour and environmental standards 
South Africa does not consider the question of trade and environment a priority in the 
DR. Even though South Africa has approached the deliberations of the WTO's 
Committee on Trade and Environment with seriousness, it believes that focusing on 
the matter of trade and environment in the multilateral negotiations, where the 
possibility for making meaningful progress is negligible, would unduly delay progress 
on all other issues. As pointed out at the start of this chapter it is the EU, prompted 
by influential environmental lobbies, that has actively pushed for a linking of trade 
and environmental policies in the DR negotiations. Proponents of linkage argue that 
the rapid growth and development of the global economy has exerted tremendous 
pressure on the world's environment. This pressure, a by-product of industrialisation 
and intensive agricultural production, has resulted in pollution and environmental 
degradation. Coinciding with this has been an exponential growth in global trade, 
which has enabled multinational corporations to shift their environmental problems to 
countries where markets are less restricted than the home market. Not only do 
countries with lax environmental standards allow multinational firms to contaminate 
the environment in ways prohibited in their home countries, they enable these 
corporations to export goods from their new production facilities far less costly than 
they had been produced in their countries of origin. As such, environmental lobbies 
believe that although trade is not the foremost cause of environmental pollution, it has 
592 Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach, " p. 6 
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aggravated environmental problems 593 Irrespective of whether these arguments are 
well-founded or not, it is likely that calls on policymakers to employ trade policy as a 
tool to contain environmental degradation will intensify in future multilateral 
negotiations. 
South Africa supports the promotion of labour standards, although it has resisted 
attempts to include them in the WTO negotiating agenda and cautioned against 
countries using them for protectionist ends. Although in principle South Africa has 
embraced core labour standards, it has opposed their subjection to WTO disciplines, 
fearing that this would scupper progress in multilateral trade negotiations. For this 
reason South Africa has advised that the responsibility for setting and promoting 
labour standards ought to reside with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
which should liaise closely with the WTO Secretariat. 594 South Africa's support for 
labour standards reflects an important concession made by the ANC government to 
COSATU, a key member of South Africa's ruling tripartite alliance. The South 
African trade union movement has lobbied for an inclusion of a social clause in all 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. It is worth noting, however, that the South 
African government tried without success in the past to propose a social clause in 
bilateral agreements with Malaysia, Thailand, the Phillipines and Cuba. 595 The 
campaign by South Africa's labour movement for the enshrinement of labour 
standards has been inspired partly by concerns about the consequences of economic 
integration within the SADC region, with fears that "regional integration in South 
Africa will give South African companies the licence to find the cheapest production 
593 McDonald, The World Trading System, p. 257. 
594 Department of Trade and Industry, "Note on South Africa's Approach, " p. 7. 19' See Shafika Isaacs, South Africa in the Global Economy (Durban: The Trade Union Research 
Project, 1997), pp. 91-92. 
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site in the region, and thus bid down wages and working conditions 
in South 
Africa. , 596 Additionally, anxieties have been expressed about the possible 
implications for South Africa's economic competitiveness of the country's 
mushrooming trade relations with the Asian region. 
3. South Africa and Africa in the Doha Round 
The initial position of most African countries was to obstruct a new round of WTO 
negotiations on the grounds that they had given away more than they had got in the 
UR and were reluctant to support a new round of trade liberalisation unless pledges 
made by developed countries during the UR to provide them with larger market 
access for their agricultural products and apparel and textile exports, as well as with 
the necessary technical assistance to implement their WTO obligations, had been 
fulfilled. Driving this African offensive to resist the inclusion of the `new issues' in 
the Doha negotiating agenda were several African states which had organised 
themselves in the LMG. Although South Africa agreed that Africa's concerns - 
especially the implementation of outstanding UR agreements by developed countries 
- ought to be prioritised, it argued nevertheless 
for broad-based negotiations covering 
the `new issues. ' In other words, while South Africa did not support the ambitious 
EU agenda it was prepared to consider a modified, less ambitious and carefully 
defined agenda. In adopting this position the country was influenced not only by a 
recognition of rapid changes in the global economy that needed to be accommodated 
within the WTO - the Singapore issues were not urgent priorities but it was necessary 
to address them sooner rather than later - but also by a conviction that a wider 
S' Alan Hirsch, "From the GATT to the WTO, " p. 53. 
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negotiating agenda would make it possible for developing nations to wring 
concessions from industrialised countries in respect of agriculture and industrial 
tariffs. 597 
It is worth placing the differences between South Africa and its regional trade partners 
in perspective. South Africa's Doha negotiating posture, it could be argued, is in part 
reflective of the collaborative and bridge-building role which so-called `middle 
powers' tend to adopt in multilateral institutions. 599 South Africa's negotiating 
position in the DR is based on the premise that it strives to champion the interests of 
developing nations, particularly African countries, while ensuring that its interests as 
a trading nation are not bypassed. 599 One of the key ways in which South Africa has 
advanced its `bridge-building' role has been through its readiness to assume 
leadership responsibilities on various multilateral institutions such as the UNCTAD, 
SADC, NAM and Commonwealth. As Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen 
explained: 
In these various leadership capacities, South Africa has been able to 
`punch above its weight'... In practical terms this means that South 
Africa's intervention, or support for a particular position, sometimes 
was crucial in breaking a deadlock, or securing the co-operation of the 
various parties to the multilateral initiative 600 
Critics of South African trade policy have blamed the country's Doha negotiating 
strategy for fomenting disunity among African countries, thereby undermining their 
597 Interview with Faizel Ismail, Geneva, 13 March 2003. 
598 See A. Cooper, R. Higgott and K. R. Nossal (eds. ) Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and 
Canada in an Evolving World Order (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1993). 
599 Interview with Tshediso Matona, Pretoria, 7 April 2002. 
600 Philip Nel, Ian Taylor and Janis van der Westhuizen, "Reformist Initiatives and South Africa's 
Multilateral Diplomacy: A Framework for Understanding, " in Philip Nel, Ian Taylor and Janis van der Westhuizen (eds. ), South Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change (Aldershot; Ashgate, 
2001), p. 2. 
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interests and weakening their bargaining power within the WTO. 
601 While 
understandable, these criticisms downplay a crucial dilemma faced by intermediate 
economic powers such as South Africa in the international political economy. 
Partially industrialised, South Africa's economic profile exhibits the traits of both 
developed and underdeveloped societies. This explains why even though the country 
has identified with the trade problems faced by its less developed African counterparts 
- and has actively pushed for their resolution - 
it has also sought to advance its trade 
policy objectives in respect of the new WTO issues in which it has a keen interest. 
South Africa, unlike most of its African counterparts, is fundamentally a trading 
nation - over 50 per cent of its national economy is dependent on external trade. 
Moreover, South Africa has ambitions to become a dynamic manufacturing economy 
with a diversified export base. 602 The country has an interest, therefore, in working 
for the success of the global trading system and cannot afford to insulate itself from 
the world economy in the same way as some African countries can. 03 The low level 
of agricultural development and the problems intrinsic to some African economies has 
prompted them to focus primarily on the need for technical assistance rather than on 
expanding their export capacity. It is for this reason that the NEPAD places special 
accent on agriculture, industrialisation and boosting the export capabilities of African 
nations. Additionally, South Africa is relatively endowed with technical capabilities 
- increasingly shared with its SACU trade partners - to participate actively in the 
WTO processes and has not refrained from exploiting its strengths in this regard. 
601 See for example Dot Keet, "South Africa's Official Position, " and Patrick Bond, "South Africa's 
Sub-Imperial Trade Agenda - Splitting Africa to Launch a New Multilateral Round, " undated. 602 Department of Trade and Industry Annual Report 2000/1 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 2001) 
13-16. 3 
Interview with Tshediso Matona,, Pretoria, 7 April 2002. 
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These considerations do not, of course, imply that African countries cannot forge 
coordinated positions on strategic issues. What they do underline though is that it is 
not unusual for countries, even close allies, to hold different positions on trade 
negotiations. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that most of the differences that have 
arisen between South Africa and its regional trade partners have been about process 
not substance. In reality, the Africa Group within the WTO (AGW) - an informal 
caucus group made up of Geneva-based African trade representatives set up at the end 
of the UR to spearhead African trade diplomacy and forge unified African positions 
within the WTO in recent years. 604 Its establishment was inspired generally by a 
recognition among African countries that if they were to become a force to be 
reckoned with within the WTO they had to pool their intellectual and technical 
resources and work together as a unified force in pursuit of common goals. 
Specifically, the AGW was formed with the aim of developing the capacity of African 
countries to engage meaningfully with implementation issues arising from the UR. 
The AGW, it is worth emphasising, is not a monolithic entity but a hybrid formation 
encompassing African countries that belong to overlapping groupings such as the 
least developed countries (LDCs), the African Union (AU), as well as the ACP group 
of nations. As it is argued later in this chapter, it is this heterogeneous character of 
AGW membership that poses the most serious challenge to the group's future 
viability. The AGW meets regularly to synchronise African countries' trade 
negotiating positions on sectoral and product specific provisions. Its meetings are 
convened and chaired by participating states on a rotational basis, with the incumbent 
604 The meetings of the AWG are convened and chaired by participating states on a rotational basis and 
the incumbent state acts as a general spokesperson of all countries for the duration of its one-year 
tenure. Although the AWG's status is informal, its views are accorded serious attention within the WTO primarily because they are elaborated in consultation with trade bureaucrats and political 
principals in the national capitals. 
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state acting as a general spokesperson of all countries for the duration of its one-year 
tenure. Its activities are predominantly interest-driven or issue-based, and countries 
participate voluntarily depending on the issues under consideration. Although the 
AGW does not have a special representational status in the formal WTO processes, it 
nonetheless provides an important platform for intra-Africa dialogue and for 
formulating common positions on issues arising from the WTO system in Geneva. 
Furthermore, it has sought to strengthen African coalition building efforts, especially 
in respect of forging South-South alliances. 
The AGW played a pivotal role in crafting the DDA and has pushed very hard for a 
positive negotiating outcome on three issues of major interest to African countries - 
namely, agriculture, trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and public 
health, as well as special and differential treatment (SDT). And its negotiating efforts 
on TRIPs and SDT have borne relative success. The conclusion of an agreement in 
August 2003 allowing developing countries confronted with public health 
emergencies - particularly those induced by epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and tuberculosis - to override patents and import copies of life-saving drugs 
represented a huge victory for the AGW, especially given that such an agreement was 
nearly foiled by the US administration - at the behest of the country's powerful 
pharmaceutical industry - which had wanted the patent override to be extended only 
to the LDCs and for a limited number of diseases. 605 Acting in unison, African 
countries - supported by other developing nations - also succeeded to persuade WTO 
members to set up working groups to examine the relationship between trade, debt 
605 'Last-minute deal on cheap drugs, ' The Guardian 28`h August 2003; see also 'US wrecks cheap deal, ' The Guardian 21" December 2002. p 
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and finance, as well as between trade and technology transfer - crucial issues of 
enormous interest to poor countries. 
WTO members also committed themselves to the goal of providing duty-free and 
quota-free access for goods produced by the LDCs 
606 Moreover, the ACP countries 
secured a waiver of the WTO rule stipulating that any trade deal accorded to one 
member must be extended to all members. Designed to accommodate the Cotonou 
agreement, the waiver will be effective until the preferential market access granted to 
ACP exports by the EU terminates on 31 December 2007.07 At Doha developing 
countries also extracted a commitment from industrialised countries to provide 
technical assistance to poor countries, although it was not specified what the scale of 
assistance offered would be and how the needs of individual countries would be 
determined and fulfilled. 608 Significantly, vital progress has also been made on the 
agreement on 28 proposals designed to extend special and differential treatment to 
developing countries. 
4. South Africa and the Cancun Minsiterial Meeting 
The collapse of the WTO negotiations in Cancun in September 2003 marked a turning 
point in the history of trade relations between industrialised and developing nations. 
Thanks to their steadfast unity, for the first time in almost two decades the developing 
countries successfully thwarted attempts by the developed nations to ride roughshod 
over their interests and concerns. Moreover, the Cancun meeting was notable for the 
assertive manner in which developing countries articulated their concerns: African 
6'56 Cronin, "The Doha Round, " p. 385. 
607 World Trade Organisation, Doha Declarations, pp. 51-57. 
608 Ibid., pp. 33-35. 
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countries actively participated in the negotiations and succeeded to place their trade 
interests at the heart of the negotiating agenda. 
It is still to early to determine the precise cause of the Cancun collapse but a number 
of factors seem to have been responsible for the ministerial meeting's failure. First, 
both the EU and the US were not willing to drastically reduce their agricultural 
subsidies, a key demand of developing nations. As the former Mexican president, 
Ernesto Zedillo, suggested: 
The unexpected US-EU alliance was the fundamental cause of the 
Doha Round debacle at Cancun. That alliance immediately triggered 
the formation of an opposition led by Brazil, India and China that not 
only produced its own agricultural proposal but also remained militant 
and, admittedly, inflexible on many other issues until the 
breakdown. 609 
Linked to this was the unwillingness of the US to address the grievances of four 
competitive West African countries - Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali - for the 
removal of export subsidies on cotton. This alienated many smaller developing 
nations and hardened their resolve to oppose the discussion of the "Singapore issues" 
- investment, competition, trade facilitation and transparency in government 
procurement. 610 Three groups of predominantly African states played a central role 
in the collapse of the Cancun meeting. The LDCs, the AU, and the ACP states 
refused to negotiate until the EU and its negotiating allies - including South Korea 
and Japan - had backed down on their insistence on discussing the "Singapore issues. 
Third, some participants suggested that the conference Chairman, Mexican Foreign 
609 'Mysteries of Trade Diplomacy, ' Current Events l la' October 2003. 610 `Put the trade talks back on track, ' Financial Times 14th October 2003. 
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Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez, ended the negotiations prematurely. 611 Fourth, the 
emergence of the influential Group of 20+ (G20+) developing countries - marshalled 
by Brazil and including China, India and South Africa - provided a counterweight to 
the enormous bargaining power of the US and the EU and made it difficult for these 
economic powers to resort to their long-standing divide and rule tactics of buying off 
small nations with bilateral deals or threats. 
Fifth, and interestingly, the LDCs and ACP states were opposed to an ambitious 
multilateral liberalisation of agriculture. At issue were the trade preferences that 
have been historically enjoyed by the LDCs and the ACP group of states. The ACP 
countries, in particular, have gained from the EU-ACP banana, sugar, beef and rum 
trade protocols. Given that the these states have benefited from the artificially high 
prices created by the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), they have been 
concerned about the potentially adverse consequences a disintegration of this 
protectionist trade regime would have on their monocrop economies. 612 This 
vulnerability played into the hands of the US, EU and Japan, which exploited it by 
diligently courting the LDCs and ACP countries. Complicating matters was the fact 
that African Group was chaired by Mauritius, a trade preference-reliant country that 
calculated that its national economic interest resided with joining forces with assorted 
agricultural protectionists such as Switzerland, Japan and Norway. Furthermore, the 
unity of African countries was undermined by the fact that the G20+ developing 
... See for example Faisel Ismail, "An Insider's Insight, " in Peter Draper and Steven Gruzd (eds. ) 
Africa After Cancun: Trade Negotiations in Uncertain Times (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2003) pp. 9-19. 
612 See S. Tangermann, The Future of Preferential Trade Arrangements for Developing Countries and the Current Round of WTO Negotiations on Agriculture (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
2002). 
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country coalition had expended the bulk of its diplomatic muscle on negotiating with 
613 the EU and the US at the expense of harnessing the cohesion of the Africa Group 
The stalemate on the issue of trade preferences constitutes a threat to the AGW's 
ability to champion African trade interests in a unified and coherent way. It is 
important, therefore, that this problem is tackled proactively and constructively by 
both developed and developing countries. The EU must desist from exploiting the 
legitimate concerns of the ACP states about the possible whittling down of their 
preferences to stall movement on agricultural liberalisation. The LDCs and ACP 
countries, for their part, need to come to terms with the fact their long-term economic 
security does not lie with reliance on preferences. While trade preferences have 
undoubtedly benefited the poorest nations in the past, they have serious drawbacks. 
Their key shortcoming is that they are unilateral and can be withdrawn arbitrarily by 
the countries that provide them. Trade preferences have also been criticised by trade 
economists, notably Jagdish Bhagwati, for diverting trade away from non-preferred 
countries, thereby playing off poor nations against each other. 614 
Additionally, preferences can foster a debilitating culture of dependence in their 
recipients. Even so, there is a need for the industrialised nations to ensure that the 
poorest developing countries do not shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs of 
adjustment in the former's agricultural sector and to assist these low-income nations 
to diversify their economies away from agriculture. Without innovative solutions to 
the conundrum of preferences there will remain difficulties and tensions between the 
61 For an insider's view of what transpired at Canciºn see "Statement on the 5' Ministerial Meeting of 
the World Trade Organisation held in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003, " a statement made by the 
South African Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, to the South African National Parliament, 
Cape Town 26 September 2003. 
6'a `The poor's best hope, ' The Economist 20th June 2002. 
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preference-dependent African nations and those African countries that stand to benefit 
from a radically reformed CAP regime. As was implied earlier, South Africa's Doha 
negotiating stance has resulted in the country being viewed with skepticism within the 
AGW. It is worth noting, however, that South Africa's position tilted closer to that 
of the AGW in the build-up to the Cancun ministerial. This came soon after a crucial 
role played by the country in brokering the deal on TRIPs and public health. These 
actions attested to South Africa's commitment to African solidarity and coalition 
building. Yet South Africa's role within the AGW is likely to remain marginal, 
confined to spearheading coalition building efforts and making the odd interventions 
in issues of strategic concern. For South Africa's global ambitions imply that it is 
likely to find higher common ground with other emerging industrial economies, an 
increasingly important divide. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined South Africa's approach to the DR of multilateral trade 
negotiations. South Africa believes that that the DR represents a chance for 
developing countries to provide leadership on issues of multilateral trade and 
development. For this reason South Africa has sought to carve a role for itself as 
facilitator and broker in the Doha trade negotiations. South Africa's negotiating 
stance in the DR is predicated on the idea that it seeks to defend the interests of 
developing nations, particularly African countries, while ensuring that its interests as 
a trading nation are not neglected. For South Africa, therefore, preserving the 
credibility of the WTO and preventing its breakdown is an overriding objective. A 
rules-based world trade system, whilst defective, provides a firm foundation for 
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ensuring that global trade processes are not determined exclusively by economic 
power plays. The DR has exposed, however, the limits faced by South Africa in 
pursuing its strategic objectives. The degree to which South Africa's strategic 
negotiating objectives can be achieved depends, therefore, not only the resilience of 
the rules-based multilateral trade regime but also on the extent which the country can 
marry its global ambitions with its domestic and regional obligations. 
Restoring momentum to the DDA has become a pressing imperative for all WTO 
member states, developed and developing. For poor African countries have more to 
lose from an unsuccessful negotiating round. The DDA has placed the issue of 
development at its core, implying a greater commitment by industrialised countries to 
accommodate the sensitivities of poor nations. Already, important advances have 
been made on the issues of access to essential medicines for the poorest nations as 
well as on the agreement on SDT. Yet more needs to be done if the Doha Round is 
to succeed. First, a breakthrough is badly required on the issue of agricultural 
liberalisation. Agricultural liberalisation is the centrepiece of the DDA and 
agreement on the agenda for it was a major factor in the decision to launch a new 
round of trade negotiations. As such, failure to achieve meaningful progress in this 
area will continue to impede movement on all other items on the Doha agenda. 
Ironically, one of the few positive outcomes of the Cancun meeting is that it has 
placed the mater of agriculture firmly on the negotiating agenda: it can no longer be 
ignored by the EU and other protectionist countries in the industrialised world. Both 
the EU and the US ought to take the lead and make significant concessions on export 
and domestic subsidies in agriculture. The commitments made at the WTO General 
Council meeting in August 2004 by the EU and the US respectively to terminate 
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export subsidies as well as to curtail food aid and export credit programmes bode well 
for the revitalisation of the WTO process. 615 The next important step the US and the 
EU need to take is to signal that they also intend to make headway on the elimination 
of import barriers and domestic subsidies. 
Second, larger developing countries such as South Africa, Brazil and India must 
recognise that the goal of ambitious agricultural reform cannot be attained without 
them making deeper commitments on non-agricultural market access. Furthermore, 
these emerging market economies must eliminate their trade barriers to products from 
the LDCs. These barriers not only impede market access of exports from the LDCs, 
they also hinder these poor countries' attempts to diversify their economies, most of 
which are dependent on a very limited range of export products. Third, a degree of 
flexibility on the part of both the developed and the developing countries is required 
on the "Singapore issues. " The EU must either remove from the negotiating agenda 
or unbundle the "Singapore issues, " and must refrain from using these issues as a 
bargaining chip on agriculture. Unbundling the "Singapore issues" would entail 
eliminating from the agenda the negotiation of multilateral agreements on the issues 
of investment and competition policy and focusing on transparency in government 
procurement and trade facilitation, which are not only less controversial but also 
clear-cut market access issues. The flexibility shown by the EU on this issue in 
Cancun, albeit too late in the day, provides a basis for moving ahead. Likewise 
countries, including the LDCs and ACP states, that were implacably opposed the 
inclusion of all four issues need to review their positions and embrace a more 
accommodating stance. 
615 `Real trade negotiations still lie ahead, ' Financial Times 2nd August 2004. 
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Fourth, the US ought to respond credibly to the demands of four competitive West 
African countries - Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali - for the removal of export 
subsidies on cotton. The unwillingness of the US to address these countries' concerns 
in Cancun alienated numerous smaller developing nations and hardened their resolve 
to oppose the discussion of the "Singapore issues. " Not only has the problem of 
cotton subsidies exposed the egregious inequities inherent in the WTO agricultural 
regime, it has become a litmus test for the Doha Round; several African countries 
consider its resolution as central to recommencing the Doha negotiating process. 
Significantly, the WTO recently upheld an earlier ruling that backed a claim by 
Brazil, supported by other countries, 616 that the more than US$3 billion in subsidies 
paid by the US to its cotton farmers distorted global prices and contravened 
international trade rules. 617 If implemented, this decision could go a long way 
towards not only strengthening the hand of cotton producers in the developing world 
but also in invigorating and propelling the global trade agenda forward. This is 
perhaps one area where South Africa can use its diplomatic influence within the WTO 
to help secure a fair and just dispensation for these African cotton producers. 
Fifth, whilst important, the issue of institutional reform - to which the EU ascribed 
Cancun's failure - must not be allowed to sidestep the resolution of substantive issues 
on the Doha agenda. 618 This does not suggest, however, that the WTO's procedural 
problems should be downplayed or ignored. To be sure, the appointment by the 
WTO director-general, Supachai Panitchpakdi, of a consultative board (led by Peter 
616 Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chad, China, the EU, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Taiwan and Venezuela. 
617 `WTO rules against US cotton subsidies, ' The New York Times 19th June 2004. 
618 See `Crushed at Cancun, ' Financial Times 15" September 2003. 
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Sutherland, a former head of GATT) to prepare recommendations on the future of the 
WTO attests to a recognition that the institutional arrangements of the organisation 
need to be adapted to accommodate the needs of its fast-growing and increasingly 
diverse membership. Yet it is important to bear in mind that the governance structure 
of the WTO was a product of negotiation not a precondition for negotiation. As such, 
a case can be made that it makes sense for the organisation's procedural problems to 
be dealt with in the future, preferably once the DR has concluded. Reaching 
consensus first on what the purpose of the WTO is could go a long way towards 
clarifying and settling institutional problems. 619 Collectively, these undertakings are 
necessary for fence-mending and confidence-building and could provide a firm basis 
for putting the Doha Round back on track. 
619 Interview with Katie Waters, Geneva, 15/06/03. 
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Conclusion 
1. The Argument 
The central research question of the thesis concerned the rationale for the trade policy 
reforms that have been undertaken by the South African state in the post-apartheid 
era. The thesis has challenged conventional accounts of trade policy reform in South 
Africa, which have excessively stressed economic factors to explain trade reform in 
South Africa to the exclusion of other vital considerations such as the role of power in 
the world economy, the dynamic interface between domestic and international 
politics, the effects of globalisation on national policies and domestic economies, and 
the impact of domestic politics on strategies and outcomes. As such, the thesis has 
contended, these accounts are vulnerable on theoretical and empirical grounds. The 
key question this study set out to answer was: Considering the relatively sufficient 
U 
scope for manouevre it had vis-ä-vis the IFIs when it came to office in 1994 why, 
then, did the ANC government adopt and even strengthen the trade liberalisation 
policies that had been initiated by the apartheid government in the late 1980s, 
particularly in light of some evidence that trade liberalisation in South Africa had 
already reached a highly developed stage by the end of the 1980s and that the central 
barriers to rapid export growth were unrelated to trade policy? 620 
International experience has demonstrated in the past that comprehensive trade policy 
reforms have been introduced in the aftermath of major economic crises. 
Policymakers can use an economic crisis as a pretext to undertake far-reaching 
reforms that would have been unthinkable in normal times. And, invariably, the IFIs 
620 Bell, State and Market, pp. 83-127. 
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have played a key part in pushing for the implementation of such reforms. 621 In this 
context trade liberalisation is frequently depicted, therefore, as an unwanted policy 
that is foisted upon national economies by the conditionalities prescribed by the IFIs. 
Yet this has not been precisely so in the case of South Africa. As the thesis has 
shown trade reform in South Africa, unlike in most African countries, has been 
dictated by domestic considerations. Of course, this should not be interpreted to 
imply that the `crisis' explanation of trade reform bears no relevance to South Africa. 
As indicated in Chapter 3, the structural crisis that hit the country since the late 1970s 
has been an important trigger of economic policy changes that have been 
implemented in the past decade. However, it is worth emphasising, these changes 
have not been executed as part of structural adjustment programmes dictated by the 
IFIs. On the contrary, in spite of the neo-liberal ideological pressure to which the 
ANC leadership was subjected to in the early 1990s (Chapter 5), its economic policies 
were eventually the consequence of a homegrown and self-imposed structural 
adjustment programme, not one foisted from outside. 
It is for this reason that thesis has argued that trade reform in South Africa has not 
been prompted by solely economic considerations but has also been influenced by 
domestic and international political economy factors. Trade reform in South Africa 
has been the linchpin of a global adjustment strategy pursued by the domestic political 
elites by which they have sought to fulfill South Africa's global, regional and 
domestic political and economic objectives including: a determination on the part of 
the ANC government to reintegrate South Africa into the global political economy 
after decades of international ostracism; a desire to gain the confidence of domestic 
62' Rodrik, "The Limits of Trade Policy Reform, " p. 89. 
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and international financial markets; a drive to restore political, diplomatic and 
economic relations with African countries and to pursue South Africa's regional 
hegemonic ambitions; and a quest to lock in the government's macroeconomic 
economic policy reforms and curb the power of domestic interests that gained from a 
sheltered economy in the past. In this respect trade policy has been deployed to 
pursue domestic as much as foreign political and economic policy objectives. 
The thesis has demonstrated that South African policymakers have actively pursued 
trade reform as a strategy to dispose of South Africa's erstwhile image of 
international pariah and reinsert it into the global political economy on the basis of 
outward-oriented growth. As was detailed in Chapter 2, the ANC inherited from the 
apartheid state an economy hobbled by serious structural problems. Thanks to an 
over-prolonged policy of import substitution industrialisation and decades of gross 
economic mismanagement, South Africa entered the twenty-first century with: a low 
GDP growth rate; unsustainable levels of public debt; plummeting rates of gross fixed 
investment and soaring rates of capital flight; dismal levels of private investment and 
declining competitiveness; high unemployment and shortage of skilled labour; low 
investment in research and development; a stunted small and medium business sector; 
and recurrent balance of payments constraints. The economy's overwhelming 
dependence on traditional commodity exports exposed it to volatile price fluctuations 
on the global markets. Collectively, these problems confirmed South Africa's 
economic status in the NIDL as one that was not dissimilar to those of many 
underdeveloped countries. 
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The reintegration of South Africa into the global economy and the restoration of its 
trade rights within the WTO system have spawned positive political, diplomatic and 
economic gains for South Africa. They marked the end of decades of international 
isolation induced by the country's apartheid policies. The installation of a democratic 
government in 1994 induced a favourable international disposition towards South 
Africa, a key catalyst in South Africa's subsequent assumption of the leadership of 
multilateral bodies such as the UNCTAD, the NAM and the Commonwealth (see 
Chapter 7). Chapter 4 highlighted a number of significant changes that the South 
African economy has undergone since the conclusion of the UR of trade negotiations, 
laying strong foundations for the pursuit of decision-makers' stated policy goal of 
creating a dynamic export-led economy. A perfunctory analysis of post-apartheid 
South African manufacturing performance has revealed an increasingly robust, 
resilient and growing export sector. The crisis that beset South Africa's 
manufacturing prior to 1994 has made way for a sustained upward trend in 
manufacturing exports. Furthermore, South Africa has benefited immensely from the 
expanded trade opportunities brought about by multilateral, regional and bilateral 
market access agreements, as well the reinforcement of the rule of law in international 
trade. Market opening has benefited South Africa by not only improving access for its 
goods and services to traditional developed country markets (the EU and North 
America) - although there is still ample room for South Africa to expand access for 
its agricultural and manufactured products to these regions - but also by exposing it to 
new ones (Africa, East Asia and Latin America). 
Yet these positive developments must be qualified. For although there has been a 
structural transformation of South Africa's export basket during the second half of the 
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1990s - with some sectors beginning to reap the 
benefits of liberalisation and 
selective export promotion - this has been achieved at a very low 
base. Moreover, the 
export gains that have been made in new sectors have been reversed 
by export losses 
that have been incurred in industries such as gold, coal and other mining. South 
Africa has a long way to go, therefore, before it can optimally bolster its 
industrial 
manufacturing base, whose development was stifled by over-prolonged 
inward- 
oriented industrialisation policies and poor competitiveness performance. 
Furthermore, as the analysis of South Africa's export performance in Chapters 4 and 6 
has attested it will take South Africa many years to accomplish its objective of 
becoming a fully-fledged outward-oriented manufacturing economy. 
Whether the industrialisation process in South Africa can replicate that of the East 
Asian economic tigers - with whom South African policymakers are frequently wont 
to make comparisons - remains doubtful. In Chapter 1 we saw that the powerful 
strength of East Asia's developmental states vis-ä-vis societal interest bestowed upon 
them a degree of autonomy that enabled decision-making elites to define 
developmental goals independently and to insulate themselves organisationally from 
societal pressures. The relative autonomy enjoyed by these states provided them with 
the capacity to take advantage of their control over the production process to 
influence actor behaviour and mobilise social support for their policies. The 
Weberian character of the state institutions of the East Asian NICs - with their 
characteristic emphasis on highly meritocratic and selective recruitment of 
bureaucratic personnel - instilled a sense of commitment and corporate coherence, 
which promoted conditions where the pursuit of corporate goals had been rewarded 
and the maximisation of individual self-interest discouraged. This, in turn, enhanced 
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the insulation of bureaucratic incumbents from societal influence. As the thesis 
argued in Chapter 5, it does not appear that South Africa can emulate the experience 
of the East Asian `economic tigers' in this regard. For a start, the South African state 
does not boast the extensive degree of autonomy and authority once enjoyed by its 
East Asian counterparts thanks to the country's robustly democratic (rather than 
authoritarian) political system and the massive power still wielded by domestic capital 
and labour in relation to the state. This does not, nonetheless, detract from the 
argument advanced in this study that the South African state has used the restricted 
nature of corporatism in South Africa to not only to lock in the government's austere 
macroeconomic policy but also to curtail the power of fractions of domestic capital 
and labour that benefited from trade protectionism in the past. Corporatism has 
provided the state, albeit within the limited confines of an institutional setting, with a 
leverage to bargain with its social partners over economic policy and with a breathing 
space to consolidate its economic reform agenda both at international and domestic 
levels. In return for their co-operation, the South African state has allowed these 
domestic interests enhanced institutional representation in economic policymaking 
under the auspices of the NEDLAC. In this sense trade policy has been employed to 
serve domestic as much as foreign political and economic policy ends. 
Furthermore, when contrasted with those of its East Asian counterparts the domestic 
and global conditions under which the South African state has been reintegrating itself 
into the world economy are likely to make it difficult for the country to reproduce the 
developmental model of the East Asian NICs. 622 First, these NICs (especially 
Korea and Taiwan) used their geo-strategic significance during the Cold War to win 
6' For a perceptive analysis of the dynamics of South Africa's political and economic transition see Roger Southall, "The New South Africa in the New World Order: beyond the double whammy, " Third World Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1,1994. 
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preferential access to the US markets without having to reciprocate by opening their 
own markets. This provided a vast captive market for their export commodities. 
Second, in line with their roles as bulwarks against communism these states took 
advantage of US military and economic aid to bolster their domestic savings and low 
patterns of consumption. Third, they embarked upon export-led growth when most 
industrialising countries were still pursuing import-substitution policies. These 
special conditions provided a unique geo-political and economic context in which the 
developmental goals of the NICs have been realised. 
It is unlikely, however, that this success can be attained elsewhere in the post-Cold 
War period. The end of the Cold War has implied that developing states cannot 
continue to enjoy preferential treatment - in terms of market access as well as 
economic aid - similar to that provided by the US to its client states during the Cold 
War. Moreover, the inexorable pursuit of trade liberalisation by national states under 
conditions of enhanced economic globalisation in the past decade has meant that 
individual states are under growing pressure to embrace more liberal trade and 
investment policies. 623 In addition, the effects of globalisation on the national state 
cannot be ignored. This thesis concurs with Scholte's assertion that although there 
has been some continuity in the role of the state under conditions of globalisation (in 
the sense that inter-state relations still comprise the substance of governance 
mechanisms in the globalising world), there has also been conspicuous change in the 
character of the state in terms its capacities, policy-making processes and 
constituencies. 624 All these considerations suggest that South Africa will be best 
623 Strange, The Retreat of the State, p. 6. 
624 Scholte, "Global Capitalism, " p. 428. 
320 
served by pursuing a developmental model that is uniquely suited to its domestic 
political, social and economic conditions. 
The pursuit by South Africa of a trade policy explicitly geared at bolstering exports 
has raised questions about whether in the long-term export-orientation can deal 
adequately with the country's formidable developmental challenges. As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 1, the advantages of an outward-oriented trade strategy over that of 
import-substitution industrialisation are now widely recognised. In the post war- 
period, countries that pursued an open trade policy experienced faster economic 
growth than those that did not. The dynamic economies of East Asia registered 
exponential growth rates thanks in part to their open trade policies, whereas those 
economies (chiefly in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East) that stuck 
excessively to inward-looking development policies were hobbled by dreadful growth 
performance. Yet a key problem that has been raised consistently by COSATU in the 
South African context (Chapter 5) is that although the outward-oriented strategy has 
considerably strengthened the country's manufacturing performance, export growth 
has not resulted in increased employment. On the contrary, in numerous cases the 
shift to export orientation at enterprise level has led to a restructuring of production 
that has shed jobs. 25 In sum, South Africa's outward-oriented model "does not add 
up to a strategic policy of the Japanese or South Korean varieties. Measures arc 
predominantly supply-side and bereft of an overt role for the state in targeting and 
buttressing, for instance, the development of labour-intensive industries or of coaxing 
and rewarding job creation and productivity advances. "626 It could be inferred, thus, 
that while there has been broad, albeit fragile, consensus among the key social actors 
625 Cosatu, "Cosatu Submission, " p. 29. 
626 Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change, p. 128. 
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- the state, capital and labour - on the centrality of export-oriented manufacturing as a 
way to achieve international competitiveness, the government's trade policy has been 
characterised by deficiencies. Export growth has been overly capital-intensive and 
the resourcing of more labour-intensive forms of beneficiation and industrial activity 
has been overlooked. It is apparent that in some areas trade liberalisation has 
proceeded much further than has been required or could have been negotiated, leading 
to significant job losses in certain industrial sectors such as the footwear industry 
(Chapter 4). Supply-side measures to compensate for the resulting competitive 
pressures or to promote successful restructuring have been limited and lacking 
appropriate sequencing with trade reform. A labour-abundant country such as South 
Africa cannot sustain an employment-insensitive trade policy. Nor can trade policy 
be oblivious to the legacy of the dual character of the South African economy, which 
is characterised by the dominance of the small, modem and developed sector over the 
large, neglected and underdeveloped economy. 
The experience of Mexico has demonstrated that although trade liberalisation can 
create conditions conducive to growth, it is not a panacea for development problems. 
NAFTA did play a crucial role in consolidating Mexican political and economic 
reforms, in opening the previously sheltered economy to external competition, in 
forcing Mexican corporations become more efficient and focused, and in shoring up 
the productive capacity of Mexico's automobile sector. However, as Chapter 6 has 
illustrated, the sustainability of Mexico's economic boom in the 1990s was 
undermined by serious underlying weaknesses including a dysfunctional educational 
system, poor investment in technology, inadequate spending on research and 
development, soaring energy costs, and pervasive corruption. 
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Against this backdrop, it could be argued that South Africa has a great deal to learn 
from the Mexican experience. It is necessary that the South African government 
desist from placing a disproportionate emphasis on the export-oriented growth to the 
detriment of other critical aspects of its national development strategy. Moreover, 
there's a need to discard the assumption entertained by some decision-makers that 
trade liberalisation leads seamlessly to economic growth. 627 It was clarified in the 
introductory chapter that there is no direct correlation between trade liberalisation and 
economic growth. Trade policy does not generate economic growth, but it can create 
an enabling environment for it to occur, for example by promoting an efficient 
allocation of economic resources and playing a supportive role during stabilisation 
through the mobilisation of resources for the government. Trade liberalisation, 
therefore, cannot be seen in isolation from other policies: fostering economic growth 
requires an integrated strategy that locates trade policy in a wider development 
context that includes other pillars of industrial policy such as investment policy, 
entrepreneurship development policy, training and development policy, technology 
policy, research and development policy. The South African state has a critical role to 
play in ensuring that South Africa's productive capabilities and material resources are 
deployed to develop the national economy in an integrated fashion. It also has a 
responsibility to protect its citizens against the negative effects of economic change 
and globalisation. 628 
Chapter 5 has highlighted the trade reforms that have been carried out by the South 
African state to restructure South Africa's previously isolated economy and foster the 
development of an export-led manufacturing economy. It has been asserted that trade 
627 This was a general impression formed by the author during the course of interviews with some 
government trade officials. 
628 Interview with Ben Turok, Cape Town, 11 April 2003. 
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policy in South Africa has basically mirrored economic changes introduced by the 
ANC government since 1994, designed to expose the economy to external 
competition and reverse decades of economic incompetence. Additionally, 
reforms have been geared at changing the structure of national institutions and 
industries to promote domestic economic adjustment. The establishment of 
corporatist institutions (centred around NEDLAC) has served to facilitate social 
bargaining between the state, capital and labour over trade policy. Even so, the thesis 
has cautioned against the risk of tripartism in South Africa disintegrating for a number 
of reasons, including the problem of social cleavages induced by elite-pacting, the 
mounting tensions within the labour movement over the direction of NEDLAC, and 
the sluggish pace of uniting the previously racially segregated business associations in 
South Africa. 
In addition to NEDLAC, economic changes have resulted in the transformed 
institutional arrangements for trade policy-making in South Africa led by the DTI. 
But the study has drawn attention to the mounting pressure on the DTI to engage with 
ever expanding global, regional and bilateral trade negotiations. South Africa's 
trade bureaucracy has evolved from being poorly organised, inadequately staffed, 
ineffective and secretive to becoming relatively competent, professional and 
accountable. However, there is no disguising the reality that South Africa's trade 
negotiation resources are overstretched. South Africa has to shore up its human, 
technical and institutional resources if it is to keep up with its growing diplomatic 
commitments. If adequate resources are not funnelled into strengthening the DTI's 
technical resources in accordance with its growing negotiations agenda, the South 
African government will in future struggle to meet its trade liberalisation obligations. 
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Specifically, there is a need for the DTI and the DFA to abandon their debilitating turf 
battles and strive for qualitatively better coordination and cooperation to ensure 
effective implementation of South Africa's foreign economic policy. 629 For their 
part, organised business and the labour sector need to accord higher priority to South 
Africa's trade negotiation agenda and work closely with government and the national 
legislature to strengthen the country's economic diplomacy regionally and globally. 
This will require, for example, greater investment in trade policy research capacity 
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which can be aligned with the government's existing resources. 
It was observed in Chapter 6 that the model of developmental integration that the 
SADC had set out to pursue in 1992 has yielded insignificant outcomes in the SADC 
context: although there has been greater regional integration and co-operation, this has 
advanced without reference to the principles of balance, equity and mutual benefit 
that had originally inspired the regional integration enterprise. On the contrary, the 
mounting support for the classical model of economic integration in the 
regionalisation discourse in recent years has raised doubts as to whether the SADC 
can effectively tackle the social dislocations caused by polarised regional growth. 
Moreover, trade tensions between South Africa and Zimbabwe over the former's 
protectionist policies towards the latter's clothing and textile imports have illustrated 
the difficulties of integrating economies at different levels of development. These 
challenges must be addressed if the SADC is to reduce regional economic polarisation 
and manage the destructive aspects of economic globalisation. 
629 Interview with Ian Basson, Pretoria, 14 April 2003. 
630 Draper, "South African Business, " p. 7. 
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The thesis has underlined South Africa's pivotal role in the regional integration 
process. South Africa has not only used its trade policy as a foreign policy 
mechanism to normalise political relations with neighbouring countries in the 
Southern African region, it has deployed it to pursue its hegemonic ambitions and to 
consolidate regional trading arrangements as stepping-stones towards the 
incorporation of Southern Africa into the global economy. However, South Africa 
can fulfil its hegemonic regional ambitions only if it acts in a manner that does not 
undermine the cohesion of both the SACU and the SADC. The study has highlighted 
that although South Africa's hegemonic designs appear to have found greater 
accommodation within the SACU, it has been far less effectual in exercising 
leadership over the SADC. In particular, the failure of South Africa's `quiet 
diplomacy' in Zimbabwe has made a mockery of its leadership credentials in the 
SADC region and underscored starkly the significant limits to what even a regional 
powerhouse such as South Africa can accomplish in its regional neighbourhood. The 
degree to which South Africa can fulfil its leadership aspirations in Southern Africa 
will reside ultimately with how adroitly the country can reconcile its regional 
aspirations with its domestic and international pressures. 
We also saw in Chapter 6 that South African policymakers have actively encouraged 
the country's re-incorporation into the global economy and campaigned for a more 
substantial role for developing nations in moulding multilateral economic governance, 
particularly in relation to the WTO. As its role in the G20+ has testified, South 
Africa has become a key diplomatic player in the global trade system in the last 
decade, respected by developed and developing countries alike. 63' This thesis has 
"'See `Seeking a friend in South Africa, ' The Economist 21" February 2004. 
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maintained that South Africa's fortunes in the multilateral system will be influenced 
not only by how it implements its global trade strategy but also by the future 
trajectory of the contemporary system of economic multilateralism. Contemporary 
multilateralism is in a serious crisis. The success of the post-1945 international 
economic order has depended on American leadership and its cooperation with the 
major West European powers through multilateral institutions. This relationship 
propelled the development, albeit unevenly, of an open international economy that has 
underpinned the global order for over five decades. This multilateral system has 
undergirded progressive trade liberalisation under the GATT and its successor after 
1995, the WTO. The potential collapse of the WTO imperils the future of 
multilateralism, with dire consequences for small trading nations such as South 
Africa. 
It is for this reason that in Chapter 7 the study has argued that resuscitating the stalled 
Doha negotiations has become an urgent priority. The US and the EU have to take 
the lead in this respect and spell out how they intend to reform their highly 
protectionist agricultural policies. The commitments made at the WTO General 
Council meeting in August 2004 by the EU and the US respectively to terminate 
export subsidies as well as to curtail food aid and export credit programmes have 
restored impetus to the WTO. Combined with the decision of the EU after Cancun to 
remove investment and competition policy from the multilateral agenda - though it 
now wants these issues to be addressed within the context of a plurilateral agreement 
(voluntary code) - these commitments augur well for the rejuvenation of the Doha 
negotiations. The next important step the US and the EU need to take is to signal 
that they also intend to make progress on the elimination of import barriers and 
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domestic subsidies. Equally, Japan and South Korea should abandon their demand to 
include the "Singapore issues" in the multilateral talks. Moreover, together with 
Norway and Switzerland, they should show some flexibility on the issue of 
agricultural market access. The larger, middle-income developing countries such as 
Brazil, India and South Africa ought to recognise that the goal of ambitious 
agricultural reform cannot be attained without them making reasonable commitments 
on non-agricultural market access. Furthermore, they should eliminate their trade 
barriers to products from the least developed countries. Making these adjustments 
will require tough political decisions on the part of all the key payers. These are 
essential to restoring credibility to the multilateral trading system. 
It was contended in Chapter 7 that South Africa has sought to carve a role for itself as 
facilitator and broker in the Doha trade negotiations. Its negotiating stance in the DR 
has been based on the notion that it seeks to safeguard the interests of developing 
nations, particularly African countries, while ensuring that its interests as a trading 
nation are not neglected. The thesis has highlighted South Africa's ambivalent and 
edgy position in the Doha trade negotiations, especially in respect to its relationship 
with other African countries organised under the auspices of the AGW. Although in 
the Cancun ministerial meeting South Africa's negotiating posture tilted towards that 
of the AGW - avowing South Africa's commitment to continental solidarity - its role 
within the AGW is likely to remain inconsequential. South Africa's global 
aspirations suggest that the country is likely to have more in common with other 
larger developing countries such as India and Brazil; the IBSA initiative attests to this 
direction in South Africa's multilateral diplomacy. Though this diplomatic 
positioning is understandable, it must not detract from the overriding importance of 
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greater intra-regional economic integration across Africa. For regional integration 
represents the best vehicle through which African countries can overcome their 
structural weaknesses - including political disintegration, tiny intra-regional markets 
and narrow resource bases - and advance their integration into the global economy. 
2. The Contribution to the Study of IPE 
This study has sought to make two contributions to the IPE field of inquiry. A major 
contribution of this thesis to IPE has been to throw light on the inadequacies of the 
conventional accounts of trade policy reform in the post-apartheid era. Anchored in 
the neo-classical tradition, these analyses have advanced a solely economic rationale 
to explain the trade policy choices made by the ANC government since 1994. The 
thesis has maintained that, far more than these accounts allow, international and 
domestic political economy considerations have also played a central part in the ANC 
governments' calculations to embark upon trade reform to the degree it has. In 
particular, the thesis has sought to repudiate these economic explanations of South 
African trade reform for failing to into incorporate into their analyses critical factors 
such as the role of power in the world economy, the dynamic interaction between 
domestic and international politics, the impact of globalisation on national policies 
and domestic economies, and the effects of domestic politics on strategics and 
outcomes. Consequently, as the study has shown, these explanations arc vulnerable 
on theoretical grounds. 
In advancing this contention, this thesis situated itself within the `eclectic approach' 
derived from the 'new political economy' model. The strength of the new political 
economy paradigm lies with its determination to transcend the shortcomings of the 
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analytical tools and methods deployed in traditional social sciences. "" First, it 
concedes that traditional social science instruments cannot deal adequately with the 
challenges presented by globalisation, especially the role that globalisation has played 
in shattering the distinction between the domestic and the international as well as the 
political and the economic. Second, its intellectual spirit is multi-disciplinary and 
theoretical but it also embedded in history. Third, its methodology discards erstwhile 
dichotomies - between agency and structure as well as between states and markets - 
that ruptured classical political economy into discrete disciplines. Fourth, it is driven 
by a progressive normative agenda that is preoccupied with questions of social 
equality and justice in a globalising world economy. 
633 Moreover, the new political 
economy paradigm recognises the prominence of the notion of power in the global 
political economy, especially the role that power plays in producing winners and 
losers in the global system. 634 
To sum up, the new political economy paradigm on which the analytical framework 
for this research is based departs from three assumptions. First, it maintains that in 
studying international political economy the political and economic spheres cannot be 
separated in any significant way. Second, while economists conceive of the market as 
an efficient mechanism for processing information to arrive at a market clearing price, 
the new political economy views it as an important part of the social and political 
conditions in which it is embedded. Third, it asserts that there is a close connection 
between domestic and international levels of analysis. Additionally, the new political 
economy has illuminated the notion of structural power in the global order, 
632 Higgott and Payne, The New Political Economy, pp. ix-xvi. 633 Ibid 
634 See Strange, States and Markets, especially pp. 45-138. 
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concentrating in particular on how the distribution of that power determines the 
relationship between authority and market 635 
The second contribution the thesis has attempted to make has been to the 
understanding of the IPE of the South. It was intimated in Chapter 1 that for a great 
part of the post-war war era developing maintained a suspicious posture towards the 
LIEO. To a degree, this had to do with the ISI policies that they implemented in the 
1950s and 1960s, which were based on the post-war arguments of export pessimism 
and infant industry protection. South Africa was no exception. Yet while developing 
countries were reticent participants in consecutive GATT negotiating rounds, their 
involvement in the international trade system intensified significantly in later decades. 
A number of factors accounted for this change of position, including the realisation 
that special and differential treatment granted to poor countries in the mid-1980s had 
not improve their economic position markedly, the rise of East Asia's NICs which 
highlighted growing economic differentiation among developing countries, and 
increased pressure imposed by the IFIs on countries pursuing inward-looking trade 
strategies. Through the national lens of South Africa, this thesis has tried to shed light 
on the experiences of countries of the South in the WTO system against the backdrop 
of heightened economic globalisation and a rapidly changing global trade regime. 
3. Future Research Agenda 
A key aim of this thesis has been to sketch a systematic and detailed analysis of the 
political economy of South African trade policy in the post-apartheid era. In this 
study trade policy has been defined in conventional terms: a microeconomic policy 
635 Underhill, "Introduction: Conceptualising the Global Order, " p. 5. 
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that is a vital part of a wider industrial policy that encompasses other microeconomic 
policies such as technology policy and research and development policy (see 
Introduction). It was pointed out, however, that this narrow definitional 
interpretation is not oblivious to the fact that in contemporary times both trade policy 
and industrial policy have become so intertwined that drawing distinctions between 
the two has become almost impossible. This is unquestionably the case with South 
Africa. For a semi-peripheral state such as South Africa requires more than a trade 
policy to attain its long-term economic ambitions: it needs an integrated industrial 
strategy to undergird trade policy in a broader national developmental context. The 
research has been responsive, therefore, to the fact that in the South African context 
no straightforward distinctions can be drawn between trade policy and industrial 
policy. For reasons of pragmatism and manageability however the thesis has focused 
only on areas of trade policy directly relevant to this research project. The study does 
not, therefore, represent the final word on South African trade policy. 
Two issues require further consideration. The first is the relationship between South 
Africa's trade policy and the government's integrated manufacturing strategy alluded 
to Chapter 5. Among other things, the strategy is designed to stimulate 
competitiveness, create a value-added export-oriented manufacturing economy and 
increase employment. To this end, the South African state has provided generic 
support measures to designated industrial sectors with a view to fostering their 
international competitiveness, including export support, investment support, quality 
improvement, strategy development, research and development as well as targeted 
empowerment and small business development programmes. Greater attention has 
been focused on eight industrial sectors - agriculture, tourism, information and 
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communication technologies, cultural industries and export sectors, clothing and 
textiles, automobiles, agro-processing and chemicals - and in each of these groups 
specific supply-side programmes have been developed to enable them to compete 
internationally. 
The success of the manufacturing strategy has been predicated on five preconditions: 
a sustainable growth-oriented macroeconomy; continued expansion of global trade; 
capacity within the economy to meet basic needs and expand exports; increased levels 
of savings and investment; and capacity in the state to lead and act effectively. 636 
Whilst the integrated manufacturing strategy represents a significant improvement on 
its initial discussion document, several questions remain unanswered. First, 
policymakers have argued that for the integrated manufacturing strategy to succeed, 
South African industry must pursue a balanced approach to domestic and foreign 
markets, and ensure improved equity and employment. There are grounds to 
question whether these goals can be achieved given industry's excessive emphasis on 
exports as the key indicator of economic outputs and outcomes. To what extent do 
these outputs and outcomes reflect an understanding of the paramount challenges 
facing the South African economy - low growth; poverty; and social inequality? 
Second, the integrated strategy is preponderantly focused on the manufacturing sector 
to the exclusion of other sectors? Why is this case? What accounts for the apparent 
discontinuity between the analysis of the deep structural problems of the South 
African economy, and the kinds of policy measures which he strategy tends to 
concentrate on? Also, what role can the service sector - which accounts for 54 
percent of South Africa's GDP - play in generating employment? 
636 The Department of Trade and Industry, Accelerating Growth and Development, p. 5 
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The second issue that deserves additional attention is South Africa's future role in the 
G20+ and the IBSA Dialogue Forum. The formation of the G20+ was undoubtedly 
a significant development in the history of the international trade system. Not only 
did the coalition emerge as a credible negotiating force, its steadfastness in the face of 
repeated attempts by the US and the EU to break its unity represented a crucial 
political victory for the developing world. But what does the future hold for the 
G20+? Can the resoluteness and unity forged by developing nations in Cancun 
endure? The experience of the G77 developing countries provides a good case study 
of the difficulties of sustaining coalition diplomacy. An array of factors - including 
national economic self-interest, intra-group political dynamics, and developed country 
pressure and arm-twisting - undermined the long-term unity and cohesion of the 
G77.637 Already some Central American countries Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru and 
Colombia have withdrawn from the coalition. A question for investigation is how 
will this realignment of forces affect the future of the G20+ and South Africa's 
position in it? As outlined in Chapter 6, South Africa has promoted strategic 
cooperation with designated developing nations - mainly India and Brazil - with a 
view to challenging the structural imbalances of the contemporary global order and 
agitating for a freer and fairer global trade system. It is still too early to offer a 
considered and comprehensive assessment of how the IBSA alliance is likely to 
unfurl. 
The IBSA Dialogue Forum was formed to coordinate the three countries' strategies 
around issues of trade, health, defence and global governance. Their collective 
637 For a detailed discussion of these factors see Marc Williams, Third World Cooperation - The Group 
of 77 in UNCTAD (London: Pinter, 1991)., pp. 77-106. 
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potential as a diplomatic counterweight to the domination of global economic 
governance institutions was demonstrated in the conspicuous roles they played as 
leading members of the G20+ in Cancun. However, given that this putative alliance 
is still in its formative phase, it raises a number of questions. Will these countries be 
able to maintain in the long-run a balance between the imperative of collective 
cooperation and their positions as competitors for export share in developed country 
markets? How will they deal with concerns raised by other developing countries that 
IBSA is an exclusionary group? Can South Africa effectively dispel suspicions 
among other African countries that its participation in the three-way alliance implies a 
lack of commitment to Africa? How does South Africa intend to bridge the chasm 
that may arise between itself and other African countries as a consequence of its 
involvement in the IBSA Dialogue Forum? Is South Africa's role in this coalition 
that of a policy leader or is it merely that of a policy taker? These issues constitute an 
agenda for future research. 
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Appendix A: List of Interviewees 
Tshediso Matona Pretoria, 7/4/02 
Deputy Director-General - International Trade 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Gerrit Bryl Pretoria, 14/4/03 
Former Acting Director-General 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Faizel Ismail Geneva, 13/3/03 
South African Ambassador to the WTO 
Francis Moloi Pretoria, 10/4/03 
Director - Trade Negotiations 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Pankie Matomela Pretoria, 5/4/02 
Director - Executive Management Unit 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Moosa Ebrahim Pretoria, 5/4/02 
Chief of Staff 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Alan Hirsch Pretoria, 5/4/02 
Deputy Chief Economist 
Department of Trade Industry 
Willem Smallberger Pretoria, 9/4/03 
Deputy Director- European Desk 
Department of Trade and Industry 
James Lennox Johannesburg, 9/4/02 
Chief Executive 
South African Chamber of Business 
Neil Cole Pretoria, 6/4/02 Director 
Department of Land and Agriculture 
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Philip Dexter Johannesburg, 9/4/02 
Executive Director 
National Economic Development and Labour Council 
Fiona Tregena Cape Town, 26/3/02 
Researcher - Trade Policy 
Congress of South African Trade Unions 
Rob Davies Cape Town, 27/3/02 
Chaiperson 
Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry 
Kent Durr Cape Town, 11/4/03 
Former Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry 
Ben Turok, Cape Town, 11/4/03 
Member of Parliament, ANC 
Maika Oshikawa Geneva, 20/9/02 
Economic Affairs Officer - Technical Cooperation 
World Trade Organisation 
Katie Waters Geneva, 15/6/03 
Office of the Director General 
World Trade Organisation 
Chiedu Osakwe Geneva, 15/6/03 
Office of the Director General 
World Trade Organisation 
Tapia Voon Geneva, 15/6/03 
Appellate Body Secretariat 
World Trade Organisation 
Ahmed Ndyeshobola Brussels, 8/7/03 
Member of the ACP Secretariat 
Rashad Cassim Johannesburg, 9/4/02 
Chief Executive Officer 
Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies 
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Peter Draper Pretoria, 9/4/03 
Programme Manager- Development Through Trade 
South African Institute for International Affairs 
Ian Basson Pretoria, 14/4/03 
Director - Policy, Research and Analysis 
Department of Foreign Affairs 
Mohseen Moosa Pretoria, 15/4/03 
Chairperson 
Select Committee on Economic Affairs 
Mpho Leseka Geneva, 13/6/03 
Economic Affairs Officer 
South African Mission to the WTO 
Zingisa Mavuso Geneva, 13/6/03 
Economic Affairs Officer 
South African Mission t the WTO 
Anthony Black Cape Town, 28/3/03 
Professor of Economics 
University of Cape Town 
Derick Moyo Pretoria, 14/4/03 
South African Consul-General 
Brazil 
Thabo Mokwena Pretoria, 14/4/03 
Chief Executive 
South African Local Government Association 
Kennedy Mbekeani London, 7/7/04 
Director 
Southern African Trade Research Network 
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Appendix B: NEDLAC Structure 
NEDLAC Structure 
EXCO 
MANCO 
Section77 Finance Labour Public Development 
Standing Co. Committee Market Finance 
Trade & Demarcation 
Industry Standing 
Technical & Fund for 
Sectoral Research 
Finance Labour Public Development Committee Market Finance 
Source: Nedlac Annual Report, 2000/01 
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